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This paper investigates the emergence of new successful export activities in 
Brazil through the analysis of four industry case studies: furniture, swimwear, 
soybeans and grapes. Extensive secondary data research was done to study 
industries’ historical development and to understand the elements that affect the 
discovery of new export-oriented activities and their diffusion in the economy. 
Detailed analysis was carried out to identify the role of public sector in the 
discovery and diffusion process, if any. Comparison of the four experiences show 
different models of diffusion and demonstrate how barriers to discovery, 
spillovers and institutions responses varied dramatically among the cases. The 
paper tries to extract some general conclusions concerning the role of pioneer 
firms, external actors and public sector institutions. Some lessons learned are 
presented aiming to help policymakers to design positive policy interventions in 
Latin America countries. 
 
 
                                                 
* This paper was undertaken as part of the Latin American and Caribbean Research Network project “The 
Emergence of New Successful Export Activities in Latin America.”   10
Introduction 
 
1. Theoretical Framework 
 
Recent contributions from the economics literature (Hausmann and Rodrik, 2003; Hausmann, 
Pritchett, and Rodrik, 2005; Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik, 2005) have stressed the importance 
of structural change, and how the “discovery” of new export activities by firms could be 
associated to high growth episodes. From this stream of literature derives a new set of intriguing 
research questions and hypotheses, concerning the ways by which firms in an emerging market 
start exporting new varieties of products, and the implications to public policymakers and 
countries’ economic development. Bringing up those unsolved challenges, Hausmann, Pritchett 
and Rodrik (2005) concluded, using a cross-country growth analysis, that growth accelerations 
seemed to be mostly driven by idiosyncratic reasons.  
In another work, Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2005) stated that, although country 
endowments perform an important role, these were far from being the only key factor in 
determining what a country would produce and export. The authors also emphasized that not all 
goods had the same impact on economic performance, but producing certain goods could lead to 
higher economic growth than others. Therefore, “government policy has a potentially important 
positive role to play in shaping the production structure” (p.2). 
Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) advocated the existence of a significant element of 
uncertainty at a disaggregated level as to what a country is “good” at producing, and decided to 
investigate this specific issue, which they believed could not be appropriately analyzed through 
neoclassical models of trade and economic growth, especially when related to less favored 
economies. They stated: 
 
 We emphasize that this is a key challenge in the process of transformation into a modern 
economy. Neither economic theory nor management science is of much help in helping 
entrepreneurs (or the state) choose appropriate investments among the full range of 
modern-sector activities, of which there could be tens of thousands, once one moves 
beyond broad categories such as “labor-intensive products” or “natural-resource based 
products”. Yet making the right investment decisions is key to future growth, as it 
determines the pattern of specialization. In these circumstances, there is great social 
value to discovering that cut flowers, soccer balls, or computer software can be produced 
at low cost, because this knowledge can orient the investments of other entrepreneurs. 
But the initial entrepreneur who makes the “discovery” can capture only a small part of 
the social value that his knowledge generates…. Consequently, entrepreneurship of this 
type – learning what can be produced – will typically be undersupplied, and economic 
transformation delayed” (p.605). 
 
In fact, these authors contradicted the belief that, in the case of developing countries, 
production functions of all existing goods are common knowledge, and thoroughly discuss 
evidence associated to the adversities encountered when importing technology off-the-shelf. 
From their point of view, “there is really no such thing as off-the-shelf technology” (2003, p. 
624), since to be successful, imported technology requires careful and substantial local 
adaptation, what consequently demands substantial domestic experimentation.    11
Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2005), based on what Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) 
called “cost discovery”, affirmed that an entrepreneur engaged in the production of a certain 
good for the first time in a developing economy would necessarily encounter substantial cost 
uncertainty, sentencing:  
 
“If the project is successful, other entrepreneurs learn that the product in question can be 
profitably produced and emulate the incumbent. In this way, the returns to the pioneer 
investor’s cost discovery become socialized. If the incumbent ends up with failure, on the 
other hand, the losses remain private. This knowledge externality implies that investment 
levels in cost discovery are sub-optimal unless the industry or the government find some 
way in which the externality can be internalized” (p.2). 
 
Indeed, Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) reinforced that once the initial difficulties 
associated to adjusting imported technology are tamed by the pioneers, imitators may come 
along almost immediately, washing away first movers’ profits. 
Another interesting assumption brought up by Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) is that 
potential entrepreneurs in developing countries could be compared to potential innovators in 
developed countries, as the returns on investments demanded to learn what a country is good at 
producing could not be entirely appropriated. Nonetheless, they stressed that  
 
“the policy environments facing the ‘innovators’ in the two settings are quite different. 
Typically, the intellectual property regime protects discoverers of new goods through the 
issuance of temporary monopolies, i.e., patents. But the investor in the developing 
country who figures out that an existing good can be produced profitably at home does 
not normally get such protection, no matter how high the social return” (p.606).  
 
The authors concluded that free entry by competitors worsens even more the situation 
faced by potential entrepreneurs in developing countries. Public policymakers should thus be 
aware of such distortions, starting by encouraging entrepreneurship in new activities but later 
letting unproductive firms and sectors fail. 
Concerning the diffusion process, the literature is plenty of examples to clarify its pattern. 
One major mechanism of diffusion is the turnover of skilled employees who have acquired the 
necessary expertise on the job. In fact, loosing such employees to later movers proved to be one 
of the most relevant competitive concerns faced by the pioneers, as indicated by Hausmann and 
Rodrik (2003). Entrepreneurial spin-offs are another type of diffusion mechanism, although they 
are sometimes described in the literature as a sort of parasites or as a brain-drain from parent 
firms (Ferreira, Tavares, and Hesterly, 2006). Geographic proximity may also play a major role 
in stimulating the development of interactions among players in a cluster, and to accelerate 
diffusion. These “systemic interactions” – interactions among firms, or between firms and 
government agencies, universities, research centers, and other institutions – are often the motor 
of innovation, facilitating the discovery and the diffusion process (Iammavarino, Sanna-
Randaccio, and Savona, 2006).  
  This study is part of a larger research project supported by the Interamerican 
Development Bank. The aim of this research effort is to contribute to the understanding of the 
drivers of export growth. The theoretical framework briefly summarized leads to the following 
research issues that were examined in this paper in four economic sectors:   12
 
•  The characteristics of the first mover and the challenges it faced. 
 
•  The characteristics of imitating firms and the diffusion process, including the channels 
and the magnitude of spillovers. 
 




2. Overview of Brazil’s Export Performance 
 
Brazil’s dimensions, both in terms of size and population, place the country as a regional leader 
and one of the main economic powers of Latin America, as well as one of the leading emerging 
economies in the world. Yet these dimensions do not reflect the country’s presence in 
international trade, which is quite limited: Brazil is responsible for only 0.9% of the world’s 
international trade
1.   
Up to the early nineties, Brazil was a closed economy. Economic liberalization in the 
early 1990s drastically reduced Brazilian import tariffs and exposed the economy to international 
competition. Brazilian firms accustomed to a highly protected market were obliged to adapt their 
processes and reduce their costs in order to remain competitive. New investments were made and 
firms increased their productivity. 
The liberalization of the trade regime combined with a tight monetary policy and a fixed 
exchange rate adopted in 1994 to lower inflation had severe impacts on Brazil’s trade balance. 
Only after 1999, when successive international shocks and pressure upon the country’s 
international reserves led Brazil to abandon its fixed exchange rate for a flexible one, did the 
situation started to change. In the wake of this devaluation, more Brazilian firms began looking 
at external markets and developing international business strategies. In 2002, the year that 
brought leftist President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva to power, a new monetary crisis depreciated 
the exchange rate by 53% over a 12-month period, giving even more stimulus to Brazilian 
exports. In 2003, Brazil achieved its first trade surplus since 1992 and export records have been 
successively broken ever since.  
  The economic scenario of the 1990s – high interest rates, an overvalued exchanged rate, 
increased competitiveness and privatization – affected each economic sector in a different 
manner. The impact of these factors on each sector depended upon the prevailing capital-
production relationship, the elasticity of exports and imports, the greater or lesser relevance of 
capital opportunity costs per inversion project and the competitive advantages acquired by 
companies in each of the various sectors. In the cases in which these factors combined to 
generate long term perspectives, companies became more profitable, the industry became more 
competitive and the export potential greater (Miranda, 2001). Thus, some sectors became success 
cases and have obtained high growth rates in the international market: the soybean complex, 
beef, chicken, steel, aircraft, automobiles and auto parts are good examples of such sectors. 
                                                 
1World Trade Organization, base year 2004   13
A preliminary analysis of goods and merchandise data points to the growth of the export 
base. In 1989, Brazil exported 4,897 types of products (HS 8 digits
2), while in 2005 this number 
had increased to 7,242, representing a growth of 2.5% per year and thereby suggesting the 
existence of numerous discoveries. 
A careful analysis of Brazilian export data shows that the country exports a significantly 
diversified range of products. Brazil sells agricultural products (soybeans, fruit, sugar, coffee), 
chemical products, pharmaceutical products, aircraft, automobiles, home appliances, etc. (Table 
1). There are almost 10,000 different products exported by more than 15,000 companies. In 
addition, service sector exports have had significant growth in such areas as financial services, 




Ranking of Brazilian Exports 
   Commodities  Exports in 2004 (US$ Billion)  % of Total Brazilian Exports 
1  Vehicles and Auto Parts  10,583  11.0 
2  Soybeans  10,039  10.4 
3  Iron and Steel  7,062  7.3 
4  Ores  5,177  5.4 
5  Oil  4,295  4.4 
6  Aircraft  3,268  3.4 
7  Chemicals  3,169  3.3 
8  Machinery and Equipment  3,107  3.2 
9  Pulp and Paper  2,908  3.0 
10  Poultry  2,705  2.8 
11  Sugar  2,639  2.7 
12  Wood  2,451  2.5 
13  Beef  2,409  2.5 
14  Coffee  2,024  2.0 
15  Footwear  1,898  2.0 
16  Aluminum  1,778  1.8 
17  Telephone Equipment  1,564  1.6 
18  Plastics  1,514  1.6 
19  Textiles  1,445  1.5 
20  Tobacco  1,38  1.4 
21  Leather  1,29  1.3 
22  Electrical Equipment  1,137  1.2 
23  Orange Juice  1,057  1.0 
24  Pumps an Compressors  1,026  1.0 
25  Furniture  1,002  1.0 
26  Pork  744  0.8 
27  Stone  647  0.7 
28  Corn  597  0.6 
29  Alcohol  461  0.5 
30  Gold  412  0.4 
31  Cotton  406  0.4 
32  Shrimps  391  0.4 
33  Refrigerators  362  0.4 
34  Ceramics  342  0.3 
                                                 
2 Brazil’s adoption of the HS system meant a reduction in the number of classified products from 13,179 to 9,386. As a result, counting of the 
number of the products exported in 1989 based on the NBM classification results in a greater number of products exported that year: 7,392.   14
35  Pharmaceuticals  270  0.3 
36  Glass  266  0.3 
37  IT Equipment  237  0.2 
38  Fertilizers  223  0.2 
39  Fruit  220  0.2 
40  Motorcycles  208  0.2 
41  Nuts  207  0.2 
42  Wheat  207  0.2 
43  Cocoa  193  0.2 
44  Perfume Products  189  0.2 
45  Cooper  187  0.2 
46  Rubber  177  0.2 
47  Tools  171  0.2 
48  Candy  166  0.2 
49  Precious Stones and Jewelry  165  0.2 
50  Chocolate  121  0.1 







Discription  US$ Million 2005 Annual Average  Standard Growth 
Services Revenue  16,095 620  10%
   Professional, technical and business services (mail)  3 0  22%
  
Professional, technical and business services 
(liberal professional)  455 10  21%
   International travels (government travels)  28 1  21%
   International travels (credit card)  2,01 99  19%
  
Professional, technical and business services 
(project execution)  8 0  18%
  
Professional, technical and business services 
(engineering and architectural)  3,372 154  17%
   Computing and information technology  88 3  17%
   Government  1,194 56  16%
  
Professional, technical and business services 
(professional athlete fee)  158 8  15%
   Equipment rental  78 5  15%
  
People to people, culture and recreation - 
Audiovisual  16 1  15%
   Culture and Sporting Events  40 2  14%
  
Professional, technical and business services 
(publicity)  116 9  14%
   Communication  239 13  13%
  
Professional, technical and business services 
(participation in trade fairs and exhibitions)  17 1  13%
   International travels (health)  18 1  13%
  
Professional, technical and business services 
(Instalation/maintenence of offices and real state)  1,906 108  12%
   Royalties and licenses  102 7  12%
   Construction  8 2  11%  15
  
International travels (educational, cultural and sport 
reasons)  7 0  9%
   Financial services  507 23  9%
   Trade related  606 25  8%
   International travels (tourism)  1,668 38  4%
   Insurance  134 5  3%
   Transports  3,186 47  3%
   International travels (business)  40 0  0%
    Source: Brazilian Central Bank 
 
 
Brazil has positioned itself among the world leaders in some sectors. Agribusiness in Brazil 
makes up to half of total exports, corresponding to approximately 30% of the Gross National 
Product, and employs 37% of the economically active population in the country (Jank et al, 
2005). Brazil is the world leader in the sugar industry and the largest coffee and orange juice 
producer; it is also the main exporter of tobacco, soybean, and beef; and one of the leading 
exporters of shrimp.
3 It also has achieved a prominent position in certain industrial sectors. For 
example, it produces almost 50% of the global short-ranged jet market, due to the operations of 
EMBRAER. 
Nevertheless, qualitative improvements in the range of exports are still necessary. Despite the 
fact that historical series of exports shows a clear growth trend and the substitution of primary 
products by manufactured ones, Brazilian performance has been inferior when compared to the 
global average.  
 
Graph 1 



































































































TOTAL MANUFACTURED BASIC SEMI-MANUFACTURED
 
Source: Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Commerce 
                                                 
3 Analysis: Foreign Commerce Yearbook, 2005 – 2006”, from Análise Editorial   16
 
 
Only 40.9% of Brazilian exports grew at a rate equal to or higher than that of global exports and 
of these, only 20.9% were products of medium-high and high technology (Miranda, 2001). The 
strong dependence on low and medium-low technology products makes low price an important 
factor in the competitiveness of Brazilian products. As a result, the country’s exports can be 
easily impacted by currency variations and by the entrance of new competitors with a low-cost 
positioning. This is demonstrated by the decline of Brazilian participation in the U.S. and 
European markets, which has fallen almost 10 points in the last three years. This slack has almost 
certainly been taken up by countries such as China and India, whose exports to the United States 
and the European Union have grown more than Brazilian exports in the same period. Finally, the 
analysis of Brazilian export performance shows a scenario of strong concentration, with around 
75% of total national exports being concentrated in little more than 250 companies.
4  
 
Another important aspect directly related to the performance of national export companies is the 
low level of internationalization of these companies. A large number of them still operate solely 




The research method used was industry case studies. The first step consisted of the selection of 
the cases to be studied. The second step was data collection, using both secondary sources and 
personal interviews, and analysis. 
 
 
3.1. Case Selection 
 
The selection of sectors to be analyzed was performed in two phases. First, production and 
exportation data was collected and analyzed for each sector. Following this step and using a list 
of potential sectors, specialists were interviewed in order to discuss and identify products or 
sectors that could serve as relevant case studies. 
 
 
Analysis of Exporting Data 
 
The best option for identifying products that were not produced in Brazil 20 years ago, but which 
are today are considered major exports is to analyze domestic production information and cross 
reference that with available data on exports. However, because data on industrial production is 
not itemized in such a way as to allow the identification of new products, our selection process 
must primarily rely upon an analysis of export data. 
 
 
                                                 
4 Analysis: Foreign Commerce Yearbook, 2005 – 2006”, from Análise Editorial   17
Data on the export of merchandise and commodities 
 
Information on the export of merchandise and commodities is made available to the public on the 
internet through the Foreign Trade Office (SECEX). SECEX data is released on a monthly basis 
and is separated by state of origin, country of destination and type of product, using an 8-digit 
code in accordance with the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS). 
Records were only digitalized in 1989, making it possible to build a database for products 
exported from the country between 1989 and 2005. The result is a usable database comprising 
9,605 product types tracked over a 17-year period. 
 
The source of official data also contains the name of export companies, addresses, and the 
amounts exported by each one. Unfortunately, the complete database is not available to the 
public. When information on companies is made available, products exported are not reported, 
making it impossible to build a longitudinal sequence, which contains both the values exported 
and the companies exporting. As a result, our analysis was limited to an analysis of products. 
 
According to Klinger & Lederman (2004), the level of separation to be used in the analysis is not 
an obvious choice.  Greater separation allows for a more specific study of products by which 
discoveries can be confirmed and uncertainties cleared up.  On the other hand, given an 8-digit 
classification, differences in products may not be relevant in terms of production and difficulty 
of discovery. We therefore decided to an intermediate position and opted to analyze data using 
six digits HS classification.  
 
The six-digit data base contains 5,280 products, the majority of which belong to sectors that 
enjoy considerable consolidation in the country. It was therefore necessary to apply some filters 
in order to select more interesting products.  
 
•  Filter 1 – Selection of products with an average growth greater than the total of the 
sequence - The proposal request stated that research should focus on cases which “have 
recently emerged and experienced strong growth, going from basically zero to becoming 
a ‘major’ export”. Therefore, the first filter applied to the exportation base is the average 
growth of the sequence for each of the 5,280 products. Based on the results of this initial 
filter, products with low levels of growth were then eliminated. Due to the presence of a 
large number of zeros throughout the sequence, the angular coefficient of the sequence's 
variation was used as a growth indicator, standardized by an average value of 17 years. 
Based on this number, all products that had an average growth which was less than the 
total growth of the sequence (7%) were eliminated. After the implementation of Filter 1, 
2,830 products were eliminated and 2,450 potential products remained. 
 
•  Filter 2 – Elimination of products with exports totaling less than US$ 100 million in 2005 
(0,085% of Brazilian exports in 2005) - Another reference made in the proposal was that 
the cases selected should currently be considered a major export product. While it does 
not specify what, exactly, a "major" export is, the filter is intended to eliminate products 
whose export value in 2005 was less than US$ 100 million. The selection of this 
particular amount is arbitrary, however. We feel that it is a conservative estimate for a 
relevant product on Brazil's export list, considering that it represents 0.085% of the total   18
exported by Brazil in 2005. Through the application of Filter 2, 2,337 products were 
eliminated, leaving 113 potential products. 
 
 
Data on the export of services 
 
Data on the export of services is available from the Brazilian Central Bank. The historical 
sequence begins in 1947 and contains 25 categories. Unfortunately, the data available does not 
allow for a detailed analysis of exported services. However it did point to certain categories that 
deserved a more detailed examination. It can be noted that the principal technical services sold 
by Brazil are engineering and architectural services. This, however, has been a strongly 
consolidated sector in Brazil since the 1970s and it is therefore not applicable to the current 
study. Another category that has shown considerable growth is that of professional services. 
However, since no distinction is made between the professionals from different sectors, we could 
not use this variable in our analysis. Finally, two other categories were shown to be interesting: 
“computing and information technology” and “publicity”, with an average growth of 17% and 
14% respectively.  
 
Consultations with specialists 
 
With the final list of merchandise and goods (including a selection of services from the Brazilian 
Central Bank) the next stage in the case selection process was consultation with specialists.  This 
stage was extremely important given the long list of finalists produced by the filtering process 
described above, an often very technical description of the products involved and each sector’s 
internal specifications, making the process of selecting the most interesting cases quite difficult.
5 
 
A group of macroeconomic analysts, sector specialists and experts in foreign trade was 
consulted. First, requests were made for information regarding the most important recently 
emerging sectors, without presenting our list of finalist sectors. Following this, consultants were 
asked to give their opinions upon the list of finalists resulting from the selection process 
described above. Using this sequence of questions, the interviews served to compile a 
complementary list of potential cases including sectors that were not previously selected using 
the HS classification system. These cases generally turned up because their classification code 
did not clearly indicate the product in question or because they had been divided into different 
classification segments.  
 
Case selection was based in a qualitative analysis of 113 products that remained in the list after 
the application of the two filters. The final choice is always controversial, given the many 
possibilities available. The research team had two concerns: (i) to identify the activities in which 
a discovery marked the beginning of the export process or caused a great expansion of export 
volumes; (ii) providing a sampling of differentiated cases where specific forms of knowledge 
could be generated, thereby enriching the final results of the research project. One of the 
                                                 
5 According to our experience – and despite the wealth of existing information in the country – specialist consultation has been proven to be most 
valuable and cost effective research tool. During research previously undertaken by our team, indications from specialists have provided new and 
important contributions to the list of interesting cases, assisting in the identification of a number of cases that were not revealed by the numbers. 
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requirements for reference – the identification of products whose domestic production was 
insignificant 20 years ago – had to be considered less strictly since most industries were installed 




The final list of cases was then discussed with IDB’s project coordinators, who had access to 
another database on Brazilian exports and had the desire to have complementary case analysis 
from the two Brazilian teams working in the project. 
 
As a result of these successive steps, the following cases were selected for analysis: 
 
•  Two manufacturing cases: furniture and swimwear 
 





Agribusiness had a major contribution to Brazilian exports growth during the last decades. For 
this reason, two cases were selected for analysis: soybeans and grapes. The study of agribusiness 
exports is even more interesting because of the strong government support materialized in 
EMBRAPA’s research and development activities. EMBRAPA is a government research 
institute that has achieved national and international recognition in the area of tropical 
agriculture. Soybeans appear as a natural candidate to be studied, with exports of $ 10 billion in 
2004, whose development was strongly supported by EMBRAPA. Since soybeans are 
considered a more traditional crop, grapes, a non traditional agricultural crop, was also selected. 
Grape production also received the support of EMBRAPA. This product exports grew from 1.8 
million USD in 1989 to 107 million USD in 2005. Interestingly, 95% of grapes exported comes 





To obtain a different perspective, the research team also selected two cases from manufacturing. 
The manufacturing sector is responsible for 55% of total Brazilian exports. It is a more 
diversified group, in which the selection of specific industries showed to be particularly difficult, 
since a number of these industries could actually be interesting and fruitful case studies: vehicles 
and auto parts, steel, aircraft, some machinery and equipment, paper and pulp, footwear, 
telephone equipment, plastic, textiles and furniture.  
 
The intention was to exclude those industries were: (i) investment decisions and discoveries are 
mainly dictated by large multinational firms, such as vehicles and autoparts; (ii) there was only a 
small number of exporting firms, making it difficult to study diffusion proceses (steel, aircraft, 
paper and pulp, plastics).  
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The final decision on one of the manufacturing cases was taken after consultation of a database 
provided by one of the IDB project coordinators, which showed the furniture industry as the 
second in the Brazilian ranking of export growth between 1980 and 2000.
6  
 
Finally, qualitative analysis suggested that the study of a smaller but growing industry with 
differentiated characteristics might shed some light into the diffusion process among small 
players: the swimwear industry, a segment of the apparel industry. This industry showed 
substantial growth in its exports, although the total volume is still limited. The interest here 
derives from being an industry which a high degree of product differentiation and with high 
added value. By looking at the structuring and professionalization of the industry, new insights 
can be drawn in the understanding of the phenomena under study, improving in turn our 
understanding of how a developing country such as Brazil can penetrate more dynamic markets 
in which less tangible factors such as knowledge and branding are of paramount importance. 
 




The following secondary sources were used: 
 
•  Secondary data from government databases 
 
•  Academic studies by various universities and research institutes 
 
•  Industry and government agencies publications 
 
•  Company sites 
 
•  Other information available in the internet 
 





The most important source of information were personal interviews conducted with government 
officials, industry representatives, government agencies executives, research institutes’ 
specialists, industry observers, and firm owners and managers. This was especially relevant in 
the two cases selected from the manufacturing sector, and quite decisive in the swimwear 
industry, were almost no records exist of its development and exporting. A list of the 
interviewees can be found in Appendix 1.  
 
The analysis proceeded in two steps: descriptive and analytical. The first – descriptive – step 
included: (i) the preparation of industry case reports, covering available sales, export and import 
                                                 
6 The first product in this ranking was cellular phones, already selected by the other research team.   21
data, industry organization, and historical background; (ii) a detailed description of the process 
of discovery and diffusion, including historical information on the role of first movers, 
immediate followers, and late adopters; (iii) a descriptive account of the role of support 
institutions, private and public, in the process. The second – analytical – step consisted of: (i) 
industry case study analysis, including summary tables with the time line of major events 
shaping the cluster and the industry, diagrams illustrating the connections between various 
players in the industry, and case-specific conclusions; and (ii) comparison of the four case 
studies to understand the discovery and diffusion process, extract general conclusions, and 
discuss policy implications.   22
CASE 1 – THE BRAZILIAN FURNITURE INDUSTRY 
 
1. General  Description 
 
1.1. The Brazilian Furniture Industry 
 
The Brazilian furniture industry comprises around 16,000 firms, of which 10,000 are micro-
businesses, 3,500 are small-sized, 1,000 are medium-sized, and 750 are large firms. The vast 
majority are domestic and family-owned firms. The industry also includes another group of very 
small firms operating in the informal sector of the economy (estimates are of 6,500 firms). 
 
Table 3 presents the evolution of total sales, exports and imports of the industry, from 2000 to 
2005. Total sales increased from 7.6 billion reais in 2000 to an estimate of slightly over 12 
billion reais, an increase of almost 60%. Exports, on the other side, more than doubled, moving 
from US$ 485 million to $991 million. The export/sales ratio has grown from 10.1% in 2000 to 
22% in 2004, but was expected to have fallen in 2005 to slightly over 18%. 
 
The main competitive advantages of the Brazilian furniture industry are country-specific, such as 
local availability of raw materials, skilled labor (typically of European origin), and cost 




Indicators of the Furniture Industry Performance 
Indicators   2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Total Sales (R$ millions)  7,599  8,631  10,095    10,756  12,543  12,051* 
Exports (US$ millions)     485    479     533       662         941         991   
Imports (US$ millions)        113         99           78           70          92       108 
Exports / Sales (%)  10.1  11.6  15.4  17.2  22.0  18.3* 
* Estimates 
Source: Abimóvel (2005) 
 
 
The evolution of Brazilian exports of furniture is an interesting case of success. Total exports 
grew from almost nothing in the early 1990s, to close to one billion dollars in 2005 (Graph 2), 
with Brazil becoming number 12 in the world ranking, compared to China, number one in the 
ranking, with total exports of approximately 9 billion.  
 
Main destinations of Brazilian exports of furniture in 2005 were: the United States (39%), France 
(10%), the United Kingdom (8%), Argentina (5%), and the Netherlands (4%). Although 
Argentina is presently the largest export market for Brazilian furniture in Latin America, recent 
anti-dumping measures may reduce the growth of exports to this market in the near future. 
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Source: Abimóvel (2005) 
 
 
The distribution of Brazilian exports of furniture by state of origin shows interesting patterns 
(Graph 3). The state of Santa Catarina has approximately a 50% share of Brazilian exports and 
the state of Rio Grande do Sul has another 30%.  
 
Graph 3 
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Source: Abimóvel (2005) 
 
 
Furniture manufacturers are concentrated in production clusters, as indicated in Figure 1 and 
Table 4. This type of production arrangement is very common in the furniture industry, not only 
in Brazil, but also in other countries, such as Italy. A typical furniture cluster in Brazil has 
between 100 to 300 firms.  
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Figure 1  





The three most important clusters are located in Bento Gonçalves (state of Rio Grande do Sul), 
in the Metropolitan area of São Paulo, and in São Bento do Sul (state of Santa Catarina). Other 
important clusters are located in the states of Minas Gerais, Espírito Santo, and Paraná.   
 
The Bento Gonçalves cluster, in the state of Rio Grande do Sul, is located in an area of Italian 
immigration, also responsible for the best wine in Brazil. The cluster has 370 firms and produces 
predominantly home furniture made of MDF panels or pine wood. The state of Rio Grande do 
Sul accounts for 20% of the Brazilian production of furniture, and Bento Gonçalves has a 40% 
share of the state output. According to Abimóvel, the Brazilian association of the furniture 
industry, the Bento Gonçalves cluster is well organized, with strong cooperative actions among 
firms in the cluster. It also works closely with the industry association, Abimóvel. It exported in 
2005 27% of total Brazilian exports of furniture.   25
Table 4 
Larger Furniture Clusters in Brazil 
Furniture Cluster  State  No. of Firms  No. of Employees 
Ubá  Minas Gerais  310    3,150 
Bom Despacho  Minas Gerais  117    2,000 
Linhares e Colatina  Espírito Santo  130    3,000 
Arapongas  Paraná  150    7,980 
Votuporanga  São Paulo    85    7,400 
Mirassol  São Paulo  210    8,000 
Tupã  São Paulo    54     700 
São Bento do Sul  Santa Catarina  210    8,500 
Bento Gonçalves  Rio Grande do Sul  370  10,500 
Lagoa Vermelha  Rio Grande do Sul    60    1,800 
Metropolitan Area of São Paulo   São Paulo  3,000    9,000 
  Source: Abimóvel (2005) 
 
The São Paulo cluster, the second in size, has different characteristics, when compared to all 
others. It comprises around 3,000 firms, mostly small and medium-sized, dispersed in the 
Metropolitan area of the city of São Paulo. Most of these firms produce office furniture. Despite 
its size, the cluster is more oriented towards the domestic market, which may be explained at 
least partially by the attractiveness of the largest and richest market in South America, the São 
Paulo state. Exports from the Metropolitan São Paulo cluster in 2005 were 8.8% of total 
Brazilian exports of furniture. 
 
The São Bento do Sul cluster, the third in size, has also its unique characteristics. It is located in 
an area of Austrian and German immigration. Although it occupies the third place in the 
Brazilian ranking of furniture clusters in number of employees, it is the number one exporter of 
furniture in the country, with 43% of total Brazilian exports of furniture in 2005. Many firms in 
the cluster export 80 to 100% of their production. One of the firms in the cluster, Artefama, is the 
largest individual exporter of home furniture in Brazil. Around 80% of the cluster’s output is 
home furniture made of solid pine wood. 
 
According to a high official of Abimóvel, the industry association, the São Bento do Sul cluster 
is very restricted in terms of contacts with manufacturers belonging to other clusters: “They are 
very closed. Firms from other clusters have much more interaction among them. But the São 
Bento do Sul cluster remains quite closed, they only interact among themselves.” He attributed 
such behavior to characteristics of the Germanic culture, as well as to a historic rivalry between 
Italian and Austrian/German immigration groups. He also indicated that the physical insulation 
of the cluster might also be associated to this little level of interaction with other firms in the 
industry. The level of associativism is also considered low, especially when compared to the 
Bento Gonçalves cluster. 
 
The Paraná cluster, although located in an area characterized by intense forestry activities, has 
not developed as much. It is responsible for only 9% of total Brazilian exports of furniture. It has 
specialized in the production of furniture for the low-income market. 
 
Because of its characteristics, the São Bento do Sul cluster was selected for further investigation.   26
1.2. The São Bento do Sul Furniture Cluster 
 
The São Bento do Sul furniture cluster consists mostly of small and medium-sized Brazilian 
family-owned and family-operated firms. It is estimated that the cluster is formed by 400 firms, 
if included those established nearby the cluster (in the areas of Campo Alegre and Rio 
Negrinho), which employ around 10,000 employees. Home furniture represents around 80% of 
total furniture production.  
 
The importance of the cluster to the local economy can be better evaluated from Table 5: 40.7% 
of the total value added is generated in the furniture production chain, with almost 50% of the 
labor employed in the area.  
 
Table 5 
Economic Activity in São Bento do Sul 2005 – (in reais) 
Activity Number  of 
establishments 
Employees  Gross Sales  Addes Value.  % 
Timber        83      482      62,722,861   14,236,264    1.7 
Furniture     257  10,116  1,362,518,442  348,078,125  40.7 
Other Inds.     326  5,452  1,203,180,833  283,079,906  33.1 
Retailing  1,354  3,018     681,729,166  149,644,816  17.5 
Services     618  2,229     126,726,387    58,093,012    6.8 
Agriculture       21        21         4,003,986       1,119,470    0.2 
Total 2,659  21,318  3,440,881,675  854,251,593  100.0 
    Source: Amunesc (2006) and Nupin. 
 
 
Exports from the São Bento do Sul cluster and surroundings are presented in Table 6: 
 
Table 6 
Exports of Timber and Furniture from the Region of Alto Vale do Rio Negro - 2005 
City  Timber and Furniture 
Exports US$1,000 
% 
São Bento do Sul  229,137  62.2% 
Rio Negrinho  127,476  34.6% 
Campo Alegre    11,658    3.2% 
Total 368,271  100.0% 
           Source: Anuário Comércio Exterior 2006 and Nupin 
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Historical Background 
 
Original settlers were immigrants from European countries, mainly Germany, Austria, 
Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Italy, who brought with them the know-how and the skills to carve 
the wood.  Nevertheless, the dominant cultural influence in the area is Germanic. 
 
The development of the São Bento do Sul furniture cluster can be divided into six stages
7: 
 
•  1800-1920 – first settlers from Europe, exploiting local natural resources, such as wood; 
 
•  1920s-1950 – emergence of small factories, most of them at the craftsman stage; 
 
•  1950s-1970s – expansion and consolidation of the cluster; production and exports of 
handicrafts; production of colonial-style furniture; 
 
•  1980s – economic crisis, forcing companies to modernize and restructure production; 
introduction of pine wood furniture; search for new export markets; 
 
•  1990s – expansion of export activities as a result of new opportunities due to wars in 
Eastern Europe and the establishment of support institutions to the furniture industry. 
 
•  2000s – continued international expansion, taking advantage of the devaluation of the 





The following are relevant characteristics of the São Bento do Sul furniture cluster (Denk, 2006; 




•  Local availability of raw materials and parts, or easy access to suppliers; 
•  Local availability of experienced and skilled labor; 
•  Quality products, recognized as such in international markets; 
•  Proximity to suppliers of other inputs and components necessary to the production of 
furniture; 
•  Local availability of representatives of machinery and equipment manufacturers, as well 
as producers of certain types of tools and equipment; 
•  Local availability of specialized services needed for distribution and exporting; 
•  Presence of support institutions; 
                                                 
7 The first five stages are proposed by Denk (2002). The sixth stage was added.   28
•  Presence of technical and educational institutions, including SENAI and FETEP, the 
Foundation for Education, Technology and Research, and UDESC – the State University 
of Santa Catarina; 
•  Recent modernization of factories, with last generation equipment; 





•  Preference for vertical integration, with firms producing their own wood parts, little 
outsourcing, and low level of specialization within the cluster; 
•  Lack of skills and competence in design, with strong dependence on foreign design, 
despite growing interest and concern with developing capabilities in this area; 
•  Limited market knowledge and marketing know-how, with a passive and dependent 
presence in international markets; 
•  Dependence on imported equipment; 
•  Adoption of a low-cost strategic positioning as compared to a differentiation approach; 
•  Low level of associativism among local firms; 




A number of actions are being implemented to face the challenges and weaknesses of local 
producers. Among those, the most relevant are: 
 
•  Better management training; adoption of more advanced management practices; move 
from family managers to professional managers; 
•  Internal actions to develop their own design; 
•  Investments in technological actualization; 
•  More emphasis in quality management and quality control. 
 
 
2. The Discovery And The Diffusion Process: Historical Overview 
 
Indústrias Zipperer was the first mover in the São Bento do Sul furniture cluster. Founded in 
1923, the company claims to be the oldest firm in the Brazilian home furniture industry. It had a 
major impact on four major steps of the development of the furniture cluster of São Bento do 
Sul: the first one was the use of parts of pine wood that were wasted, up to then, to produce 
handicrafts; the second was to export these products; the third was the decision to produce 
colonial-style furniture; and the fourth was the move towards pine wood and its exportation.  
 
Zipperer led other entrepreneurs and local firms in these four stages. The role played by 
Indústrias Zipperer is broadly recognized by other firm members, industry representatives, and 
government officials interviewed. Artefama was the immediate follower, became the leading 
firm in the industry, and also had a major influence in the development of the São Bento do Sul   29





Comparison between Zipperer and Artefama 
  Zipperer Artefama 
Foundation 1923  1945 
Initial product line  Wood handicrafts  Wood handicrafts 
First export order  Early 1960s  1965 
Beginning of furniture 
production 
Mid-1970s Early  1970s 
First exports of 
furniture 
Mid-1970s Late  1970s 
Start production of pine 
wood furniture 
1979 – visit to Canada to learn 
production techniques 
Late 1980s 
First exports of pine 
wood furniture 
1981 Early  1990s 
Product lines  bedroom sets, dining rooms, 
pieces for living rooms, and 
children bedrooms 
bedroom sets, dining rooms, 
bookshelves, home entertainment 
centers, and pieces for living rooms 
No.of employees  220  1,250 
Total sales (in US$)  6 million  32 million 
Export intensity (% of 




2.1. Zipperer, the first mover  
 
Indústrias Zipperer was founded in São Bento do Sul by Carlos Zipperer Sobrinho, a descendant 
of Austrian immigrants, who became a legendary figure in the region. Coming from a family 
background of finishing carpenters, he started to work as an apprentice at the age of 11. In 1923 
he acquired a small plant owned by his boss, which produced small pieces of furniture and 
windows.  
 
Soon afterwards he started the production of handicrafts made of small pieces of pine wood that 
were wasted by the timber industry. The idea of using this wood waste to manufacture 
handicrafts in industrial scale was by itself an innovation. The wood was carved in different 
ways, creating all kinds of objects for home use, including jewelry boxes, abat-jours, and other 
decorative items, as well as small pieces of furniture. The company started to sell its products in 
Rio de Janeiro, at that point the capital of Brazil, in the industrial city of São Paulo, and in the 
city of Aparecida do Norte, a religious center.  
 
Carlos Zipperer Sobrinho was limited by the technological and human resources available in the 
region, at this time quite insulated from the rest of the country. To overcome his firm’s 
limitations, he imported books from Germany, developed his own equipment, and trained his 
new employees. He was also a proactive businessman; he traveled frequently to make contacts 
and sell his products. The company was also said to be a pioneer in selling wood products   30
outside the state of Santa Catarina (Denk, 2002; Kormann, 2005). He was later elected mayor of 
the city of São Bento do Sul, and served the local community in important ways. 
 
Soon Indústrias Zipperer’s products became popular among tourists, generating more orders, and 
stimulating other firms from São Bento do Sul to pursue the same path. According to one of the 
founder’s daughters, Nicia Zschoerper, even at this early period in Indústrias Zipperer’s 
development a number of new firms followed the example, many of them formed by people who 
had previously worked for Indústrias Zipperer. One specific example of a spin-off was Móveis 
Serraltense, founded in 1947. 
 
The company started export activities to the U.S., Germany, and England in the 1950s; in the 
early 1960s it also exported to Japan. According to Denk (2002), it was the first firm in the 
cluster to export. These were initially unsolicited orders; buyers from other countries contacted 
Indústrias Zipperer, probably because of products taken by tourists to these countries. Yet 
Indústrias Zipperer did not remain as a passive exporter: Carlos Zipperer Sobrinho developed 
strong relationships with buyers in these foreign markets, trying to adapt the products according 
to their suggestions. For example, the Japanese preferred jewelry boxes with decorations of 
flowers. Products were exported in small packages by ship.  
 
As competition increased in the 1960s – especially from products made of plastic, a new fashion 
at the time – Indústrias Zipperer decided to expand the production of furniture. According to 
Denk (2002), two firms, Indústrias Zipperer and Weihermann, were responsible for the 
introduction of colonial-style furniture in the cluster.  Yet oral reports collected in the research 
process refer solely to Indústrias Zipperer as responsible for this move. 
 
The plant was modernized and new equipment acquired. A major difficulty, as reported by a 
manager interviewed, was to convince artisans to adopt new production techniques and accept 
automation. Once the change from an artisan to an industrial culture was implemented, the 
company started to grow. It was at this point that the second generation got involved in 
management functions at Indústrias Zipperer, as Carlos Zipperer Sobrinho, the founder, had 
serious health problems, which later caused his passing away at the age of 78. The older 
daughter, Nicia, who was an accountant, took charge of the administration, while the son, Carlos 
Arlindo, an engineer, was responsible for industrial operations. 
 
In 1972, Indústrias Zipperer became the first São Bento do Sul firm to export a container full of 
handicrafts. Yet the first attempts by Indústrias Zipperer to export furniture in the mid-1970s 
were unsuccessful because of the excessive moisture content in the wood due to inadequate 
drying techniques, a problem that afflicted many Brazilian wood product exporters at that time.  
Carlos Arlindo Zipperer had to travel to solve problems with customers abroad. Indústrias 
Zipperer decided then to move from imbuia to mahogany, a wood that was easier to treat and 
dry. The company also developed its own designs, launching an English-style product line, 
which was soon copied by local competitors. The company adapted its products to customer 
requirements, investing in quality improvements, and acquiring production know-how. Efforts 
were made to export these products to Florida with moderate success. Indústrias Zipperer also 
continued to produce the colonial-style furniture, which was sold in the domestic market.  
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In the late 70s, a visit of a Canadian businessman to São Bento do Sul opened new opportunities. 
This businessman, who owned a large-scale furniture plant in his country, suggested that 
Indústrias Zipperer should consider using pine wood in the manufacturing of furniture, based on 
his own experience with this material. Indústrias Zipperer had invested in pine trees reforesting 
to take advantage of government tax incentives, but the owners had never considered using it for 
furniture. As a result, in 1979 Carlos Arlindo Zipperer went to Canada to learn the most 
advanced techniques of using pine wood from reforesting to produce furniture. At this point, 
rising ecological concerns with the devastation of forests were turning the use of wood from 
reforested areas into a critical requirement of European and U.S. customers. There were also 
initial indications of a shortage of native woods in the region, and the use of pine wood was 
already being considered by local firms, although none had initiated the production of pine wood 
furniture. 
 
When the son of the founder came back from Canada, Indústrias Zipperer implemented the 
project to produce furniture made of solid pine wood. The most difficult part of the process was 
to overcome the local resistance to accept the use of pine wood – considered an inferior type of 
wood – to manufacture furniture. Second, it was necessary to learn how to manage a pine forest 
to get the best quality wood. As Zipperer produced and successfully exported this new product 
line, it started a new cycle in the São Bento do Sul cluster, and other firms followed its example 
in time. 
 
The first import markets for the new pine wood furniture produced by Zipperer were West 
Germany, France, and the U.S. With the reunification of Germany, West Germany buyers shifted 
their orders to firms in East Germany. Zipperer then led other firms into exporting to the U.S. 
market, which became the number one market. Typically, importers would bring their own 
designs and specifications, and Zipperer, as well as its followers in the cluster, would 
manufacture the products. 
 
As São Bento do Sul became known as a cluster of furniture exporters, a number of agents 
established themselves in the area, and a whole set of new intermediaries facilitated the 
exporting process. The company started to operate with a few of these export agents, namely 
Primex-Planor and Zipperer Comercial Exportadora. Although this last agent carried the same 
name of the company, it did not belong to Indústrias Zipperer. 
 
According to one of the agents interviewed, the firm planned carefully its export activities. A 
modern plant using the latest equipment and with a high level of operational flexibility was 
considered the main competitive advantage of Zipperer. Another advantage was the fact that the 
company had its own pine forests to harvest, producing high quality wood, very similar to the 
European wood, and thus valued by European customers. During the 80s, the company was quite 
successful in selling to the European market and developed a reputation as a reliable supplier of 
quality products at a competitive price.  
 
Participation in a trade fair in Germany in the late 80s, together with other producers of furniture 
from São Bento do Sul, opened new export opportunities to this market. The company also 
participated in trade fairs in the U.S., in order to increase its exports to that market.  
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The company benefited from the export boom of the early 2000s. Growing exports, combined 
with high-quality products, permitted to establish solid relationships with its foreign buyers. 
Zipperer presently exports 90% of its output. Its main markets are the United States, the United 
Kingdom, France, Canada, and Germany. It sells to furniture stores, importers, distributors, and 
mail order firms in its foreign markets. Around 55% of its production is sold to U.S. customers. 
The company sells the other 10% of its output in the Brazilian market. The most important 
domestic customer is the retail chain Tok&Stok, which has adapted the Ikea model to the 
Brazilian market. 
 
The company now faces a number of serious external threats, as well as other firms in the São 
Bento do Sul cluster, such as the appreciation of the real and price competition from China in 
every export market. In order to face these challenges, it tried to use new raw materials: lyptus, a 
new generation of pine tree wood developed by Aracruz Cellulose, and MDF panels. Changes in 
raw materials caused some problems and delays in the production process, but the company is 
overcoming these problems. In fact, sales in dollars increased in 2006, reaching an average of 
700,000 USD by month, compared to 500,000 USD in the previous year. 
 
Indústrias Zipperer is also facing the challenge of succession, transferring power to the third 
generation. The founder’s son, Carlos Arlindo, sold his part of the business in 2004. The children 
of Nicia are taking charge of Indústrias Zipperer: one is an industrial designer and the other is a 
mechanical engineer, specialized in furniture production. An outside consultant has been hired to 
oversee the transition and help the company with the present hardships. 
 
 
2.2. Artefama, the immediate follower  
 
Founded in 1945 by four entrepreneurs, Artefama was also initially dedicated to the production 
of handicraft with pieces of pine that were wasted by the timber industry. The entrepreneurs were 
young blue collar workers at a local factory who knew how to work with wood and wanted to 
develop their own business. The original founders sold the business to the three present owners, 
who have altogether 97% of the company. They also hold top management positions; one is the 
CEO, and the other two are vice-presidents in charge of commercial activities and 
administration. The CEO, Mr. Alvaro Weiss, is a descendant of Austrian immigrants.  
 
As the company grew, a new plant was built. Product lines became more diversified, and new 
handicraft items were launched and sold to stores in Rio de Janeiro, in a similar manner to what 
happened to Zipperer. The first export order came in 1965. 
 
In the early 1970s the company entered the furniture business and acquired a local plant in the 
downtown area. This was part of a larger trend that was turning São Bento do Sul into an 
important cluster of furniture. Exports grew substantially during the next years. At the end of the 
1970s, Artefama exported around 10% of its output. In only a few years, the company was 
exporting around 30% of its production. Artefama used two Brazilian trading companies: 
Interbras (part of Petrobras, the Brazilian oil and gas state company), and the Matarazzo trading 
company. The company also sold to an Australian businessman, who exported Artefama’s 
products to his homeland.    33
 
Repeated orders were an evidence of the acceptance of Artefama’s products in foreign markets, 
deriving from country-specific advantages, such as quality and cost of raw materials and labor, 
and firm-specific advantages, such as delivery and technical assistance. By 1990, the firm was 
exporting around 50% of its total output. Products were exported knocked down to reduce freight 
costs. This required the company to develop detailed and precise instructions to be used by 
customers abroad, so that the furniture could be easily assembled. Instructions were provided in 
English, French, and German. 
 
Although export initiation resulted from unsolicited orders, export development was a strategic 
choice consciously made by Artefama’s management. As the company grew, managers’ 
perception was that there was too much competition in the domestic market for higher-quality 
furniture. If the company wanted to expand only in Brazil, it would have to supply the lower-end 
segment of the furniture market. Yet price competition required a low-cost approach to 
manufacturing, and also, in the perception of Artefama’s management, required a sacrifice in 
quality. Large retailers imposed extremely rigid conditions over domestic suppliers. Companies 
such as Casas Bahia and Magazine Luiza, who served the lower-income segment of the market, 
forced manufacturers to finance their sales. Also, these large retailers tended to control a firm’s 
production to the extent that “you better just give them your factory”.  
 
Managers were aware that exporting was more risky, but believed that there were more 
opportunities for a company if it really wanted to make it work. In light of these considerations, 
the company’s management made a conscious option to grow by international expansion. 
 
Machinery was imported from Italy to improve production processes and boost productivity. 
This equipment permitted Artefama to move from furniture that employed whole pieces of wood 
to the use of particle board. Investments were also made in equipment to dry wood, a major 
problem that Brazilian exporters faced for decades, since the domestic market did not require the 
same standards as most export markets, with dryer climates. Electronic control mechanisms 
started to be used to monitor the drying process. Inventory controls were also implemented to 
avoid wood to be unnecessarily exposed to external agents. 
 
A major change was implemented during the early 90s, as the company started to manufacture 
and export products made of pine. Product lines included bedroom sets, dining rooms, 
bookshelves, home entertainment centers, and pieces for living rooms. The company prided itself 
of combining high technology and artisan work in its manufacturing processes.  
 
Supplier development occurred during the 90s. Artefama’s wood suppliers were from Brazil and 
Argentina. Suppliers of parts were typically local, since a number of smaller firms grew around 
the furniture cluster of São Bento do Sul. Packaging suppliers were also developed, both in the 
area of São Bento do Sul and from other countries. For example, a Mexican supplier was used 
for certain types of packaging. The firm was also concerned with training the workforce, and 
supporting their education. It offered a special in-house two-years program in conjunction with 
SENAI. 
In the 1990s, the company exported to Western European countries. Yet despite the opportunities 
and the desire to expand export activities, the company had to face exchange rate problems. In   34
fact, until 1999, the overvalued Brazilian currency constituted a major deterrent to the expansion 
of Artefama’s exports. By 1999, however, with the devaluation of the Real, Artefama was ready 
to conquer new foreign markets. The company had invested in new facilities and equipment, 
improved productivity, and defined its growth strategy. The president of the company expressed 
this effort as follows: 
 
“Between 1995 and 1999, we had to work hard to achieve what we did… We had to study 
thousands of alternatives to become competitive and to have a good product. It all 
happened in the last ten years.” 
 
Also, during the previous years, Artefama’s managers expanded their frame of reference to 
include international markets as part of their cognitive maps; a new mind-set seemed to be built 
during these years in such a way that exports were now seen as the best path for the company’s 
future. Very quickly, Artefama exported almost a 100% of its total output. It shipped more than 
2,000 containers per year to the United States and Europe, becoming the leading exporter of 
wood furniture from Brazil. In the early 2000s, the company was selling around 50% of its 
exports to the United States and 50% to Europe.  
 
Artefama used distributors to export. Artefama’s managers saw the company as a manufacturer 
of wood furniture, not a marketer. The CEO explained the reasons behind this strategic 
positioning: 
 
“We do not sell directly to stores in foreign markets.  We have a mass production plant, 
for large volumes. This table, I need to produce at least one hundred and fifty units to be 
price-competitive. These chairs, the minimum is six hundred units. Without volume, I 
cannot compete on price. So, I have no contact with stores. These agents here in Brazil 
are responsible for all the contacts and communications, assistance to distributors… The 
agents themselves are not in contact with the stores.” 
 
The appreciation of the Real in the middle of the 2000s caused Artefama and other firms in the 
cluster a number of problems, by reducing its price competitiveness in foreign markets, at the 
same time, they had to face Chinese competition selling at cheaper prices than those Brazilian 
firms could afford to sell. 
 
As a result of these changes in the environment, by 2005 the percentage sold by Artefama to the 
U.S. and Europe changed. The increased competition of Chinese furniture in the U.S. reduced 
Artefama’s opportunities in that market. According to Artefama’s CEO, Chinese competitive 
advantages (and, for that matter, Brazilian disadvantages) were country-specific: favorable 
exchange rate, lower labor costs with longer work hours, lower taxes, access to cheap loans, and 
a modern port structure. To face these new challenges, Artefama adopted a number of palliative 
actions, none of which was seen as a definitive solution for the exchange rate problems faced: 
outsourcing, importing of parts, and exchange rate targets. 
 
Outsourcing was adopted by the Italian furniture industry when these manufacturers had to face 
price competition from other countries. Italian manufacturers became assemblers of furniture 
parts that were manufactured by third-parties. Manufacturers were responsible for design and   35
assembly, while third-parties received all the specifications to produce specific furniture parts. 
Often manufacturers had to assist smaller suppliers in purchasing, engineering, storage, and 
packaging. Artefama’s CEO was aware of the nature of the Italian production model, and made 
the following comments: 
 
“It is often said that one problem of the Brazilian furniture industry is excessive vertical 
integration. We tend to produce our own parts… They use the Italian furniture industry 
as an example: every stage of the production process is done by third-parties. [They are] 
assemblers… At some point we have had around ten suppliers that produced parts of 
furniture for us… But it is not a large percentage, around 90% is still made here. There 
is always a risk in having outside suppliers.” 
 
Another decision was to import parts from lower-cost producers, such as China. By 2006, a small 
fraction of furniture parts was imported from China. 
 
A third strategy adopted by the company was to work with exchange rate targets, in order to be 
better prepared to face fluctuations. The following excerpts from the interview with the CEO 
illustrate this practice: 
 
“We started to work twelve months ago with an exchange rate target of R$2.50 per 
dollar. We planned ourselves to be competitive for this rate. We made it. Then we had to 
go down to R$2.25; we made it. Now we are working with an exchange rate of R$2.00 to 
be competitive. It can go down to R$2.00 and we can still survive. We can still operate at 
a profit. I tell my people in the plant: ‘the rings go, but the fingers remain’
8. We are 
doing all this. But the government is not doing its share.”  
 
Cost reductions were obtained by improving production processes. For example, waste of raw 
materials were minimized: “The only thing we don’t use here at this point is the noise of the 
equipment…” Yet, according to Artefama’s CEO, other firms in the region were not as careful in 
planning for an unfavorable exchange rate, and were having a difficult time to cope with the 
present hardships. 
 
By 2006, Artefama was the largest exporter of wood furniture from Brazil. The company had 
1,250 employees, of which around 60 were white-collar workers.  
 
It seems that Artefama’s export development benefited from two major aspects. On one side, as 
the company started to export, managers became increasingly aware of the opportunities 
available in international markets. The move to furniture manufacturing created a new set of 
opportunities in international markets. Producing a good quality product, due to a combination of 
low-cost pine wood and skilled labor, it attracted the interest of large foreign distributors. Good 
quality products and reliability in delivery schedules at a competitive price permitted the growth 
of Artefama’s export business. 
 
 
                                                 
8 Old Brazilian say, meaning, you loose your wealth, but you can still work.   36
2.3. The Diffusion Process 
 
The first evidence of the influence of the first mover appears in the use of wasted pine wood 
parts to manufacture handicrafts. Artefama seems to have been the immediate follower in 
manufacturing similar products and exporting these products as early as 1965, only 5 to 6 years 
after Zipperer. Many other firms followed the example of the pioneer. 
 
As many handicraft products started to be substituted by plastic products in the domestic and 
international markets, Zipperer increased the production of furniture, and launched, at the same 
time as another local firm, a “colonial” design. The large demand for this furniture style in Brazil 
stimulated the emergence of a number of other firms in the São Bento do Sul region.  
 
Simultaneously, a new actor played an important role in the development of the São Bento do 
Sul cluster. This man was Henry Matarazzo
9, the owner of a chain of furniture stores in the city 
of São Paulo (Henry Matarazzo Decorações). Matarazzo “discovered” São Bento do Sul. He 
brought new furniture designs and had contracts with different firms to produce them. One of the 
firms was Zipperer. These products targeted the high-end market; they were made of solid 
imbuia wood and premium- priced. 
 
Artefama’s CEO believes that the expansion of the São Bento do Sul cluster came with the 
introduction of colonial-style furniture. This was, however, in his judgement, more the result of 
vicarious learning than of collective actions by local entrepreneurs and businessmen. He 
observed: 
 
“Many new firms were created during the colonial-style boom. The industry ‘exploded’ 
during the 70s here in São Bento. Many of these new entrepreneurs were our 
employees… They saw an opportunity: ‘Ah-ha, a lot of people are earning money, all 
these new plants, I am going to do the same’. And they left our company and established 
their new businesses. And then they invited professionals who worked in our plants: 
‘Come, here you are going to be a manager, there you are only another one.’ They also 
copied some of our models. Some survived, others closed. A few succeeded.”  
 
In 1975, during the centennial anniversary of São Bento do Sul, an exhibition was organized 
which attracted the attention of large retailers to the emerging furniture cluster, at that point still 
manufacturing colonial-style products from various native woods. The exhibition served as a 
starting point for many firms to sell their products nationally and even internationally.  
 
In the mid-1970s, the growing shortage of imbuia, a tree native in the region, started to be 
perceived as a threat to the future of the furniture cluster. The tree was used by local firms to 
manufacture furniture but was also exported in natura. Osvaldo Zipperer, who was at the time 
the mayor of São Bento do Sul (from 1973 to 1977) and a relative of the Zipperer family from 
Indústrias Zipperer, in conjunction with a number of local businessmen, made efforts to convince 
                                                 
9 Although we were not able to connect Henry Matarazzo to the Matarazzo family of São Paulo, it is believed he belonged to the family. The 
Matarazzo were Italian immigrants who came to Brazil and became extremely wealthy by investing in various businesses. At one point, the 
patriarch of the family owned more than one hundred businesses. They have had and still have representatives in almost all sectors of the 
Brazilian society, from industry to arts and to politics.   37
the Brazilian government to protect imbuia forests against exporting wood in natura, thus 
protecting local furniture manufacturers and permitting to expand the share of value-added wood 
exports. Dr. Benedito Fonseca Moreira, at that time the president of CACEX, the government 
agency in charge of exporting, and a vigorous defender of national interests, accepted the cluster 
requests, and limited somewhat the exporting of this type of wood. However, he asked the cluster 
to increase its exports in order to replace the volume lost due to the limitations imposed to green 
wood exports.  
 
At this point the idea of substituting imbuia by pine wood started to circulate among firms in the 
cluster. Yet local producers lacked the know-how to correctly manage pine forests to be used for 
furniture, and did not master the technology to produce furniture from this type of wood. Also, 
there were no trained workers to deal with this type of wood. 
 
Pine wood had a number of advantages. First, it was a preferred type of wood in the U.S., 
Northern and Central European countries. Second, the cost of this type of wood in South 
America was much lower than the one originating from other traditional producers, since pine 
trees grew two to three times faster. Third, it also permitted to avoid the deployment of local 
reserves and to preserve local and noble species, which grew much slower. Pine was an easily 
renewable resource. Pine trees fit perfectly the local environment and were “ecologically 
correct”, since they could be used to reforest.  There were also certain shortcomings. For 
example, the pine wood from South America tended not to be as hard, exactly because trees grew 
much faster. Yet even these problems could be to a large extent solved by the adoption of 
specific forest management techniques.  
 
One important initiative of the local business community was the creation of FETEP – the 
Foundation for Technical Teaching and Research, inaugurated in December, 1975 in São Bento 
do Sul, with the mission of developing technical know-how and training workers for the 
furniture industry. The project was funded by local entrepreneurs and the city government. This 
foundation conducted studies on the use of pine wood by the furniture industry. FETEP played 
an important role in helping the industry to improve its production processes and to adopt pine 
wood, although it was of little help to Zipperer’s earlier moves. Further information on this 
foundation is presented in section 3.3. 
 
Yet it was only in 1979 that the first firm in the cluster – Zipperer – was successful in producing 
good quality pine wood furniture, and started to export this product in 1981. Interestingly 
enough, although Zipperer started to adopt pine wood to manufacture a different style of 
furniture as early as 1979, when a family member was sent to Canada to learn the use of this new 
type of wood, other companies remained in the colonial-style furniture until the impact of the 
economic recession of the 80s, combined with changes in consumer tastes for furniture, forced 
them to change or succumb. Even Artefama, an early adopter of major innovations introduced by 
Zipperer, was a late adopter of pine wood furniture. An industry observer described the upheaval 
in the cluster in the 1980s as follows: 
 
“The local industry suffered a serious crisis because the colonial-style furniture market 
started to decline. People in the cities, especially the larger ones, wanted smaller, lighter 
furniture, with different design. And the manufacturers here did not see it coming… They   38
remained in the same path. But problems started and sales went down. Native woods 
were getting expensive, with environmental laws limiting their use. You could not just get 
into the forest and cut your wood, unless you planted new trees. At the end of the 80s, the 
firms here started to adopt pine wood.” 
 
Despite these efforts, pine wood furniture was not well accepted by consumers in the domestic 
market during the late 1980s. Apparently the first furniture using pine wood sold in the domestic 
market did not have good finishing and the wood itself was of bad quality, in such a way that 
consumers ended by associating pine wood with low quality furniture.
10 As the efforts to sell 
pine wood furniture in the domestic market failed, companies started to look at alternative export 
markets. The cluster had already accumulated some export experience from the early handicrafts 
and the imbuia furniture years. Some of the early adopters of exporting in the cluster are 
presented in the following table: 
 
Table 8 
Adopters of Pine Wood Furniture Exporting in the 1980s in the São Bento do Sul Cluster 
Firm  Year of 
Foundation 




Móveis Neumann  1971  1983  70% 
Móveis Walfrido  1972  1983  100% 
Famossul 1973  1984  100% 
Móveis Consular  1973  1986  80% 
Móveis Serraltense  1947  1987  Not available 
Source: Telephone interviews and Brazilian Exporters Catalog. 
 
 
An opportunity to expand exports came with the civil wars in the Balkans. East European 
countries were traditional exporters of this type of furniture to many countries in Western 
Europe. With the rupture of the established political order, these suppliers were unable to accept 
orders and meet deadlines. Buyers from Germany, the Netherlands, and France came to South 
America in search of alternative suppliers. In their efforts, they contacted firms in Chile and 
Brazil. The contacts in Brazil with the São Bento do Sul firms were extremely successful 
because of cultural similarities, and the use of German as a business language. The population of 
São Bento do Sul, historically quite insulated from other areas of Brazil, had kept many of its 
Germanic traditions and inheritance, easily seen in the local architecture, family names, business 
practices, and the ability to speak German, as well as some other European languages. This 
cultural identification is seen by many as a major element to foster exporting from the cluster to 
Europe. 
 
Export agents started to visit the cluster in the early 1990s. According to an industry expert, these 
export agents were responsible for the “identification of distributors and retailers in foreign 
markets”. They traveled to the foreign markets and became the most important intermediaries in 
the export process. Most were foreigners, but some a few companies also developed, 
                                                 
10 This trend seems to be reversing at this point, but only in specific niches in the domestic market. A large retailer, Tok&Stok, following the Ikea 
model, helped the recovery of pine wood furniture reputation in the country by selling products specially designed for the middle-class small 
apartments in large urban areas. 
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independently from local manufacturers. Also, certain Brazilian general trading companies 
started their activities in the cluster, such as the Matarazzo trading company. Large U.S. and 
European distributors established commercial offices in Brazil with purchasing agents 
responsible for placing orders, following up production schedules, exercising quality control, and 
supervising transportation to the destination. As a result of these efforts, the first export boom 
occurred already in 1990-1991. Certain firms sold their one-year production in advance. 
 
To better serve the new export markets, it became necessary to further improve the quality of the 
pine wood furniture. Importers played a major role during this stage, bringing new technical 
standards. New accessories and parts had to be specially designed and developed to meet buyers’ 
requirements. Domestic wood panel suppliers also improved the quality of their products. By 
1994, the cluster had attained international product quality standards. 
 
Table 9 presents a list of some of the firms in the cluster that started to export in the early 1990s. 
It should be noted that we were unable to find a firm that started to export between 1994 and the 
year 2000, suggesting that the appreciation of the Brazilian currency from 1994 to the 1999 
devaluation prevented new firms in the cluster to enter the export activity. 
 
Table 9 
Adopters of Pine Wood Furniture Exporting in the Early 1990s in the São Bento do Sul 
Cluster 








Intercontinental Indústria de Móveis  1948  1990  50% 
Tremóvel Indústria de Móveis  1981  1990  90% 
Indústria de Móveis Três Irmãos  1972  1991  100% 
Móveis Katzer  1985  1991  100% 
IMOCOL – Ind. de Móveis Coloniais  1976  1992  100% 
Móveis Clement  1984  1992  100% 
Móveis América  1977  1993  100% 
 Source: Telephone interviews and Brazilian Exporters Catalog. 
 
 
With the Plano Real, from 1994 to 1997, it became easier to import foreign equipment and 
technology. In fact, according to industry experts, most firms, even smaller ones, imported 
equipment from Germany and Italy. Plant automation of larger firms was completed during this 
period.  
 
Table 10 presents the percentage of firms by size that invested in new equipment and facilities 
and Table 11 presents the percentage of renewal of equipment and plant. 
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Table 10 
 Investment in New Equipment and Facilities 1996/1997 
 (% of firms) 
Group of firms by size  % of firms 
Over R$ 1 million  29% 
500,000 – 1 million  14% 
250,000 – 499,999  14% 
100,000 – 249,999  14% 
Less than 100,000  22% 
Made investments  93% 
Did not invest  7% 
Total 100% 




 Revamping of Manufacturing Facilities 1996/1997 
 (% of firms) 
Percentage of Revamping  % of firms 
Less than 3%  7% 
From 3 to 10%  36% 
From 10 to 30%  36% 
More than 30%  14% 
Made investments  93% 
Did not invest  7% 
Total 100% 
 Source: Ferreira (1998) apud Garcia and Motta (2005) 
 
 
It should be pointed out that these investments were not unique of firms from the São Bento do 
Sul cluster, but of firms in the furniture industry all over the country. For example, according to 
the same study, 100% of the firms from the Bento Gonçalves cluster, 92% from the Paraná 
cluster, and 80% from the Metropolitan São Paulo cluster also made investments in plant and 
equipment during the same period. 
 
As the exchange rate became extremely favorable to exporting after the 1999 devaluation, other 
firms in the São Bento do Sul cluster entered exporting. Profits from export business were 
reinvested, permitting to complete the modernization of the local industry.  
 
Table 12 presents some of the firms from São Bento do Sul that were late adopters of furniture 
exporting. These four firms entered the export activity between 2000 and 2004. Again, we did 
not find any firm that started exporting after 2004, suggesting that once more the appreciation of 
the Brazilian currency acted as a deterrent to export initiation. 
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Table 12 
Late Adopters of Pine Wood Furniture Exporting in the São Bento do Sul Cluster 








Milamóveis 1972  2000  100% 
Móveis Irimar  1967  2002  25% 
Brasmóveis 1983  2002  100% 
Móveis 3J  1986  2004  0% 
 Source: Telephone interviews and Brazilian Exporters Catalog. 
 
 
By 2001, the industry started to search for new markets. It is not clear whether this was caused 
by a search for new opportunities, or a desire to reduce the risks of concentration in the European 
market. The United States, the largest market for furniture in the world, was prospected. New 
adaptations were required, since U.S. customers preferred larger furniture of different styles and 
materials. From 2001 to 2005, exports to the U.S. market grew steadily, with a favorable 
exchange rate.
11   
 
2.4. Present Hardships 
 
From 2005 to 2006, the appreciation of the real negatively impacted Brazilian exports of 
furniture. Price competition from Chinese exports also made it quite difficult for domestic firms 
to continue exporting.  
 
Most interviewees believe that the industry is going to face continued hardships during the next 
ten years. In Artefama’s CEO perception, Brazilian furniture is not recognized by its design or 
specific characteristics; they just had good products at a competitive price. In general, it is 
believed that the industry will suffer a consolidation process, with weaker and smaller firms 
disappearing. Firms that were not able to develop differentiated products are now challenged by 
Chinese competitors and their own survival is at stake. 
 
An industry expert interviewed suggested that the export-oriented strategy of the São Bento do 
Sul cluster was actually mistaken, since these firms were highly dependent of exchange rate 
policies. In his view, firms in the cluster made an option for international markets that increased 
their risk. He claimed that while the average export intensity (percentage of exports on total 
sales) for the furniture industry in Brazil was around 20%, firms in the São Bento do Sul cluster 
exported as much as 80% to 100% of their output. Moreover, their products were specifically 
designed to the European taste:  
 
“They cannot sell their furniture in the domestic market. They are designed to serve the 
preferences of buyers from other countries. They are finer and lighter than the products 
sold in the domestic market.” 
                                                 
11 For example, Wal-mart, the giant U.S. retailer, has been purchasing furniture from suppliers in the cluster.   42
Another industry expert adds that the cluster is not considered anymore an important supplier to 
the domestic market. Large retailers fear that firms from São Bento do Sul will not continue to 
supply them when the exchange rate becomes more favorable to exporting. 
 
A major weakness perceived by most interviewees is the lack of a marketing-oriented approach 
to exporting. Local traditions are strongly production-oriented. São Bento do Sul has 
demonstrated its capacity of becoming a leading production cluster, but it has delegated the 
marketing function to intermediaries, keeping little control over the commercialization of its 
products. One consultant to the industry noted: 
 
“People are not prepared for marketing. Managers from most companies here never 
visited their customers abroad, never visited their export markets, never visited a store, 
never talked with a customer. Family owners are involved with production, with 
operations… And these firms lack management control systems, management indicators, 
professional evaluations. There are still many paradigms that need to be broken.” 
 
 
3. Role of Support Institutions  
 
The evidence collected in this case suggests that a number of institutional actors played an 
important role in the diffusion process. 
 
3.1. Abimóvel, the Furniture Industry Association 
 
The most important institutional actor was Abimóvel – The Brazilian Association of Furniture 
Manufacturers, founded around 30 years ago, which combines furniture producers and suppliers 
to the industry. Around 60% of the 16,000 furniture manufacturers in the country operating in 
the formal sector of the economy, organized in 28 associations, are members of Abimóvel. 
 
Abimóvel has been active in promoting the cooperation with unions, syndicates, and other 
industry associations. The Executive Superintendent of Abimóvel, Miguel Sanchez, believes that 
to foster cooperative efforts within the production chain, among firms in production clusters, and 
between producers and suppliers of equipment is a necessary condition for the growth of the 
industry in the near future.  
 
Among the most important actions developed by Abimóvel are alliances and partnerships with 
other institutions, private and public, such as SENAI, the National Service for the Industry; 
SEBRAE, The Support Agency for Small and Medium-Sized Firms; and CNI – The National 
Federation of Industries. These partnerships aim at providing management education, technical 
training, technological development, and information to industry members. In addition, it is 
Abimóvel’s responsibility to organize and manage FENAVEM, a national exhibition for the 
Brazilian furniture industry. The association has also been extremely successful in representing 
the various sub-sectors of the industry with the Brazilian government. 
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A major initiative at this point is the establishment of standards for the industry, a work that is 
being carried out by Abimóvel in partnership with ABNT, the Brazilian Association of Technical 
Norms. This project is still starting.  
 
Abimóvel had a significant role in the diffusion process. Abimóvel´s actions directed towards the 
promotion of exporting started around 1995, according to Miguel Sanchez, when Abimóvel hired 
a consultant who prepared a study on the industry’s present position and future opportunities in 
exporting. This study included the analysis of export markets, imports, types of products 
imported, prices, materials etc. The conclusion of the study was that there were substantial 
opportunities for Brazilian exports because of its intrinsic quality, the availability of raw 
materials, and cost advantages. This study permitted the creation, three years later, of the 
Promóvel Program, dedicated to improve the quality standards of Brazilian furniture and to 
promote exports. 
 
The first edition of Promóvel, between 1998-2000, aimed at achieving total exports volume of 
2.5 billion USD in 2000. Another goal was to expand Brazilian exports of furniture to the U.S. 
market. Other specific goals included: 
 
•  Development of technical standards for the manufacturing process  
•  ISO 9000 
•  ISO 14000 
•  Quality and productivity improvements 
•  Acquisition of foreign know-how 
•  Trade missions 
•  Support to participation in trade fairs 
•  International marketing studies 
•  Export marketing practices 
•  Formation of joint export marketing groups (export consortia) 
•  Development of a Brazilian design 
•  Creation of business centers in other countries to serve the industry 
•  Management training 
•  The restructuring of manufacturing plants 
 
A multidisciplinary research team studied the U.S. market. Between April and May, 1999, the 
team visited the most important production clusters and made presentations to local firms. At the 
same time, Promóvel supported another study by four specialists in Brazil and in the U.S.  
 
One of the areas in which Promóvel was especially active was in promoting the development of a 
Brazilian design, preferably incorporating elements of the Brazilian culture. 
 
The association was also concerned with being environmentally responsible. Officials claimed 
that the Brazilian furniture industry at this time works mainly with raw materials from 
reforesting.  
 
In 1999, Abimóvel started to work with APEX, the Brazilian export promotion agency. This 
partnership became so successful that in 2004 APEX decided that all export initiatives in the   44
furniture industry using APEX funds should be directed to Abimóvel. As a result, presently 
every firm or association in the Brazilian furniture industry that wants to have access to APEX 
export promotion funds has to work with Abimóvel. 
 
Abimóvel has developed, in partnership with APEX – the Brazilian Association of Export 
Promotion of MDIC, The Ministry of Development, Industry, and External Trade, a new 
program to boost exports of furniture, named Brazilian Furniture Program. The Brazilian 
Furniture Program is the third edition of Promóvel for the period 2005-2007, with funds of 
US$7.4 million, half of which should come from the government and the other half from firms in 
the production chain. 
 
Although some goals were not yet achieved, Promóvel had a positive impact on the number of 
exporting firms. It also apparently was more successful in helping smaller and medium-sized 
firms, since larger firms had already developed export management know-how and capabilities.  
 
According to Abimóvel officials, the following are indicators of the positive impact of the 
Program: 
 
•  A total of US$8.6 million were invested in the Program. 
•  The Program reached around 600 to 700 firms in the furniture industry. 




3.2 Sindusmobil, the São Bento do Sul Industry Association 
 
Another organization that played a significant role in the export development of the furniture 
industry, this time specifically of São Bento do Sul, was Sindusmobil, the Syndicate of the 
Construction and Furniture Industries of São Bento do Sul. Of the 400 local firms (including São 
Bento do Sul and surroundings), however, only 72, or 20%, are members of this syndicate.  
 
There seems to be a resistance against this type of association among firms in the cluster, 
although there seems to be some sort of “localism” among cluster members. For example, 
furniture manufacturers in the cluster tend to privilege their suppliers from the same region, even 
when their prices are not as good as those of suppliers outside the cluster. 
 
The Syndicate is responsible for the organization of a furniture exhibition, Móvel Brasil, every 
two years, with producers from the São Bento do Sul cluster. It also has a number of 
partnerships, including a very important one with FETEP (see section 3.3 below). Sindusmobil is 
also responsible for negotiations with the Workers’ Union. In addition, it supports the 
development of industry studies and offers legal assistance to member firms at subsidized prices.  
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3.3. FETEP, the Local Training and Research Center 
 
FETEP, a foundation to foster the teaching and research on technology for the furniture industry, 
was created in 1975. It was an initiative of Oswaldo Zipperer, a mayor of São Bento do Sul 
during the period 1973-1977, who initiated the process by pulling together a group of 
businessmen and the city government to create a center of excellence in furniture technology. 
The original funding was divided between local firms and the city government
12. This foundation 
played an important role in the formation of local workers, as well as in the development of 
technology to manage pine forests. It also helped to solve technical problems associated to the 
use of pine wood during the 80s.  
 
This institution was in decline in recent years, but seems to have recovered thanks to the support 
of SENAI, an arm of the Brazilian Federation of Industries, who now manages FETEP
13. 
SENAI/FETEP offers at present training programs for blue-collar workers and specialized 
technicians, and University degrees in association with UDESC, the State University of Santa 




3.4. UDESC, the State University 
 
The need for university training in the area of furniture production stimulated local authorities 
and businessmen to ask the state government to expand state university activities to the Northern 
part of the state, where São Bento do Sul is located. As a result, the local Commercial and 
Industrial Association, FETEP, the city government, and UDESC (the State University of Santa 
Catarina) joined efforts to start university programs in the area.  
 
UDESC started its activities in São Bento do Sul in 1994, offering a bachelor’s degree in 
Mechanic Technology Applied to Furniture Production. In 2002, the University offered a new 
program in Information Systems Technology. Initially operating in local schools’ facilities, 




3.5. The Brazilian Government 
 
As to the role of public institutions in supporting the export drive of the furniture industry in 
general and the São Bento do Sul cluster in particular, it was determined that certain government 
actions at various levels had a positive impact on the sector. 
 
The special attention given by the federal government by means of the Competitiveness Forum is 
considered by specialists as an important government incentive. The purpose of the 
Competitiveness Forum was to increase the international competitiveness of production chains. 
                                                 
12 1% of the city budget was allocated to the project (interview with Oswaldo Zipperer). 
13 SENAI funding comes from a mandatory contribution of Brazilian manufacturing firms.   46
The furniture industry was chosen to be supported by this program based on its export potential. 
The Forum was installed in 2001, although preliminary meetings were already conducted in July 
and August, 2000. A total of US$ 1.9 billion from BNDES and the private sector was planned to 
be invested in the furniture industry, $1 billion in the wood panels industry, $ 600 million in 
reforesting, and $147 million in other suppliers. However, an evaluation of this program by the 
executives interviewed does not suggest a major impact in the development of exports of the São 
Bento do Sul cluster. 
 
The most effective government action was through APEX, the government agency for the 
promotion of exports, and its association with Abimóvel, explained in more detail in section 3.1. 
Negative aspects that deserve consideration in analyzing the relationship between government 
actions and the exports of furniture are: 
 
•  The negative impact of exchange rate changes on the price competitiveness of 
manufacturers; 
•  The high level of taxation, reducing firm and product competitiveness; 
•  Bureaucratic impediments and delays to the devolution or compensation of export credits 
earned by manufacturers, mounting in 2005 to something around US$ 30 million; 
•  Frequent strikes within the Federal Income Service in ports and airports,  and government 
reaction to these strikes, causing delays in delivery schedules, and corresponding fines 
imposed by foreign buyers, or extra expenses to meet delivery schedules by using more 
expensive transportation alternatives; 
•  Incompetence and bureaucracy in customs service, typically under government 
administration; 
•  Bureaucratic and taxation impediments to outsourcing, making it difficult for firms to 
organize themselves in a supply chain model similar to Italy; 
•  Lack of government control on exports of green wood or semi-industrialized wood, 
reducing wood availability in the domestic market, instead of promoting exports of 
industrialized wood products; 
•  Lack of specific long-term (15 years) financing from BNDES for reforesting. 
 
In general, interviewees claimed that they would be satisfied with less government interference: 
“the government may not help, but at least it should not disturb”, said Artefama’s CEO. 
 
 
4. Counterfactual Analysis 
 
Our counterfactual analysis for this case will used as counter examples:  
 
•  exports of non wood furniture (mainly office furniture) 
•  the case of Rudnick, a São Bento do Sul exporter of office furniture and other types of 
furniture, who is very active in exporting; 
•  the case of Flexiv, a very successful manufacturer of office furniture from Paraná, located 
in the city of Curitiba, but that has not succeeded in exporting.  
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4.1 Exports of Non-Wood Furniture 
 
Other segments of the Brazilian furniture industry were not as successful in developing their 
exports as the wood furniture in general, and the pine wood in particular. Graph 4 shows clearly 
that the non wood segment of the furniture industry – typically office furniture – was not capable 
of developing a strong position in exports. Separate data for the pine wood furniture is not 
available from government or industry sources. 
 
Graph 4 
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4.2. Rudnick – a different São Bento do Sul exporter 
 
Other São Bento do Sul firms, although not involved with the exporting of pine wood furniture, 
also engaged in exporting. We selected the case of Rudnick as a counter example, suggesting 
that the main reason behind the export success of the São Bento do Sul cluster does not come 
only from the adoption of pine wood as a raw material, but rather from a certain export mentality 
that developed in the area and is probably associated with the discovery and diffusion process led 
by Zipperer first and Artefama in more recent years.. 
 
Móveis Rudnick started in 1938, as a cabinet-making carpenter shop, serving the local market. In 
1946, the founder, Mr. Leopoldo Rudnick, moved his shop to the present location of the 
company headquarters. In 1959, his sons joined the company as partners. As the company grew, 
it expanded its market reach to other areas in Brazil. The company has presently five plants, 
specialized in different product lines: office furniture, bedroom and living room furniture, 
kitchen furniture, billiard and snooker tables. Altogether production facilities cover 58.000 
squared meters. It also has a reforesting affiliate, covering an area of 12 million squared meters 
with approximately 500.000 trees. 
 
Exports started in a reactive manner, as many other firms in São Bento do Sul. By 1981, a buyer 
from Brunswick, a U.S. company, visited the São Bento do Sul cluster, looking for suppliers for 
billiard and snooker tables. Rudnick got the contract and started its export activities. The original 
tables were made of native woods such as jacaranda and mahogany. Until 1998, Brunswick 
remained the only foreign customer of the company, with 8% of Rudnick’s total sales. 
 
An executive interviewed explained that a reduction of sales in the domestic market by 1998 
forced the firm to search for export markets. The company focused in the U.S. market. The 1999 
devaluation of the Brazilian currency helped Rudnick, making its products more price-
competitive. 
 
In the year 2000, the company was contacted by a U.S. firm specialized in high- quality office 
furniture. The buyer supplied the design and Rudnick manufactured the product to be sold under 
this buyer’s brand name in the U.S. By 2006, Rudnick provided 80% of the needs of this firm in 
the specific product line. In sequence, Rudnick started to manufacture as a third-party to another 
company in the U.S., named Stanley, established in North Carolina. 
 
Exports grew steadily the following years, as foreign buyers continued to approach Rudnick. 
Nowadays, approximately 95% of its international sales go to the U.S., but the company has also 
exported sporadically to Canada, France, Holland, Portugal, Angola, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
Israel, Lebanon, and nine other countries in Latin America. Export intensity (the percentage of 
exports on total sales) grew from 8% in 1998 to 65% in 2005. The projected export/sales ratio 
targeted for the near future is 55%. At this ratio, managers believe they will minimize risks due 
to exchange rate and demand fluctuations. Graph 5 shows the evolution of export intensity at 
Rudnick.   49
Graph 5 
Export Intensity at Rudnick 
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Despite these contracts and differentiated product lines (when compared with  those produced by 
other São Bento do Sul manufacturers), Rudnick is also facing the challenges of China’s rise in 
the furniture industry. One interesting aspect raised by an executive interviewed was that 
American buyers were transferring technology and know-how to China, and Chinese firms 
seemed to be more ready to learn from foreign buyers than firms in the São Bento do Sul cluster. 
 
In contrast with most other firms from São Bento do Sul, Rudnick developed its own marketing 
organization to sell to the U.S. directly, consisting of an export manager, three traders working 
with different product lines (home furniture, office furniture, billiard and snooker tables), and 
other four employees. Rudnick traders visit foreign buyers, including distributors and stores in 
the U.S. and other countries. The company is planning to establish a distribution center in Miami 
until the end of 2006. It is also trying to enter new export markets. 
 
Rudnick can be considered a later adopter of exporting, when compared to other firms in the São 
Bento do Sul cluster. It is very probable that the experience of other firms in the cluster had an 




4.3. Flexiv, a successful producer that failed to export 
 
Flexiv was founded by Ronaldo Duchesnes, the son of a professor of architecture and movie 
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among friends of his father: other architects, designers, and owners of business in the furniture 
industry. In 1985, he opened a finishing carpenter shop in the city of Curitiba. With the advent of 
PCs, Duchesnes became aware that changes in office automation required a new conception of 
office furniture. During a period of one year he visited design centers in Europe and developed a 
new product line specially designed to serve these new needs. 
 
In the early 1990s he became acquainted with Régis Dubrule, a Frenchman who had started a 
very successful chain of furniture stores in Brazil, Tok&Stok, after Flexiv’s participation in a 
state trade fair. The two companies celebrated a contract and Flexiv started to supply Tok&Stok 
with a product line comprising 11 items. In the early 2000s, Flexiv decided to expand the 
business by opening stores under his own brand name to sell his products. 
 
It is only in 2004 that Duchesnes decided to enter foreign markets, taking advantage of the still 
favorable exchange rate. Flexiv partnered with other local firms, hiring a joint representative that 
went to the U.S. These efforts were not successful, and the initiative failed. Duchesnes also tried 
to export to Panama, but he did not succeed either. He believes that the main reasons for his 
company’s failure in exporting have to do with price competitiveness and lack of market 
knowledge (specifically the U.S. market). 
 
Flexiv has a differentiated product line, with an emphasis in design.  It has earned in recent years 
a number of national prizes in design, including those offered by Abimóvel, the industry 
association, by Movelsul, the trade exhibition of Rio Grande do Sul, and by CNI – the National 
Federation of Industries. At present, Flexiv has a plant in Curitiba and five stores in the cities of 
Curitiba, Florianópolis, and São Paulo. It also has ten representatives in other cities of Brazil. 
 
 
4.4. A Comparison of Rudnick’s and Flexiv’s Experiences 
 
Table 13 compares relevant data for the two companies.  
 
Table 13 
Comparison between Rudnick and Flexiv 
Characteristics  Rudnick  Flexiv 
Foundation 1938  1985 
Initial product line  Wood furniture (cabinets)  Wood and non wood office furniture 
First export order  1981  2004 
Product lines  bedroom sets, dining rooms, living 
rooms, kitchen furniture, office 
furniture 
Office furniture 
No.of employees  970  90 
Export intensity (% of 
export on total sales) 
55% 0%   
 
It seems that belonging to an exporting cluster might produce valuable spillovers even to firms 
that are not engaged in manufacturing exactly the same products. Such spillovers include on one 
side, intangible aspects such as vicarious learning of export opportunities, and export practices, 
but also more tangible aspects such as those provided by the presence of export agents and 
importers from foreign countries in the cluster, which transfer technical and marketing   51
knowledge from one firm to another, and from the foreign market to the cluster. This was the 
case of Rudnick: the firm benefited from the visit of an export agent as early as 1981, searching 
for new suppliers in the São Bento do Sul cluster. There can thus be interesting export marketing 
benefits coming from being a cluster member that are not available to firms outside the cluster. 
Not having had the benefits of export marketing spillovers, Flexiv was late in searching for 
export market opportunities. It only did so when the appreciation of the Brazilian currency was 
already jeopardizing the competitiveness of Brazilian products abroad. 
 
Rudnick did not significantly invest in design, but Flexiv did. One competing explanation for 
Rudnick’s success and Flexiv’s failure might also be a matter of product adaptation. Rudnick 
was ready to manufacture specific designs and styles brought by international buyers and to sell 




5. Synthesis of the Discovery and Diffusion Process in the São Bento do Sul 
Cluster 
 
The history of the São Bento do Sul cluster shows a very interesting case of a set of 
“discoveries” followed by a diffusion process that led to the development of a very successful 
furniture exporting cluster. 
 
Table 14 presents a complete overview in time of the adoption and diffusion process in the São 
Bento do Sul furniture cluster. Since it was not possible in some cases to determine the exact 
year of a given event, some of the indications in the table are suppositions from information 
gathered in the interviews. 
 
Table 14 
Time Line for the Discovery and Diffusion Process in the São Bento do Sul Furniture 
Cluster 
Year  Firms Facts  Industry Evolution 
1950s  Zipperer exports wood handicrafts to U.S., Germany, and England.   
1960s  Zipperer exports wood handicrafts to Japan 
   
 
1965  Artefama starts to export wood handicrafts 











1975 Creation  of  FETEP 
1976  Zipperer exports furniture in mahogany to Florida 
1977  
1978  Artefama exports furniture 
1979  Carlos Arlindo Zipperer visits Canada to learn the use of pine wood in 
furniture 
Expansion of the 
colonial-style 
furniture market   52
Year  Firms Facts  Industry Evolution 
1980  Zipperer starts the adoption process of pine wood 
1981  Zipperer exports pine wood furniture  
Export agents are established in São Bento do Sul 
1982  




Maturity and decline 
of the colonial-style 
furniture market 
1987  Artefama starts the production of pine wood furniture. 
1988  Trade fair in Germany. 
1989  Exports to Germany (Zipperer and others). 
Adotion of pine 
wood by other 
producers 
1990  
1991  Export agents visit the cluster.  First export boom 
1992  
1993  
Development of the 
supply chain  
1994  Artefama starts to export pine wood furniture. 




1998  First edition of Promóvel. 
Investments in plant 
and equipment  
1999  Study of the U.S. market by Abimóvel. 
2000  
2001  Cluster efforts to reach the U.S.market. 
2
nd edition of Promóvel. 
Competitiveness Forum installed. 
2002  Expansion of cluster exports to the U.S. 
2003  
2004  
2005  Third edition of Promóvel/Brazilian Furniture Program. 
New UDESC campus in São Bento do Sul. 
Accelerated growth 
of pine wood 
furniture exports 
2006   Crisis 
 
 
Figure 2 shows a tentative schematic representation of the diffusion process in the São Bento do 
Sul cluster, based on evidence collected in the interviews and from published information. It is to 
some extent speculative, because only indirect evidence was available regarding certain aspects. 
The arrows link the various players in the diffusion process. The legend indicates the type of 
link: those that come from solid evidence are portrayed as a full line, and those for which there is 
only limited evidence are represented by a dotted line. The first number in the parenthesis under 
the firm’s name is the year of foundation; the second number is the year when the firm started 
exporting. 
 
The second group of pine wood furniture exporters, in the early 1990s included Artefama, and 
thus could not be influenced by this firm. It is believed that Zipperer’s experience was still a 
benchmark for the second group of exporters, but not as important as for the first group. There 
are also indications that the experience of the early adopters was used by the second group, and 
that export agents and foreign buyers played an important role in the dissemination of the 
“discovery”. 
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The third group of pine wood exporters (late adopters) was influenced by Artefama, at this point 
already the leading firm in the cluster, and by export agents and foreign buyers. This third group 
might have benefited from the actions of the Brazilian government and the industry association. 
 
The diagram shows that Zipperer was followed by Artefama and other exporters of handicrafts in 
the earlier period, and that Zipperer had an impact on the first group of pine wood furniture 
exporters (early adopters) during the 1980s.  
 
Figure 2 
A  Schematic Representation of the Diffusion Process of Exporting 




An interesting complementary aspect has to do with the diffusion process among clusters. Data 
available suggests that the clusters of São Bento do Sul (43% of total Brazilian exports of 
furniture in 2005) and Bento Gonçalves (27%) were earlier movers in the discovery of furniture 
exports, although this process was more intense in São Bento do Sul first, and Bento Gonçalves 
second. Other clusters are showing, however, substantial growth: the Bahia cluster had the 
largest increase in exports in 2005, 50.6%, followed by Minas Gerais with 44%, and Ceará with 
43%, suggesting that the diffusion process among clusters is still under way. These clusters are 
located in areas of low-cost labor, indicating a possible transfer of exports to them. 
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6. Case Study Analysis and Conclusions 
 
The analysis of this case provides solid evidence of the role of the first mover in the furniture 
cluster of São Bento do Sul, and the subsequent bandwagon effect. The following is a discussion 
of the main aspects learned from this case, regarding the original research questions, and partial 
conclusions, limited to this case study. 
 
 
6.1. The Nature of the Discovery 
 
This case study shows a series of “discoveries” that led to the development of a very successful 
furniture exporting cluster in the Santa Catarina state of Brazil. These discoveries were: 
 
•  first, the use of wasted parts of the pine to manufacture handicrafts; 
•  second, the exportation of these products; 
•  third, the decision to manufacture colonial-style furniture 
•  fourth, the move to the production and exportation of pine wood furniture. 
 
There is no question that Zipperer made the four critical steps that allowed the growth of the São 
Bento do Sul cluster, and Artefama later became the leading firm in the cluster. The two 
companies inspired other firms to follow their path in different moments of the cluster’s history. 
In both companies two charismatic figures exerted the role of local leaders in the development of 
the cluster.  
 
 
6.2. First Mover Characteristics 
 
Zipperer pioneered all the steps that led to the development of the cluster. An entrepreneurial 
firm, the company was led by its founder during the first three above-mentioned discoveries. The 
fourth discovery was led by the second generation of the family. 
 
One specific individual, the founder of Zipperer, had a paramount importance in this process. A 
genuine entrepreneur, he created new opportunities, faced initial problems, developed solutions, 
accepted risks, and succeeded. He was also a man devoted to his community, and a political 
figure, as the city’s mayor for a period of time. These characteristics are probably behind the 
breadth and speed of diffusion of his business experiments. Even after his retirement and death, 
the company remained for a few years as the flagship firm
14 in the cluster, while the second 
generation was in command.  
 
Later Zipperer lost the leadership to Artefama, which became the leading firm in the cluster in 
the 1990s. Artefama’s CEO also had a leading role in the São Bento do Sul cluster. A supporter 
of a number of initiatives, he is a vice-president of Abimóvel, the Brazilian Association of 
                                                 
14 The term “flagship firm” is used here following the work of Ferreira, Tavares, and Hesterly (2006), meaning “the company that leads the 
cluster”, typically a “mother firm” with a large number of spin-offs.   55




6.3. First Mover’s Motives and External Stimuli 
 
The entrepreneur seemed to be self-motivated in the first two steps of the cluster’s development. 
The first step was to make handicrafts from pine wood. There were already firms in the cluster 
producing various wood artifacts, using the two most important resources available: wood from 
local forests and the ability to carve wood. But the entrepreneur innovated by using a raw 
material that was wasted and had up to that moment no economic value. Even before starting to 
export, he innovated again by selling to other regions in the country in the 1950s. The 
significance of this innovation can only be fully appreciated under the light of the physical and 
cultural insulation of the original community of settlers for more than one century. 
 
The second step was exporting. Zipperer was the first company from the region to export, and 
was also the first to export a full container of handicraft products. Initially stimulated by 
unsolicited orders from potential buyers in other countries, the entrepreneur actively pursued 
these contacts, visiting foreign customers, and started his export business. He thus expanded first 
from the local to the national market, and then went international. This pattern of firm expansion 
has been hypothesized by scholars from the Uppsala School in Sweden (Johanson and Vahlne 
1977, 1990), with considerable empirical support from various studies. In this case, sequential 
market expansion was not induced by external stimuli, but was apparently the result of the 
entrepreneurial spirit. 
 
The third step was the decision to move into colonial-style furniture. Evidences collected suggest 
that Zipperer was not alone in this effort, although it was the most important actor. Another 
company in the cluster was also influential at this point, as well as an external actor, a retailer 
from the city of São Paulo. Despite these influences, there is no question that Zipperer made the 
most significant moves towards the adoption of this new product. Although this type of furniture 
could not be successfully exported, it induced an expansion cycle, with many new companies 
being formed to take advantage of the colonial-style furniture boom. Many of these firms were 
spin-offs of Zipperer and Artefama. 
 
The fourth and final step was the move towards pine wood furniture and its exportation. The 
company was then motivated by the desire to export furniture and the understanding that the 
products it manufactured were not, for a variety of reasons, adequate to foreign markets. 
Externalities included the growing shortage of native woods, and the influence of a foreign 
businessman who gave the son of Zipperer’s founder the opportunity of visiting his plant in 
Canada to learn production techniques. Also, the firm had its own pine forests, thanks to 
government incentives to reforesting. Furthermore, there was a growing awareness within the 
business community in São Bento do Sul of the shortage of wood and an interest in pine wood. 
Despite these influences, Zipperer was again the most important factor in the adoption of pine 
wood, and was a benchmark for other firms in the cluster. This was the last outstanding 
contribution of Indústrias Zipperer to the cluster development.   56
6.4. Difficulties Faced by the First Mover 
 
Initial difficulties faced by the entrepreneur were associated to the insulation of São Bento do Sul 
from the rest of the country, both physically and culturally.  The entrepreneur had no access to 
universities, technical schools, or research centers. During the first step of the cluster 
development, when he established his firm, he was forced to develop his own techniques from 
imported German books, and trained his employees.  
 
A second period of technical difficulties happened during the first exports of furniture. The 
company was not aware, as many other Brazilian exporters of wood products at the time, of the 
effect of a dryer climate on furniture that was not adequately dried, since the problem did not 
appear in the wet climates of Brazil, except in the highlands where the city of Brasilia is located. 
As soon as the company exported a first batch, problems appeared, and the son of the founder 
went abroad to visit the customer and try to solve the problem. The company changed to a new 
type of wood, mahogany, and finally moved to pine wood.  
 
Technical difficulties persisted, but the company invested time and money to overcome them. 
Investments were made in equipment and machinery. Finally, in the early 1980s, the company 
succeeded in exporting good quality pine wood furniture, paving the way to followers. 
 
 
6.5. Entry in the First Foreign Market and Subsequent Markets 
 
It is difficult to establish which was “the first foreign market” for the first mover, since there 
were a number of different moments were the firm had to start a new export business, depending 
on the product exported. Two specific moments of time seem to be particularly meaningful in 
terms of “discoveries”: 
 
•  first exports of handicrafts; 
•  first exports of pine wood furniture to West Germany in the early 1980s. 
 
When the company started to export handicrafts, the first foreign markets were the U.S., 
Germany, and England, followed by Japan. It was not possible to determine which of these 
markets was first served, since there are no records. Although first exports came from unsolicited 
orders, substantial efforts were made to develop these foreign markets, including product 
adaptation and traveling to the foreign market. 
 
Another breakthrough was the exportation of pine wood furniture. This time the first market was 
West Germany, but soon this market lost its importance, with the reunification of Germany. 
Importers shifted their orders to firms from East Germany, to support the restructuring of the 
economy. At this point, Zipperer led again other firms into the U.S. market, which became the 
number one foreign market for Brazilian exports of pine wood furniture. 
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6.6. Impact of Diffusion on the First Mover 
 
Why didn’t the first mover benefit more from the “discovery” of pine wood furniture production 
and exportation? Why Artefama grew to become more than five times larger than Zipperer? 
 
Diffusion did not seem to have a negative impact on the first mover. In fact, the problems faced 
by the pioneering firm seemed to have more to do with succession problems, which halted its 
development, than with a loss of market share due to the competitive action of imitators. 
 
One reason is exactly the nature of a cluster, characterized by dense agglomeration and a high 
degree of attractiveness to all sorts of supporting and related activities. This type of industrial 
organization can be extremely effective in promoting the development of the whole group of 
firms, by providing economies of scale in production, access to suppliers of various inputs, and 
by attracting buyers. The growth of the cluster actually tends to have a positive effect on the 
growth of member firms. Even in the case of spin-offs, which are sometimes seen as “stealing” 
knowledge or market share, they appeared to be beneficial to the cluster’s earlier development. 
Nevertheless, the positive impact of imitators and spin-offs that mimick the parent company’s 
behavior may turn negative, with the cluster facing the competition of low-cost Chinese products 
and the appreciation of the Brazilian currency. 
 
The characteristics of family-owned firms may also help to explain why Zipperer did not grow 
faster. The company did not have the capital to invest in further expansion, and did not have easy 
and fast access to long-term subsidized debt. The option of accepting partners outside the family 
is often not considered, because of a desire to keep the company under family control (Barretto 
and Da Rocha, 2001). Often a family-owned company does not even wants to grow. Although 
we were not able to determine if these reasons actually explain the case of Zipperer in the 1990s, 
we believe it might have had an impact, especially if one considers the company has been 
dealing with difficult succession problems, including the withdrawal of the founder’s son from 
the business and the transfer of management to the third generation. 
 
Finally, the expansion of pine wood furniture exports only happened in the 1990s, when Zipperer 




6.7. Characteristics of Imitating Firms 
 
Imitating firms did not differ from the pioneer in almost any regard. All the firms in the region 
had access to the same resources: raw materials, skilled labor, technical know-how. Most firms 
were entrepreneurial and founded by descendants of European immigrants, mostly from 
Germany and Austria. The firms initially faced the same challenges and obstacles.  They were 
also typically small, with a few medium-sized firms, at least until the 1990s. 
 
The major difference between the pioneer and its followers as suggested by the research results 
was leadership. The original entrepreneur, the founder of the pioneering firm, was a classic 
entrepreneur, as well as a public figure and a community leader. He actively searched for new   58
opportunities, and found solutions for the problems and limitations he had to face. One of the 
followers, Artefama, which later became the flagship firm leading the cluster, also had an 
inspired CEO. 
 
Many imitators were spin-offs of the leading companies, Zipperer and Artefama, or other first 
adopters, and mimicked their parent firm’s behavior. This process of endogenous growth of the 
cluster by spin-offs also favored imitation. 
 
 
6.8. Strategies Followed by Imitating Firms 
 
Endogenous spin-offs and isomorphic behavior among firms in the cluster make it possible to 
look at the firms in the São Bento do Sul as one single unit. In fact, the cluster can be described 
as a constellation of similar firms. 
 
The strategies followed by imitating firms were basically the same of the pioneer, with very few 
exceptions. (Rudnick, a company used to develop the counterfactual analysis for this case, is 
one.) They exported to the same markets; they also moved together to new markets as the 
demand for their products decreased, for one reason or another. During the early 1980s, for 
example, the pioneer and the early followers exported to Germany and other Western European 
countries. In the mid-1980s, as Germans buyers shifted their orders to East Germany, the 
companies, under the leadership of the pioneering firm, expanded to the U.S. In sequence, firms 
increased their exports again to Germany, in response to the civil war in the Balkans. Later, 
under the auspices of a study developed by the industry association, which was made available to 
all of them, manufacturers expanded their efforts again in the U.S. market. 
 
There is a time lag in adoption, and some firms can be described as early adopters, while others 
should be seen as late adopters, and others even as  laggards, using Rogers (1995) taxonomy. 
Also, some firms were very fast in adopting certain “discoveries”, and not others. This was the 
case of Artefama, who was the immediate follower of Zipperer in pine wood handicrafts, but 
took much more time in adopting an obvious success, pine wood furniture. The later adoption of 
pine wood furniture by Artefama was probably caused by its moderate success in exporting 
furniture made of imbuia. 
 
 
6.9. External Events Influencing Discoveries and Diffusion 
 
Table 15 presents a list of external events that had a positive or negative impact in the process of 
discovery and diffusion examined. 
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Table 15 
External Events in the Process of Discovery and Diffusion in the São Bento do Sul Cluster 
Steps in the Cluster Development  External Events  Observations 
Exports of handicrafts  Competition from products made of plastic  Negative impact 
Production of colonial-style furniture  Colonial-style boom in the domestic market  Positive impact 
Shortage of native wood (imbuia)  Positive impact 
Production of pine-wood furniture 
Government incentives to reforesting  Positive impact 
Requirement of reforested wood to export to the 
European market 
Positive impact 
Reunification of Germany  Negative impact 
Civil wars in the Balkans  Positive impact 
Devaluation of the Brazilian currency  Positive impact 
Competition from Chinese exporters Negative  impact 
Exportation of pine wood furniture 
Appreciation of the Brazilian currency  Negative impact 
 
 
Of all the external events that helped to shape the growth of the São Bento do Sul cluster, those 
that had more impact were the boom in the domestic market for colonial-style furniture in the 
1970s, the civil wars in the Balkans, the 1999 devaluation of the Brazilian currency, and the 
present price competition from Chinese firms.  
 
 
6.10. Coordination Issues and Spillovers 
 
Two elements can explain the diffusion process: homogeneity and cooperation. Both aspects are 
the result of specific cultural characteristics of the cluster, its centuries-long insulation, and the 
degree of interconnectedness among its members, due to kinship, friendship ties, business 
relationships, church connections, etc. These factors permitted a high level of communication, 
which in turn facilitated informal coordination among member firms, and also stimulated 
isomorphic behavior.  
 
It should be noted that firms in the cluster did not valued formal mechanisms of coordination, 
such as syndicates or associations. This was stressed by most people interviewed in the cluster, 
and was actually reported as a negative characteristic. Yet our research indicated that although 
joint actions were not common, communication flows were high and isomorphic behavior was 
the rule, not the exception. Competition and cooperation seemed to coexist side by side in the 
cluster. 
 
The diffusion process also took place because Zipperer and Artefama, although unwillingly, 
supplied skilled workers to fulfill the needs of other firms in the region, and stimulated the 
appearance of new entrepreneurs among their own employees. They also gave the example, and 
still do, in terms of adoption of innovations and plant modernization. 
 
Spillovers identified in this case were typically horizontal and intra-industry, that is, among 
competitors, but there were also vertical spillovers, among firms in the supply chain. 
Technological spillovers seemed to be mainly positive. They include raised productivity of 
imitators due to improvement in the management of pine wood forests by wood suppliers, or 
better quality accessories by suppliers of parts. Training effects were identified, as part of the   60
spin-off process, as well as by means of FETEP, the research and training foundation established 
and funded by the city and local businessmen. Marketing spillovers could also be identified. 
They included the transfer of knowledge on exporting and the easier access to export markets, 
including the access to export agents and distributors that operated in the cluster. As mentioned 
in the counterfactual analysis, cluster membership tends to facilitate the absorption of positive 
spillovers, because of the dense agglomeration of firms.  
 
Negative spillovers were not identified, since the “business-stealing effect” (Haddad and 
Harrison, 1993; Aitken and Harrison, 1999) was not identified in any of the interviews in the 
cluster. This is probably because the continued export growth in recent years, but might change 
with the reduction of export growth.  
 
 
6.11. Role of Private and Public Support Institutions 
 
Support institutions played a role not to start the process, but to stimulate its continuance. 
Among these, FETEP, originally an initiative of local business owners, had an important role in 
the early years, mainly in the 80s, in helping imitators to adopt pine wood as a raw material, by 
helping to solve some of the technical problems involved in its adoption, and training skilled 
labor. Other support institutions were SENAI, the industry agency for education and 
development, and UDESC, the State University of Santa Catarina, that established a campus in 
São Bento do Sul and presently provides well-trained managers and specialized engineers and 
technicians to the cluster. 
 
Abimóvel, the manufacturers’ association, was especially active after 1998, with the Promóvel 
Program. Its main role in the diffusion process was to accelerate the adoption of exporting as a 
business strategy by firms in the industry. Abimóvel provided funds, technical and marketing 
support. Not by accident, one of the leading businessmen of São Bento do Sul – Alvaro Weiss, 
the CEO of Artefama – had an important position at Abimóvel. Yet it seems that Abimóvel was 
more important in fostering the expansion of exports in other furniture clusters than in São Bento 
do Sul. Its impact on the São Bento do Sul was subsidiary. 
 
Joint efforts between government agencies and the industry association permitted the creation of 
a national program for the development of furniture exports. These efforts supported and 
expanded the scope of the diffusion process, which was already underway, and benefited mostly 
late adopters and laggards from the São Bento do Sul cluster and other clusters that were starting 
to export. Despite these positive contributions, managers perceived that the Brazilian 
government was more a cause of problems to exporting firms than a source of solutions or 
advantages, as explained in more detail in section 3.5. 
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CASE 2 – THE SWIMWEAR INDUSTRY 
 
 
1. General Description 
 
The Brazilian swimwear industry grew exponentially in the last 20 years. Between 2000 and 
2005, the sector experienced unprecedented growth and achieved average export growth rates of 
32% a year. Official statistics indicate that total exports by the Brazilian swimwear industry 
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The Brazilian swimwear industry origins date back to the 1950s, when Catalina, a brand owned 
by the American clothing company Pacific Mills, established a subsidiary in Brazil to 
manufacture swimsuits. This company became famous for the sponsorship of various beauty 
competitions, such as Miss America, Miss Universe, and Miss Brazil.  
 
The bikini, a product launched internationally in the 50s, was not accepted in the Brazilian 
market until the 60s, because of legal and religious impediments to its adoption. First produced 
domestically or sold in a few stores, the bikini gained acceptance only in the 70s, when the first 
bikini produced under a designer brand name – Blue Man – became available.
15 
 
During the 1970s, a few companies started the production of swimwear and exported their 
products in small volumes. It was at this point in time that Brazil became known for the tanga, a 
smaller version of the bikini, and the product became related to Brazil’s image (a phenomenon 
known as the “made-in effect”) and, specifically, to the Ipanema beach. One interviewee 
suggested that the well-known song Girl of Ipanema was an additional factor in spreading the 
international reputation of the Brazilian product. Another interviewee believed there was an 
influence of Brigitte Bardot, who used to come to one of Brazil’s most famous beaches, Buzios, 
as one of the factors in the creation of the Made in Brazil image of the bikini. 
 
                                                 
15 According to David Azulay, founder and CEO of Blue Man (Menos é mais. Veja, 11.10.2006, p.107.   63
During the 1980s, a large number of new firms in the swimwear industry entered the domestic 
market. Many of them were cottage industries, since the production of swimwear did not require 
substantial investments or skills, and the product had a large market. Others were small-sized, 
and a few of them had their own sales outlets. Most of these firms did not actively export. 
Companies involved with export activities during this period had been typically in operation 
since the 1970s or even before.  
 
The industry was forced to change during the 1990s due to Brazil’s trade liberalization process. 
Trade liberalization had two main effects on the Brazilian swimwear industry. On one side, 
liberalization permitted cost reductions, particularly of machinery; on the other, it opened the 
domestic market to international competition, forcing local manufacturers to cut their prices. The 
modernization process permitted large productivity gains in the whole textile industry; firms 
acquired new technologies and invested in advanced training that allowed them to compete 
internationally. As an example, equipment imported by the apparel industry during this period 
went from US$377,365 in 1990 to 737,152 thousand dollars within five years (IEMI, 2006).  
 
Additionally, Brazilian firms were exposed to international competition requiring them to 
upgrade their products and offer competitive prices. The estimated price of a finished swimwear 
garment in 1990 was US$ 10.23; in 2005 this same garment was worth $4.17. Swimwear 
production continued to increase since Brazil’s trade liberalization in the early 1990s up to 
259,400 pieces in 2005 (IEMI, 2006).  This value is underestimated since informality in the 
sector is quite large. 
 
Also characteristic of the 1990s was the increased international exposure of the industry. 
Additionally, concrete actions had been carried out to strengthen the fashion industry in Brazil, 
which also benefited swimwear manufacturers. One action that stands out was the creation of the 
Brazilian Fashion Calendar in 1996. The Brazilian Fashion Calendar encompasses various 
“fashion week” events that take place in different Brazilian cities. These fashion events played 
an important role in promoting Brazilian products internationally. According to Paulo Borges, a 
leading fashion promoter and the man responsible for the creation of the event, the Fashion 
Calendar also benefited the industry by bringing designers together, thus creating a challenging 
and creative competitive environment, which in turn stimulated the development of 
internationally competitive products. The rise of Brazilian top models such as Giselle Bündchen 
and Adriana Lima in the international fashion world also attracted attention to Brazilian 
swimwear products.  
 
Exports began to gain momentum with the Brazilian currency devaluation in 1999. The country 
experienced a decrease in real wages in dollars until it reached a low in 2003 (see Graph 8). The 
decrease in wage costs – one of the main production factors in the swimwear industry – made 
Brazilian exports price-competitive.Presently, the industry faces the challenge of the appreciation 
of the real. Few companies are well managed and seem to have the ability to remain exporting 
with the present exchange rate, according to various interviewees. 
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The Brazilian domestic market for swimwear products is quite large. Market size played an 
important role in permitting firms to develop and add value to the final product, thereby 
stimulating the emergence of current export activities. Beach activities in Brazil can take place 
almost 365 days a year, contrary to what happens in colder climates, were these activities only 
take a few months per year. 
 
The Brazilian swimwear industry consists of approximately 700 firms that produce 250 million 
pieces a year (IEMI, 2006).  The industry is formed mainly by micro and small-sized firms, with 
a large number of cottage industries. Women are a dominant part of the workforce in the industry 
(70 to 80%). Around 200 firms are presently involved with export activities. The largest 
exporting firms are concentrated in the states of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro.  
 
The Brazilian swimwear industry has a heterogeneous profile. Companies in the industry pursue 
different internationalization strategies. Some manufacturers emphasize brand development and 
export under their own brand names, while other firms chose to pursue private label strategies. 
Companies that sell their products under private label contracts produce larger quantities and 
export to large international companies, which in turn sell these products under their own labels. 
The number of firms that are capable of selling abroad under their own brand names is small, and 
their export volumes are typically limited. 
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It is possible to identify the existence of production clusters in the swimwear industry, although 
these clusters have very different characteristics from more traditional types of cluster, such as 
those in the furniture and footwear industries. The two most important beachwear clusters are at 
this point located in the cities of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, but other clusters can be 
identified all over the country, in most cases in cities located in the coast with nearby beach 
activities. This case study focused in the Rio de Janeiro and the São Paulo clusters. 
 
 
1.2. The Rio de Janeiro and the São Paulo Beachwear Clusters 
 
The original beachwear cluster was located in the city of Rio de Janeiro, the most important 
fashion center of the country, at least until the early 1990s. In the 1990s São Paulo gradually 
raised as the leading fashion center, even if Rio de Janeiro remained very important.  
 
Besides the city of Rio de Janeiro, there are other eight fashion clusters in the State of Rio de 
Janeiro, of which one is also a center for the production of swimwear (Cabo Frio). According to 
FIRJAN, the Federation of Industries of the State of Rio de Janeiro, the average value of the 
kilogram of textile products produced in the State was US$ 59.69, compared to an average for 
the whole country of US$22.13, an indication of the fashion content of its apparel output. 
 
Among the various initiatives of the last fifteen years to promote the fashion industry in the state 
of Rio, the following are considered the most important: 
 
•  The Fashion Forum, created in 2001, putting together a number of designers, in order to 
develop actions to promote Brazilian fashion products; 
•  The Fashion Rio Week, a fashion show created in 2002; 
•  The Fashion Business, a fashion products exchange center, created in 2003, to facilitate 
the contact between foreign buyers and firms located in the State.
16 
 
The São Paulo beachwear cluster developed in the 1990s, following the Rio de Janeiro cluster. It 
differs from the latter in that it has developed a large volume of private label exports, although it 
also has brand-name designers. The most relevant initiative is the São Paulo Fashion Week, 
presently the most important even in the Brazilian Fashion Calendar. 
 
 
2. The Discovery and the Diffusion Process: Historical Overview 
 
Identifying a first mover in the Brazilian swimwear industry is a very complex task, since most 
companies are small and there are almost no records of industry evolution. The information 
comes from various sources but ultimately from the firms themselves. Unfortunately, the 
information given is not very precise. Also, firms are reluctant in supplying information because 
of intense competition in the domestic market and the fear of supplying critical information to 
                                                 
16 Betwwen 2002 and 2006, the Fashion Business received almost 400 foreign buyers interested in Brazilian products. To attract buyers, FIRJAN 
subsidizes the visit of foreign buyers, which are selected by a committee. The 2006 edition of Fashion Business had 150 buyers, generating 
domestic sales of R$ 304 million and exports of $11 million. (Vale mais do que pesa. O Globo, 12.01.2007, p.23)   66
others. Finally, jealousies and rivalry among designers who have created the most successful 
brand names in the Brazilian market makes it difficult to evaluate reciprocal influences. 
 
Two firms – Blue Man and Bumbum – claim to be the first mover, and most other firms in the 
industry, although recognizing the pioneering role of the two entrepreneurs, do not see 
themselves as followers. The following description of firms, historical events, and mutual 
perceptions sheds some light on this complex diffusion process. 
 
The structure of the industry evolved substantially since the 1970s and other firms have now 
taken the lead. Companies such as Rosset and TDB focus mainly on private label production 
export larger volumes. Other firms such as Salinas, Rosa Chá, and Lenny successfully export 
under their own brand names, but they still have a small share of total Brazilian exports.  
 
 
2.1. Blue Man, the first mover 
 
The fashion designer David Azulay founded Blue Man in 1972 after a successful launch in the 
Brazilian market of jeans bikinis he had designed and produced. The first jeans bikini was made 
for his girlfriend, and was so successful among friends that he decided to sell more units of the 
same model. Export activities started soon afterwards, in 1974, as a result of unsolicited orders. 
Flight attendants working for foreign airlines carried back to their countries Blue Man’s products 
to resell or for gift giving. Later on stores that bought Blue Man’s products using these flight 
attendants as intermediaries made direct contact with the company in Brazil to place their orders. 
Almost at the same time, a tourist from Sweden bought Blue Man’s bikinis to resell in his own 
stores. 
 
Shortly thereafter, the company had an unexpected but extremely favorable exposure in the 
international media when British journalists working for The Sun arrived in Rio to photograph 
Brazilian women at Ipanema beach. They noticed that many women were wearing the same 
bikini, a tanga-type model with the American flag. The picture appeared in the cover of The Sun, 
and read: “After Carmen Miranda, Coffee and Pelé, Brazil has created a new success product: 
the tanga” (Rubim, 2004). 
 
After this publicity in The Sun, these journalists were approached by businessmen interested in 
buying the product. The journalists contacted Azulay back in Brazil, but the deal did not 
progress. Azulay then flew to London, Paris, and New York to sell his products. His primary 
motivation was not associated to the conquest of new markets. In fact, Azulay indicated that it 
was not even the idea of achieving brand recognition, for at the time he had no interest in these 
matters. His true motivation was a matter of vanity, as he himself recognized: to see “the world 
wearing his creations”, to see his products sold in European stores. A secondary motivation to 
export was to reduce seasonality in the business; he hoped to sell his products in these foreign 
markets during the months of March, April, and May. 
 
When traveling to Europe, Azulay did not have previous contacts with distributors and stores 
abroad. During his trip to London, he paid the journalists to introduce him to various store 
managers and distributors in London. Then he went to Paris, again without a marketing plan or   67
contacts, hoping to be received by store managers to offer his products. He ended by contacting 
an importer who bought 10,000 units. In New York, a friend arranged a contact with the 
purchasing department of Bloomingdale’s, a large department stores chain. Other contacts were 
made with two other companies generating a few contracts. (Rubim, 2004). In the overall, 
Azulay’s first internationalization attempts were not very successful. Yet initial contacts with 
distributors were made, generating future sales. 
 
Although initial exports were sporadic, Blue Man won a national award in 1976 as the main 
swimwear exporter from Brazil. Azulay was invited by the Brazilian Foreign Ministry to 
participate in an international trade show in Germany. Once again, Azulay did not sell many 
bikinis but was able to contact distributors; later on some of these contacts turned into business 
partnerships. In retrospective, Azulay regretted not to take full advantage of these government-
sponsored international fairs but he did get additional international exposure. 
 
In the following five years Brazilian beachwear gained more visibility in foreign markets. The 
domestic market for beachwear also developed, with an increase in the number of brands sold, as 
well as in product diversification. 
 
During the eighties, Azulay made substantial efforts to adapt his product line to foreign standards 
in order to satisfy different demands on size and style. But to achieve this goal it was necessary 
to spend extra time and resources. With a limited staff dedicated to product development, as well 
as administration, since the company remained a typical entrepreneurial firm, the result was a 
lower priority to the domestic market. A multiplicity of models and patterns were offered to 
foreign buyers, reducing economies of scale. 
 
With lower returns and loss of brand equity in the domestic market, Azulay became aware that 
the firm had neglected the Brazilian market, loosing its original positioning, its “essence”, the 
main reason for its success. In 1984, Blue Man “traded Italy for Ipanema” and returned to the 
brand’s original positioning, adopting a Brazilian tropical style that is still present in its products. 
The company reduced its international focus and decided to work with a limited number of stores 
abroad, selling directly and not using intermediaries. It opened a number of stores in the 
domestic market. 
 
Despite these changes in the company’s strategic focus, Blue Man continued to cultivate a 
presence in the American market, considered its most important foreign market. In 1990, Blue 
Man opened a store in Miami Beach, but it only lasted six years. In 2000, Blue Man began to 
export sungas (man swimsuits) in a deal with the American company Universal Gear. It also 
exported directly to companies such as G-Star, Energie, Diesel, Lucky Brand, Calvin Klein, 
DKNY, Kenneth Cole, Adidas, Y.M.L.A, Body Body Wear and Levi’s (Rubim, 2004). In 2004, 
the company created a website to sell directly to international customers. This time products 
offered in this virtual catalog were standardized and the company did not invest time and 
resources adapting to specific customer demands. Blue Man offered three main product lines, 
each developed to meet the American standards, the European standards, and the Brazilian 
standards.  
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In 2006 Blue Man had 22 stores in Brazil and sold 300,000 pieces, with total sales of US$12.4 
million. Exports accounted for less than 10% of its total production. In fact, exports were no 
longer the firm’s priority as in earlier stages of its development. The company adopted a market 
strategy primarily focused on the domestic market, although it remained receptive to direct sales 
to foreign customers without using agents or distributors. The company intended to develop the 
high-end niche, working directly with store owners in foreign markets. Azulay stated that the 
Brazilian Fashion Calendar was an excellent way to attract the “right kind of exports”, that is, 
buyers from this high-end segment of the market. In 2006, Blue Man was selling directly to 
stores in L.A., San Francisco, Saint Barth, New York, and Marbella.  
 
Several firms followed Blue Man’s initial footsteps. Yet although David Azulay remained a 
well-known name in the industry, recognized by many as a pioneer, he does not inspire new 
followers, as he did in the earlier days. New entrants in the industry have adopted different 
export strategies, mainly private label contracts. Even new firms exporting under their own brand 
name seem to be following the industry trend, but not necessarily inspired by the pioneer. 
 
 
2.2. Bumbum, an independent second-mover 
 
Bumbum was founded in 1979 by Cid Pereira (known as Cidinho) an entrepreneur with a 
previous unsuccessful experience (a fashion store that went bankrupt). Looking for new 
opportunities, he became aware that most stores in Rio had a small selection of swimwear, but 
none of them offered customers a full line. Then, in 1979, he started the first Bumbum store in 
Ipanema, Rio de Janeiro. It was the first store in Brazil specialized in beachwear. His bikinis 
were sold inside a small cotton sac with the store’s logo, which started to be used by consumers 
to carry objects to the beach (such as sunglasses, suntan products, etc.). 
 
It soon became a fad among the people in Ipanema beach, at that time the trendsetters in 
beachwear in Brazil. Less than one year latter, Bumbum opened its own production facilities in 
Ipanema. Shortly thereafter he opened a store in Fortaleza, in the Brazilian state of Ceará. 
First “exports” of Bumbum were similar to Blue Man’s. Tourists and flight attendants carried 
Bumbum’s products to other countries. Yet the company made no efforts to export the product.  
The first step in foreign markets was made in 1985, with the inauguration of a Bumbum store in 
Ibiza, Spain. The store was located at Calle Mayor, the main street. The choice of Ibiza had to do 
with the fact that it was considered a fashionable place, were artists and famous people gathered 
for vacations. The decision to open a store in Ibiza was not taken after careful planning, but was 
more intuitive, based on the entrepreneur’s feelings that it would be as successful as the Ipanema 
store. He explained his motives as follows: 
 
“And then I traveled to Ibiza with a friend of mine. When I arrived there, I thought: ‘This 
island is my place. I am going to be here anyway’. I was charmed by the island, with its 
beautiful people, with a Brazilian-like climate, and Italians, French, people from all 
nationalities, a Babel tower without clothes, only beachwear.” 
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At the time, according to Bumbum managers, Brazil was already known in Europe for its bikinis. 
In fact, when Bumbum started its operations in Ibiza, it had to initiate a legal suit against a 
Spanish businessman who had registered the Bumbum trademark and logo in that country.  
Cidinho opened the store in Ibiza in partnership with a friend. He received no support from the 
government or any other institution. Again, he was a pioneer in this type of specialized retailing, 
since there were no stores in Ibiza dedicated only to swimwear. Retailing stores in Ibiza only 
stayed open between May and September of each year, during the summer season. The first year 
of operation was considered quite successful, but after a while it was felt that the amount of 
effort required from the owners was excessive for the money earned from the business. Bumbum 
did not have an administrative structure to support its export activities to Ibiza. After three to 
four years, the store was closed. Yet Cidinho believes this was an important contribution to the 
development of the industry: 
 
“I am proud of my participation in this process. I’ve created the concept of fashion 
swimwear retailing in Brazil, and then in Europe, when I opened my store in Ibiza. After 
I did it, many entrepreneurs all over the world were jealous, they saw it was something 
really promising, and now there are thousands of competitors all over the world. When I 
opened my store in Fortaleza, the same thing happened; a number of new brands 
appeared, once people realized what I was doing.” 
 
Evaluating his personal influence over other Brazilian swimwear manufacturers, he added: “I did 
not learn anything with them, but they learned everything with me.” One of the managers in the 
firm observed that “He turned a bikini into an object of desire”. Also, the company site claims 
that “it was after Bumbum’s example that all other brands appeared”. 
 
Another store was opened in Los Angeles, California, in 1988, before the Ibiza store was closed. 
This time there was a demand for Bumbum’s bikinis in the U.S. market, and the decision was 
whether the store should be located in Miami or Los Angeles. The decision to open the store in 
Los Angeles was based on what Cidinho himself called “unreasonable” reasons, namely the 
desire to live new experiences, rather than business profitability. The store, with 300 squared 
meters, was located in Manhattan Boulevard, “exactly where the American surf was born”. The 
store was profitable, although operational costs were high. Unfortunately, local people were 
hired that did not perform well, causing difficulties to the business. Cidinho decided he was 
“tired of all this” and closed the store. 
 
Depressed with the death of his mother and negative business experiences, Cidinho “abandoned” 
Bumbum. For a few years he stayed away and got involved with other business activities. 
Bumbum faced serious problems in the next years, lacking the leadership of the founder. Cidinho 
attributed some of the problems to the fact that the firm was unfairly excluded from participating 
in the Rio Fashion Week, because of personal disputes with organizers. He tried to sell the 
business in the mid-1990s, but was not successful. He was back to Bumbum in the late 1990s. 
Bumbum export activities in the 2000s were limited to selling to the high-end market. The 
company exported to the U.S, Canada, Italy, Australia, and Croatia. Cidinho claimed he was not 
interested in exporting at any cost, but that he wanted to make a nice profit. He explained:   70
“My focus now is profitability. I will only sell my products to stores that really want 
them, to whom I can sell for thirty dollars
17. I have no interest in selling for less. I have 
such an incredible market in Brazil that I don’t need to be concerned. My brand is 
already established, if I put a store in a good location it is going to sell well. But I still 
aim at exporting…” 
 
The focus on the high-end segment forced the firm to accept small orders from foreign buyers, 
which required special production runs, causing difficulties with production schedules. In 2005, 
the company decided not to prioritize these small orders, and often did not even accept them.  
 
A manager of Lenny, another leading brand name, mentioned that Bumbum tried to export a 
bikini that was too small even for Brazilian standards, thus causing some problems to firms that 
followed by establishing an unreal image of the Brazilian product (Rubim, 2004). These 
comments suggest that the company might have had problems in exporting because the product 
was not adapted to foreign consumer preferences and habits. This information, however, was not 
supported by interviews with Bumbum’s owner and managers. 
 
The entrepreneur indicated he feels too old
18 now to engage in new adventures in foreign 
markets. The lack of government support, the excessive bureaucratic requirements, the lack of 
financing, the lack of an infrastructure to export, as well as the risks involved were considered 
insurmountable obstacles by the firm.  
 
In 2006, Bumbum had six stores in Brazil under its own brand name.  
 
 
2.3. The Diffusion Process 
 
The diffusion process began in the eighties when new firms established production units, opened 
stores throughout the country, and started to export. It should be noted that most of the 
companies that entered the market in the 1980s were initially passive exporters, using tourists, 
flight attendants, surfers, or Brazilians living abroad to sell their products in foreign markets. 
These exports sales were not accounted for in the official statistics. This is also a characteristic of 
the domestic apparel market.
19 Companies often exported in response to unsolicited orders, a 
result of the growing attractiveness of the Brazilian bikini in foreign markets.  
 
In order to export companies had to adapt their products to different consumer needs in foreign 
markets, especially the bikini’s dimensions. Large bikinis in Brazil were considered small 
abroad. Large and medium sizes had to be specially developed to satisfy foreign customer 
preferences. But although certain product adaptations were made, there were no systematic 
efforts to serve international markets. 
                                                 
17 He explained that Bumbum’s average price in the domestic market is around 50 dollars. 
18   He is now in his sixties. 
19  Product characteristics – such as small size and non perishability – facilitate informal sales. In fact, a significative 
amount of Brazilian production is sold via “sacoleiras”, women that buy the product from a small manufacturer and 
sell it door to door. These transactions are not registered and are part of the large informal sector of the Brazilian 
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In the 1990s however, firms started to look at exports as a more interesting business. This 
awareness was associated with the increased international exposure of Brazilian swimwear in 
foreign markets. Several factors may explain this exposure. One is the fact that some firms hired 
professional representatives and distributors abroad and participated in international trade shows 
in order to increase their products exposure and have access to international markets. These 
companies were successful in achieving international exposure, even though export volumes 
were not particularly large. Nevertheless, their products were featured in several international 
fashion magazines and served as an inspiration for other swimwear producers throughout the 
world.  
 
Brazilian companies started to influence fashion trends in swimwear, with bikinis with a small 
cut being referred to as “The Brazilian Cut”. An example is the recent creation of an extra small 
size for the international market. The Italian fashion magazine The Best of Intima referred to 
Brazil as an “emerging trend-setting country” and reported that “bikinis are the launching tip for 
the Brazilian fashion industry international recognition”.  
 
The 1999 devaluation, combined with productivity gains of Brazilian firms, made it attractive for 
large international retailers such as H&M, Target, Victoria’s Secret, Gap, and Zara to outsource 
production from Brazil. This large-scale private label production is a recent phenomenon, and 
had an important role in stimulating the consolidation and growth of the Brazilian swimwear 
industry in recent years. According to Rosset’s CEO: 
 
"[Before] several people started traveling hoping to increase their sales, and  others 
started coming to Brazil to buy [Brazilian swimwear]. But only with the Brazilian 
currency devaluation against the dollar exports boomed. Yet the results only appeared in 
2003 and 2004 because companies were not able to respond immediately to the exchange 
rate change. Many did not have the know-how, the distribution channels, or the human 
resources to explore the opportunities.” 
 
As the market developed, some of these firms consolidated their business while others failed. 
Better structured firms with a higher stake in foreign markets developed a formal distribution 
network, or opened stores abroad. It should be noted, however, that firms selling under their own 
brand name tended to destine most of its output to the domestic market, while private label 
manufacturers tended to have higher export intensity. 
 
Industry specialists believe that a number of factors such as Brazil’s famous beaches, beautiful 
top models, and warm weather facilitated the association of the product with the country’s 
image. This association is further supported by the fact that certain Italian and French companies 
featured Brazil’s name in their labels (Belle Brazil, Okay Brazil and Yes Brazil), as well as by its 
use in swimwear events organized by global firms such as H&M, which recently promoted a 
swimwear sale exhibition named “100% Brazil”. As a result, Brazilian bikinis are internationally 
recognized today for their good quality, fit, and design.  
 
One of the owners of Salinas explained Brazil’s influence in the swimwear industry by 
comparing it to the most important players in the fashion world: 
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“Everyone in the fashion industry travels to New York, Paris, and Milan for the latest 
fashion trends. Yet, people in the industry turn to Brazil for the latest fashion trends in 
swimwear. It is common knowledge that people prefer Scottish Whiskey, French 
Perfumes, and Swiss Chocolate, and people prefer Brazilian Swimwear. Brazilian 
Swimwear products are copied throughout the world. The same models that are produced 
in Brazil are sold in large department stores in the United States. In addition, 
international buyers and designers visit Brazil during our fashion weeks and visit local 
stores and beaches for inspiration and for the latest trends.” 
 
Currently, approximately 200 firms are trying to increase their participation in international 
markets by selling under their own brand name or to a private label. The motivation of most of 
these firms is to reduce production and sales  seasonality. In addition, the successful trajectory of 
famous national brands and government support clearly stimulated diffusion. Another group of 
firms, however, view the domestic market as a better option given its size and potential, as well 
as current international market conditions. 
 
Firms in the swimwear industry can be classified into four strategic groups, according to their 
export market strategy:  
 
•  firms that export under their own brand name; 
•  firms that export to a private label; 
•  small inexperienced firms, organized or not in consortia; and  
•  firms operating solely in the domestic market.  
 
Only firms in the first category seemed to be directly influenced by the first mover. Each 
strategic group is examined in some detail. 
 
 
Group 1: Brand Name Exporters 
 
Approximately fifteen firms exported under their own brand name consistently over the last 
decades. The average price for each bikini sold by this group is approximately US$20 to $30. 
Companies in this category include: Salinas, Rygy, Lenny, Cia Maritima, Rosa Chá, Poko Pano, 
Martinica, and Grupo Praia Brasil (which includes the Catalina, Aguia, and Praia Brasil brands). 
 
Many of these companies started their export activities following Blue Man’s initial 
internationalization strategy, yet they surpassed the first mover’s export volume and overall 
performance. Market strategies followed differed to some extent. Some firms sold to the high-
end market while other specialized in specific product-market niches. An example of the 
adoption of a focus strategy is Submarine. This company produces children’s swimwear and sell 
its products to the high-end segment of the market. Contrary to most others, it does not sell in the 
domestic market, concentrating its marketing budget in international promotions and trade 
shows. 
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The growth of these companies has been somewhat limited due to low capital availability. These 
companies have to invest in foreign markets using their own resources since cheap financing for 
international activities has not been available. 
 
In sequence we present in more detail the cases of Salinas, Lenny
20, and Rosa Chá, three of the 
most important brand name manufacturers and exporters, and the case of Vix, a strategic outlier. 
 
-  Salinas 
 
Salinas was founded in 1982 by the fashion designer Jacqueline De Biase and her husband, 
Antonio De Biase. She had worked as a model for Blue Man for some years before she decided 
to open her own business. First selling to stores specialized in beachwear, the company started its 
own retailing chain in 1985. In the early 1990s the company was responding to unsolicited orders 
typically placed by Brazilians living abroad. For example, Salinas’ products were sold in 
Portugal by a Brazilian who was a personal friend of De Biase (Rubim, 2004). 
 
In 1996 De Biase hired Rosana Lara, a former executive of Blue Man, with the mission of 
developing new markets both in Brazil and abroad. Lara was in charge of the internationalization 
process. In her view, the main reason to internationalize was the desire to reduce idle capacity 
during certain months of the year, when sales usually went down because consumers would wait 
for the next summer collection (Rubim, 2004).  
 
Lara kept De Biase’s personal connection in Portugal as an intermediary, and immediately 
started to export to Chile and Venezuela. But the target market was the U.S. because of its large 
size and potential. In Lara’s perception, to develop this market it was necessary to have a 
subsidiary in the U.S. This was accomplished by opening a commercial office in the state of 
California and hiring an executive to be in charge of the subsidiary. The person chosen was an 
executive who had worked for Reef Brazil, a beachwear manufacturer. This office was initially 
responsible for the distribution of the firm’s products in the U.S., but later became also in charge 
of the European market (Rubim, 2004). 
 
As it had previously happened to Blue Man, publicity in a leading American magazine, Sports 
Illustrated, fueled international growth. In 1997, this magazine portrayed in its cover a famous 
top model using a Salinas’ product. This event opened new opportunities for the firm abroad. 
Salinas started to sell under its own brand name to large American department store chains such 
as Bloomingdale’s and Macy’s, and to a leading retailer and catalog firm, Victoria’s Secret 
(Rubim, 2004). 
 
Salinas had to adapt its products to the U.S. market, by creating larger sizes. Smaller sizes sold in 
Brazil were discontinued from export orders. It also developed a new product line specially 
designed to serve the U.S. consumer preferences. 
 
                                                 
20 These two cases were studied by Rubim (2004), the main source of information for earlier years. Last years information in the case of Salinas 
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After 2004 Salinas expanded its presence in the U.S. market by opening a store in La Jolla, San 
Diego, California. When this initiative failed, the company did not give up and hired another 
professional to help the company access the US trade show circuits. In 2006 the company 
exported 33% of its production of 600.000 pieces to 39 countries and is considered Brazil’s by 
many as largest brand name exporter of beachwear. It had 20 stores in Brazil. 
 
-  Lenny 
 
The fashion designer Lenny Niemeyer started to produce swimwear in the early 1980s in a small 
office in Rio de Janeiro, selling to specialized retailers in the domestic market. The company 
moved to a small plant in 1985. In 1987, she opened a wholesale office in Ipanema. In 1993, the 
first store was opened under the brand name Lenny. In this same year the company made its first 
exports, responding to unsolicited orders from personal friends of the designer visiting or living 
abroad.  
 
These first export sales were the primary motivation for the company to later pursue exporting in 
a more structured manner. Yet although the decision to pursue export activities was not taken 
because of seasonality concerns, exporting did help the firm to reduce idle capacity during 
certain months of the year (Rubim, 2004). 
 
First proactive firm initiatives were successful in generating orders, but the company had 
problems with payment defaults. This experience supported the decision to use local distributors 
in the U.S. market. In 2000, Lenny established a partnership with Vix Swim Wear (see next 
section), which distributed Lenny’s products initially under Vix’s brand name, and later under 
the Lenny brand name (2003). Vix also sold to Victoria’s Secret under its own brand name and 
as a private label. 
 
In 2003, the company decided to enter the European market. A distributor was chosen to support 
the firm export activities in this market, called Jofima. The strategy adopted was to open 
seasonal stores, stores that would remain open only during Summer months, and re-open the next 
year.  The first store was opened in Portugal. 
 
The company received a number of export awards: a Brazilian award for export development 
(1995); The Quality Brazil Award – International Exporters Service (2001); The Export Rio 
Award (2001, 2002, 2003). 
 
In 2006, Lenny had 17 stores in Brazil under its brand name. The company had its products sold 
in large retailers in international markets under its own brand name. Among the most prestigious 
stores carrying Lenny’s products were Bloomingdale’s, Barney’s, Donna Karan, Harrods, 
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-  Rosa Chá 
 
Rosa Chá started in 1989 when Amir Slama received four sewing machines from his father, who 
owned a small apparel plant in São Paulo. The company started to produce under a private label. 
In 1993, the company opened its first store in São Paulo. The origins and growth of Rosa Chá are 
associated to the increased importance of the city of São Paulo as a fashion center.
22 
 
In 1997 the company made its first exports to the U.S. Three years later, Slama participated for 
the first time in the New York Fashion Show, one of the most important fashion events in the 
world. This experience opened new opportunities in export markets. In February 2002 Rosa Chá 
entered the European market. Only a few months later, in December, it opened its first store in 
Lisbon. The next year the company started to sell to the French department stores chain 
Printemps, and opened its second international store in Miami. In 2005, it had its first fashion 
show in Paris and launched a product line under the Naomi Campbell name. 
 
The company has three different sets of specifications: Brazilian, European, and American. 
Every collection is developed using the three sets of product specifications. The average cost of 
each piece was estimated in US$40. 
 
According to a consultant interviewed, the company was the first among the leading brand-name 
manufacturers to develop formal export marketing planning before entering international 
markets. 
 
In 2006 Rosa Chá had distributors in the U.S., Europe, Australia, Japan and Hong Kong. It 
exported to the U.S., England, France, Italy, Japan, Lebanon, mexico, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, 
South Africa, and Sweden. It had its own stores in Brazil and sold under its brand name in 
another 380 stores in Brazil. Total production is estimated in 470,000 pieces per year of which 
around 10% are exported. 
 
-  Vix 
 
An alternative but promising strategy was followed by a company named Vix. The Brazilian 
fashion designer Paula Harmany created Vix in 1998 with the vision that it could be profitable to 
sell swimwear produced in Brazil in the U.S. She had noticed that bikinis were sold for about 
US$100 in the U.S., while they could be purchased in Brazil for $15.   
 
Harmany lives in the U.S., where she designs her own collections and sells Brazilian-made 
bikinis. Her collections are manufactured in Rio de Janeiro. Vix became one of the leading 
companies in the Brazilian ranking of swimwear exporters, with a strategy that combines the 
benefits of low production costs in Brazil with the designer’s knowledge of the American 
market. The firm achieved good penetration in the American market supplying 600 retail stores, 
including Bloomingdale’s and Victoria’s Secret, and has plans to sell in the Brazilian market in 
the near future.
23 Vix presently sells not only its own products in the U.S. market but also acts as 
                                                 
22 Yet only in the last five years, according to a consultant interviewed, the São Paulo Fashion Week included beachwear in the show. 
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a distributor for other Brazilian firms, such as Lenny. It can be considered a typical international 
new venture. 
 
For some players in the industry, Vix cannot be considered a Brazilian firm. But Vix’s business 
model, separating production and design and with its own distribution network in the U.S., is 
considered ideal by industry experts and sets an interesting example to be followed. 
 
-  Comparison among Firms 
 
Table 16 presents a comparison of major facts in the development of four of the most important 
firms in this strategic group: Blue Man, Salinas, Lenny, and Rosa Chá, which clearly indicates 
the chronology of export initiation and development.  
 
Table 16 
Comparison among Leading Brand Name Swimwear Manufacturers 
 
Year  Blue Man  Salinas  Lenny  Rosa Chá 
 
1971  Production started in 
Brazil. 
   
1972  Foundation of Blue 
Man 
   
1974  Sporadic export orders 
Exposure in UK 
magazine. 
Trip to US and Europe  
   
1982    First production unit in 
Rio de Janeiro 
Lenny starts production 
in a small office in Rio 
de Janeiro 
 
1983  First store opened in 
Brazil 
   
1985    First store opened in 
Rio de Janeiro 
Starts to operate a small 
plant 
 
1989     Foundation  of  Rosa 
Chá  
1990  First store opened in the 
U.S.  
 
   
1991   Sporadic exports      
1993     First store opened in 
Rio de Janeiro 
Sporadic export orders 
First store opened in 
São Paulo 
1995     Wins Brazilian  export 
award 
 
1996  Store in U.S. closed. 
Direct exports to 
foreign customers  
Planning and staffing 
for international 
activities 
Regular exports to 
Chile and Venezuela  
  Initial export activities 
1997    Publicity  in Sports 
Illustrated  
  Enters the U.S. market 
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Year  Blue Man  Salinas  Lenny  Rosa Chá 
 
1998    Commercial office in 
the U.S.  
Large U.S. customers 
sell under the firm’s 
own brand name 
Problems with 
payments default by 
foreign customers 
 
2000 Contract  with  large 
U.S. customer 
celebrated. 
US office starts to 
coordinate European 
operations  
Partnership with Vix to 
sell under private label 
and own brand name 
First participation in the 
New York Fashion 
Week 
2001      Contract with Victoria’s 
Secret to sell under 
private brand and own 
brand name 
Receives Quality Brazil 
Award 
 
2002     Enters  the  European 
market 
Opens first franchised 
store in Lisbon 
2003     Distributor  in  Europe 
Seasonal store in 
Portugal 
Opens first store in the 
U.S. 
Contract with 
Printemps Dept Stores, 
France 
2004  Introduction of new 
product line in 
international markets 
Introduction of new 
product line in 
international markets. 
  Contract with Speedo 
2005  Use the internet to 
export 
Store in La Jolla, San 
Diego opened 
Seasonal stores in 
Europe 
First fashion show in 
Paris 
Launches Naomi 
Campbell product line 
2006  Exports to the U.S., the 
Caribbean and Spain 
Store in the U.S. closed 
Exports to 39 countries 
Not available  Exports to 11 countries 
 
 
Information on sales and export volumes are often unreliable, making it difficult to evaluate who 
actually exported how many pieces to which markets. For example, Blue Man presently exports 
something around 30,000 pieces. Other information suggests that Salinas exports between 
100,000 and 200,000 pieces, but it officially stands as the leading brand name exporter in the 
country. Vix was said to export 480,000 units, and was also said to be the number one exporter 
in this strategic group. Rosa Chá is said to export around 40,000 to 50,000 pieces. The ranking of 
these companies in exporting, according to the data available is presented in Table 17. 
 
Table 17 
Export Initiation and 2005 Export Volume (Estimated) 
Firm  Year of Initial Exports  Export Volume in 2005 
(no. of pieces) 
Vix 1998  480,000 
Salinas  1991  100,000 – 200,000 
Rosa Chá  1996  40,000 – 50,000 
Blue Man  1974  30,000 
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Group 2: Private Label Manufacturers 
 
During the last five years a number of Brazilian swimwear manufacturers began to export larger 
volumes under private label contracts. These companies exported approximately US$20 million 
in 2005. They are responsible for the high export growth rates in recent years.  
 
Rosset and TDB are the two most important large-scale private label manufacturers, responsible 
for US$19 million worth of private label exports.  
 
-  Rosset 
 
Rosset is a textile conglomerate, with 3,800 employees, manufacturing from fabrics to swimwear 
and lingerie. It claims to be one of the world largest manufacturers of fabrics for the swimwear 
industry. Very few companies in the swimwear industry are integrated such as Rosset: ”We are 
not a bikini manufacturer, we are an industrial organization that also manufactures swimwear”, 
claimed one of the executives interviewed. Rosset owns Valisere, a traditional manufacturer of 
lingerie, and Cia Marítima, a brand-name beachwear manufacturer. 
 
Rosset has two major swimwear lines. One is Cia Marítima, which is positioned as a sexy, 
glamorous product to the high-end segment. Cia Marítima was created in 1990. The brand is not 
sold in its own stores in the domestic market, like many other brands, but it has an exclusive 
agreement with the Brazilian retail chain Track & Field. In cities where Track & Field is not 
established, the company sells to other retailers. First exports of Cia Marítima, in the early 
1990s, were to Portugal, in response to unsolicited orders. The company has always used 
exclusive distributors abroad. It presently exports to more than 30 countries. 
 
Rosset invested heavily in the development of Cia Marítima’s image even though it accounts for 
a small percentage of Rosset’s total swimwear exports. The brand also benefited from publicity 
in international magazines, such as L’Oficiel, from France, and Time Magazine. Participation in 
the Brazilian Fashion Calendar was seen as being very helpful to develop the brand image 
abroad. These fashion shows are broadcasted to a large number of countries by a cable TV 
channel called Fashion TV. One recent marketing action was to offer Cia Marítima’s bikinis as 
part of a gift bag for the 2006 Oscar winners. The development of Cia Marítima’s brand image 
attracted international buyers although not enough to secure large contracts. Nevertheless, 
managers believe it has been crucial to promote private label exports.  
 
The other product line is sold under private label contracts, serving large international retailers 
such as Zara, Victoria’s Secret, Gap, Target, and H&M. In general these companies provide their 
own designs and specifications, and do not buy Rosset’s design. Yet Rosset’s competence in 
design is often used by these companies in specific situations. Private label exports started in 
2000. The export manager recognized the existence of a “Brazilian boom” after 1999, with 
foreign buyers searching for new suppliers of swimwear products in Brazil:  
 
“We were lucky that a lot of people were searching for Brazilian products… Because of the 
Brazilian boom… Brazil started to be seen as a ‘cool’ country: Havaianas sandals, Gisele 
Bündchen, soccer…”   79
 
Rosset’s motivation to enter new markets was the need for growth. Being a large organization, it 
needed to expand its markets. Executives interviewed believed the same was not true for most 
Brazilian exporters of swimwear, which are small, and can limit their activities to the domestic 
market. Another motivation was the growing obstacles to sell fabrics abroad. Value-added 
products are easier to sell in developed markets, such as the U.S. 
 
According to Rosset, private label customers total between ten to fifteen companies, including 
H&M, Zara, Target, and Gap. These companies buy from different producers all over the world. 
They expect high quality and competitive prices from their suppliers. In order to secure these 
contracts, manufacturers have to undergo a long selection phase in which they must demonstrate 
that they can meet all the requirements. Companies have to adapt their products to the different 
requirements of foreign customers and this process is considered lengthy. It took Rosset two full 
years to secure its first private label contract.  
 
“It was not that easy, because Brazil is not one of their usual suppliers. Target, for 
example, has a much larger operation in Central America than in Brazil… And their 
procurement system is very sophisticated, there is not much space for personal interaction, 
it’s all in the Internet. The Brazilian image works well in contacts between designers. 
Otherwise there are a lot of requirements and specifications and it is very impersonal.” 
 
Most Brazilian companies, according to the interviewees, would not be able to comply with the 
required quality standards and specifications of private label contracts. Also, financing plays an 
important role, but it is often not available for smaller, weaker firms. Countries that have free-
trade agreements have advantages over other countries. For example, the largest exporter of 
bikinis to the U.S. is Mexico, basically U.S. firms that established plants there because of 
NAFTA. 
 
With private label exports, Rosset had to make changes in its testing procedures. The laboratory 
was modernized and new equipment acquired. They believed that the company had many gains 
with private label exports: increases in quality, changes in production processes, and higher 
productivity.  
 
The executives interviewed indicated that a number of problems were faced by the industry: the 
excessive tax burden, the high incidence of labor on total costs, and competition from China. The 
tax burden on Brazilian products was seen as one of the major problems in reaching a 
competitive price: 25% of the cost of the Brazilian bikini are taxes, compared to almost 0% in 
products coming from Morrocco, Tunisia, Jordan, etc. Being labor-intensive, the apparel industry 
has an extra burden because of indirect wages and excessive social welfare benefits, which can 
double the payroll. 
 
Chinese products were seen as price-competitive, and with good quality in general. Rosset’s 
customers also bought products from China. Gap, for example, used Chinese suppliers of 
excellent quality. Interviewees claimed that China has a long tradition in manufacturing textile 
products, but not swimwear. Also, producers of bikinis are typically countries that have a 
domestic market for this type of product, which is not very much the case of China. As a   80
consequence, the swimwear market was not really targeted by the Chinese, since they did not 
have a tradition in design, at least a design that pleases Western consumers. But their quality was 
considered “better than certain Brazilian manufacturers”, although Brazilian firms were seen as 
having “a much superior design”. Rosset’s competitive advantages vis-à-vis China, in their view, 
are the creative design, and the ability to have the desired fabric, since Rosset manufactures its 
own raw materials.  
 
-  TDB 
 
TDB, an integrated manufacturer of textile products for the swimwear industry, is the second 
largest exporter of private label swimwear from Brazil. Originally a manufacturer of fabrics 
made of lycra, nylon, and cotton, TDB acquired Tip Top, a company dedicated to the 
manufacturing of children’s clothes, in 1987. After the acquisition, Tip Top started to produce 
swimwear for other age segments, including teenagers and adults. Children and teenage 
swimwear are exported both under its own brand name and under private label contracts. Adult 
swimwear is sold only in export markets, under private label contracts. Private label products 
carry the “made in Brazil” label, but they do not carry the TDB brand name.  
 
Tip Top started to export baby clothes in the 1970s, and continued to export after the acquisition 
by TDB. However, with the appreciation of the Brazilian currency during the mid-1990s, the 
company was forced to interrupt its export activities until the 1999 devaluation. It was in the 
early 2000s that TDB (and Tip Top) started to export under private label contracts. The company 
presently exports to more than 30 countries. Tip Top has around 2,000 employees and two 
plants. 
 
The manager interviewed saw Brazilian swimwear as having a differentiated image abroad. He 
believed that the image of the Brazilian product abroad was an important motivator for foreign 
buyers. The competitive advantages of the Brazilian product in his view are the Brazilian lycra, 
considered of better quality, or, at least more adequate to the manufacturing of swimwear, and 
the “Made in Brazil” image: 
 
“The image of Brazil, Brazil as a fashion in every regard… From the São Paulo Fashion 
Week, to the sensuality of the Brazilian woman, the worker that arrived to power, soccer… 
Many factors combine to build the image… Gisele Bündchen, with her image of sensuality, 
the image of the Brazilian woman… People want to project themselves. Because the 
European woman wants to have the sensuality of the Brazilians…There is an image. Well-
known international retailers come here to buy in Brazil, because Brazil is the land of 
beachwear… The image is very important. Without it, it would be much more difficult to 
export. The image helps a lot. But it is not enough.” 
 
The “Made in Brazil” image was also seen as a major protection against Chinese competition. In 
his view, Chinese products are competitive with Brazilian products, but foreign buyers want to 
diversify their outsourcing, and they also want the “Made in Brazil” label: “There are companies 
that buy here because they don’t want the ‘Made in China’ label. This is not to say they don’t 
buy in China. They buy in China too, they have offices there.“ Despite this “protection”, Chinese   81
products are perceived as effectively competing with Brazilian firms in private label contracts. 
He gave an example:  
 
“This week one of our customers called and said he was not going to buy now, he is going 
to delay his order because he is expecting the delivery of a large order from the East. He 
has been our customer for some time, he has received a lot of attention, and our products 
sold very well. What is the explanation? A better opportunity in another country. They 
forget us and go there. But we do not desist, because soon he will be back. But he will 
always choose the best deal for him.” 
 
Private label buyers often modify the company’s designs to define their own models to be 
produced under these contracts. According to the interviewee, foreign buyers from international 
retailers are impressed with the large manufacturing facilities of TDB.   
 
TDB does not participate in fashion shows in Brazil, but it participates in trade fairs outside the 
country. The company has a license from Disney-Warner to use its characters in children’s 
clothes in Brazil. Although they cannot export these products, they often export under contract to 
other Disney licensees in foreign countries. 
 
-  Aguia Group 
 
The history of the company starts with the Fischer family in Germany in 1886, with the 
production of fabrics. Although initially manufacturing only lingerie, in the early 1920s it 
included a new product line of swimwear, under the brand name Goldfish, and exported to 
countries all over the world. With the wars in Europe, the family decided to open new factories 
in Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay. The Brazilian company was started in 1937 by Jacob Adler in 
the city of Petrópolis under the name Malharia Águia
24. As the company grew, swimwear 
became the most important product line, and fabrics were discontinued. 
 
In the 1950s the Fischer family from Argentina, who also had the license to produce the 
American brand Catalina, acquired part of Malharia Aguia. Presently the firm, under the name 
Águia Group, owns three important brand names: Águia, Praia Brasil, and Catalina. The original 
owner of the Catalina trademark, an American company, disappeared, but the license to use the 
brand name still exists, and Grupo Águia cannot export to certain countries where there are still 
licensing agreements, as well as to the United States. The three brand names are positioned to 
different market segments: Praia Brasil, a more recently launched brand, targets the youth; 
Águia, the original brand name, targets young ladies; and Catalina serves the traditional or 
“classic” segment. The company today is the most important manufacturer of the Catalina brand 
name in the world. 
 
The export manager of the Águia Group was not sure about when Malharia Águia started to 
export swimwear, but believed that first exports could have happened as early as the 1960s. In 
her evaluation, however, these first exports were not relevant, neither regular. The real 
engagement of the Group in exporting only occurred in the early 1980s. Their major export 
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market was and still is Italy. Export development happened gradually, especially from 2000 on, 
mainly because of foreign buyers visiting the company. 
 
Exports to Italy are mainly under a private label contract. Águia manufactures products 
according to foreign buyers’ specifications. The interviewee believes that the exportation of a 
brand name precedes private label contracts. She argued that the Catalina brand name is well 
known all over the world, and this brand awareness was a major facilitator for foreign private 
label contracts. She believes that there is a greater potential for the Praia Brasil brand, compared 
to the other two product lines. The fashion component of this product line seems to be more 
attractive to foreign buyers. 
 
Presently the firm exports to Latin America, Europe, Australia, and Japan, both under its own 
brand name and under private label contracts. In volume, private label exports exceed brand 
name exports, but brand name exports go to a larger variety of countries and customers. Around 
30% of total sales come from foreign markets, and the other 70% from the domestic market. The 
company received in 2001 the Rio Export Award, as the largest exporter of beachwear of the 
State of Rio de Janeiro. 
 
The company does not participate in fashion shows in Brazil. Exporting uses distributors abroad. 
Many contacts are made by the Internet. Potential buyers search for new suppliers in the Internet.  
 
Exchange rate fluctuations are seen as a major threat to the continuity of exports. The 
interviewee also indicated that the competition from Chinese products is starting to be felt by 
Águia: 
 
“Last month we had here some customers from Italy and they complained a little about our 
prices. They said that Chinese products are starting to enter the Italian market, but they 
have lower quality. But people in Europe are not paying so much attention to quality. They 
prefer to buy two or three bikinis this summer and the same number the next year. They use 
during the summer and throw away. That’s why buyers want lower prices. But we cannot 
reduce our prices and our quality, we cannot go back.” 
 
-  Other Private Label Exporters 
 
Other exporters are medium-sized private label producers, including Phael, Coco Doce, Estação 
Sul, and Marcyn. These companies produce smaller quantities than large private labels producers 
but in many cases export more than other famous Brazilian brands. Most of these companies also 
produce under private label contracts for large retailers in the domestic market, such as C&A. 
Therefore, many of these medium-sized producers have experience with compliance matters and 
are able to produce high-quality products with tight delivery schedules. They have benefited 
from Brazilian beachwear international recognition and the increased demand for the Brazilian 
bikini. Some companies actively seek export opportunities such as Coco Doce, while other 
companies are referred to foreign buyers by larger companies that are not interested in smaller 
orders, such as Rosset. 
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Group 3: Small Inexperienced Firms 
 
A third group of firms is composed by small entrepreneurial firms destining most of its output to 
the domestic market and selling sporadically to tourists or personal contacts abroad. During the 
past years these firms were encouraged to form export consortia in order to gain access to 
international markets in conjunction with other firms. The main objective of each consortium is 
to develop a single collection jointly designed and manufactured and to share international 
marketing costs. The Brazilian government has been promoting the formation of consortia in 
order to help small firms to enter foreign export markets. Export marketing groups are seen as a 
less expensive and risky way of entering export markets, otherwise an extremely costly activity 
for these firms. By participating in these consortia they would be able to develop better business 
plans, train their staff, participate in international trade shows, and lower the overall costs of 
export activities. 
 
These firms are inspired in their attempts to reach foreign markets by the success of leading 
brands and the desire to reduce production seasonality. This was the impression of Salinas’ 
export manager: 
 
“I am sure that Salinas influenced other companies because these companies often see 
our name appear in international magazines such as Sports Illustrated. It makes smaller 
companies believe that there are also good opportunities abroad for them.” 
 
 
Group 4: Local Sellers 
 
Most firms in the industry prefer to focus exclusively on the domestic market. With a population 
of 170 million people, an extensive coastline with seven thousand kilometers, and almost 365 
days of sun, the Brazilian domestic market for swimwear remains a manufacturer’s first option. 
Several companies have chosen to focus on the domestic market because of their small size, the 
risks involved in entering foreign markets, and the overvalued Brazilian currency. 
 
Figure 3 presents a strategic groups map for the three strategic groups involved with exporting 
activities. The two axes stand for export performance, measured by export volume, and strategic 
positioning, measured by three different strategies: commodity positioning (low-cost strategy), 
private-label positioning (differentiation strategy under a foreign customer’s brand name), and 
brand-name positioning (differentiation strategy under the exporter’s brand name). The size of 
the circles for each strategic groups does not exactly express differences in export volume. 
Export volumes for each strategic group is estimated. 
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Figure 3 






At this point the high export performance group is formed by private label manufacturers. The 
export success of this group is the result of the ability to professionally deliver high-quality 
fashion products to the customer without marketing investments. Thus these firms could quickly 
achieve higher volumes since they did not have to create the demand for their own products but 
benefited from an already established brand name. At this point they are protected by the “made-
in effect” and the differential cut of the Brazilian bikini, not yet matched by aggressive foreign 
suppliers such as Chinese firms. 
 
The second group in volume consists of brand name manufacturers. These companies still export 
smaller volumes than the private label group since they have to develop the market for their 
products, which implies to develop brand awareness and channels of distribution to achieve 
market coverage, a task that requires substantial investments in marketing. Because of the 
differentiation strategy adopted by these firms, they tend to be better protected against Chinese 
competition than any other group in the industry. 
 
Export Volume 





Group 2 – Private 
Label Manufacturers 
US$ 20 million 
Group 1 – Brand 
Name Exporters 
US$ 4 million 
Strategic Positioning 
Group 3 – Small 
Inexperienced Firms  
> US$ 1 million 
Government 
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The last group consists of small firms stimulated by government export promotion programs that 
enter international markets with undifferentiated products competing on price. These firms are in 
direct competition with Chinese firms and other low-cost producers. The government is making 
special efforts to move at least some of them to a higher position in the strategic map (see arrow 
in the map). This is being done by stimulating the development of differentiated design within 
each consortium.  
 
Strategic group analysis helps to understand why different groups of firms in the industry 
achieved better export performance. It also gives some clues to why diffusion benefited more 
private-label manufacturers at this point. We shall return to this issue in our case conclusions.  
 
 
3. Role of Support Institutions 
 
 
3.1. ABEST, The Association of Fashion Designers 
 
ABEST, the Brazilian Association of Fashion Designers, was founded in 2003, aiming at 
promoting Brazilian design internationally.  A non-profit organization, it was initially created by 
five designers with the purpose of obtaining government support to increase exports of Brazilian 
fashion products. Four recognized beachwear fashion labels – Lenny, Poko Pano, Rosa Cha, and 
Salinas – are part of this prestigious and select group of designers. 
 
Currently, ABEST exports to 38 countries and hopes to extend its scope to 96 countries by 2010. 
Additionally, ABEST has established a partnership with the Ministry of Tourism, in which the 
two entities will work together to promote Brazilian fashion and tourism. They will do this 
through publications that draw attention to fashion collections inspired on local tourist 
attractions. The slogan will read: “Traveling to Brazil is in Fashion”. 
 
 
3.2. The Brazilian Government 
 
The government did not play an important role in developing Brazilian swimwear exports, 
although it did offer some support mechanisms to the industry export development. For the most 
part, the firms themselves played a decisive role in creating and developing foreign markets for 
Brazilian exports, and it was due to these initiatives that exports grew.  
 
During the last decade, the Brazilian government sponsored a number of activities to support 
apparel exports, of which the most important were developed by APEX, the government’s 
agency for the promotion of exports and investments. APEX’s actions in behalf of the industry 
are carried out in association with ABIT, the Brazilian Textile and Apparel Industry Association. 
The program has sponsored international trade shows and the participation of export consortia in 
international fairs. Although this support was initially restricted to firms organized in trade 
consortia, the requirement changed in the past two years. Financial support to participate in trade 
shows is now inversely related to firm size. Companies that generate up to R$ 3.6 million a year   86
have 50% of their costs covered; firms with a turnover between R$3.6 and R$7.2 million get 
25%; and large firms that generate more than R$7.2 million receive around 10%. 
 
APEX also had a partnership with ABEST. Some of the activities promoted by these agencies 
include international trade shows, fashion shows, and showrooms around the world. In 2005, 
they invested 5 million reais (approximately 2.5 million USD) in these activities.  
 
Government support was effective in encouraging smaller firms to export. Yet this result is 
perceived negatively by larger firms exporting brand name products. Managers of these firms 
feel that government actions encouraged smaller firms to export without being prepared to meet 
foreign markets requirements. Many of these smaller firms have serious internal problems, such 
as management limitations that impact on product quality and timely delivery. Their failure in 
attaining international marketing standards end up affecting the overall image of Brazilian 
products abroad (the “made-in” image).  
 
One of Salinas’ owners expressed his opinion about government intervention in the industry as 
follows: 
“Brazilian swimwear manufacturing grew spontaneously and its uniqueness is not 
matched elsewhere. Yet the country was unable to define public policies to support and 
consolidate this potential. Instead, government interventions work against what has been 
already achieved. There are thousands of swimwear producers in Brazil, some are 
excellent and some are mediocre. Brazilian government actions help mediocre producers 
by giving them money to participate in international trade shows, where they offer low-
quality samples at a price of $5. Unfortunately these samples are copies of pieces 
produced by established brands that sell their products for $30 dollars a piece.  
These small companies do not have the capabilities to deal with international customers 
as they are not trained in negotiating and their representatives often do not even speak 
English. More experienced Brazilian companies are capable of selling their products 
with value added, but the competition of firms selling apparently similar products for $5 
create serious problems. Some of these companies may succeed, but only temporarily. In 
fact, most of them are very weak and are unable to comply with on time delivery.  
The Brazilian government believes that anyone can export. Attempts are now being made 
to connect different producing regions with Europe. This is a mistake. It is impossible to 
sell products with value added when you have mediocre producers imitating higher 
quality products. What should be supported are brand names that care about quality and 
delivery. The government helps small producers and penalizes large design companies. 
Imitators have been very detrimental to the growth of exports of larger established 
firms.” 
Bumbum’s owner also strongly disapproves government actions towards the development of 
bikini. He gave the example of a program by Banco do Brasil to support micro and small 
swimwear manufacturers. These were inexperienced companies, which received support from 
the Bank to participate in trade fairs and exhibitions in foreign countries: 
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“I was invited as a consultant to participate in a meeting with ten swimwear 
manufacturers from the city of Cabo Frio with the purpose of creating an export 
consortium to sell products abroad. And what do they do? They are manufacturers 
without any experience or tradition, they do not have a production culture, they do not 
have quality standards, they do not have production engineering… And then Banco do 
Brasil gives money for these people to participate in a trade fair in Lyon, France, paying 
the stand, the air trip, other traveling expenses etc., only to burn the Brazilian product 
image abroad, because these manufacturers are unprepared, they are amateurs…” 
 
A consultant in fashion marketing interviewed suggested that government actions should be 
directed towards strengthening the leading firms, those that already proved their professionalism 
and competence in international markets. He believed that the success of the leading firms would 
bring foreign buyers to the country.  
 
In general, interviewees believed that many of the problems faced by their firms in exporting are 
not firm-specific or even industry-specific, but are problems of the country, such as high 
transportation costs, lack of export financing, poor infrastructure in ports and airports, 
government bureaucracy. For example, the lack of export financing in Brazil forces many 
businessmen to get financing from the importer, a practice that puts them in an inferior 
bargaining position. An export manager of one of the brand-name designers expressed his 
disapproval of government bureaucracy as follows: 
 
“The Brazilian government works against Brazilian firms, contrary to what happens in 
other countries.  You hear about the Exporta Fácil [Easy Export Program]. It is an 
incredible bureaucracy. It takes hours and hours only to fulfill the forms and then the 
Brazilian Customs does not accept the form. They do not make it easy for the exporter.” 
 
 
4. Counterfactual Analysis 
 
Our counterfactual analysis for this case used the lingerie industry.  
 
This industry was chosen due to the similarities with the swimwear industry: both possess the 
same infrastructure and processes. However, swimwear exports have increased consistently, 
while exports within the lingerie industry (including underwear and sleepwear products) present 
a declining trend.  
 
Exports for swimwear in 1990 amounted to US$4 million, while lingerie exports totaled $21 
million. In 2005, swimwear exports increased to $ 24.9 million while lingerie exports totaled 
only $28 million, presenting huge variations along this period (see Graph 9).  
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Graph 9 
Swimwear and Lingerie Exports (1989 – 2005) 
 
 
  Source: ALICE System/SECEX 
 
 
Also, despite the fact that the lingerie global market is 40 to 50 times larger than the beachwear 
market, the total value of Brazilian exports for both product categories is very close at this point. 
 
This happened despite the following facts: 
 
•  The lingerie industry in Brazil has a much longer tradition than the beachwear industry; 
 
•  Firms in the lingerie industry are larger, older, and much more structured than those in 
the beachwear industry. 
 
•  Many firms in the lingerie industry were traditional exporters since the 1970s (e.g. De 
Millus, Du Loren, Valisere). 
 
•  Presently, larger exporters of swimwear in Brazil (private label) are also exporters of 
lingerie.  
 
•  The lingerie industry benefited from spillovers due to the presence of multinational firms 
in the Brazilian lingerie industry, such as Triumph. 
 
•  Firms in the lingerie industry had much better access to export financing because of thir 
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•  Similar raw materials are used to manufacture beachwear and underwear products. 
 
•  The characteristics of the labor force in the two industries are the same. 
 
•  Production processes are similar for the two industries. 
 
 
Exports of swimwear products have benefited from the “Made in Brazil” effect, but the same 
image has not been associated to lingerie products exported, which remained undifferentiated 
from other countries’ exports. Interestingly enough, one of the leading company’s in the lingerie 
fashion industry in the world is the American firm Victoria’s Secret. This company helped in 
recent years the “Made in Brazil” effect in beachwear, by selling in its catalogs Brazilian 
designer bikinis under their own brand name, featuring Brazilian models in Brazilian beaches. It 
is believed by industry experts that Victoria’s Secret management feels that the Brazilian image 
has synergy with Victoria’s Secret brand positioning, which is associated to an image of comfort 
with a touch of sensuality. Yet the company does not promote lingerie products under the Made 
in Brazil label. This is a clear indication that the Made in Brazil effect in beachwear was not 
extended to the lingerie industry. 
 
Summarizing, beachwear exporters benefited from the creation of a differentiated image for its 
products, which permitted them to escape direct price competition from other low-cost producers 
from emerging countries, while lingerie manufacturers have not been able to achieve the same 
result, being forced to compete on price. 
 
A competitive explanation for this difference in export growth was suggested by Valisere’s CEO, 
who indicated that China focused more on lingerie because international markets for lingerie 
products are larger than those for swimwear. Probably for the same reasons, the lingerie market 
was also targeted by other emerging countries, such as Sri Lanka and India. Thus, according to 
him, beachwear would have been less impacted by price competition from other emerging 
countries.  
 
This is not supported, however, by the interviews with the larger private label exporters of 
beachwear, including Rosset (the owner of Valisere), TDB, and Águia. Interviews with managers 
from the beachwear product line suggest that they are facing Chinese competition, but that the 
Made in Brazil label consists to some extent in a “protection” against price competition. 
 
It is not supported either by other evidence collected in this research (see Graph 9). According to 
the data available, the average international price fell faster for swimwear than for underwear 
since the 1990s, although both show a recovery after 2003 (Graph 10).   
 
Despite this recovery, both industries ended with an average international price that was less than 
half the original price in 1990. This strong reduction in average prices is undoubtedly the result 
of price competition from emerging countries, especially India and China. This evidence thus 
suggests that price competition impacted both industries in a similar manner.  
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Graph 10 






5. Synthesis of the Discovery and Diffusion Process in the Brazilian Swimwear 
Industry 
 
The discoveries and the diffusion process of exporting in the Brazilian swimwear industry is 
quite complex, with a number of different actors intervening at different points in time. Also, the 
impact of each actor is limited, without any clear flagship firm leading the industry, or its 
segments, for a long period of time 
 
Table 18 presents the Time Line for the Swimwear Industry, using data collected in interviews, 
company sites, and other secondary data. Again, specific years had to be in many cases guessed 
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Table 18 
Time Line for the Diffusion and Adoption of Exports as an Innovation by Brazilian 
Swimwear Manufacturers 
Year  Firm Facts  Industry Events 
1968   First fashion fair in Brazil 
1969    
1970   ABIT – the Brazilian Textile and 
Apparel Industry Association is 
established 
1971  David Azulay launches his jeans bikinis  
1972  Blue Man starts operations in Rio de Janeiro. 
1973  
1974  Blue Man’s bikini is featured in a UK publication. 
David Azulay visits U.S and Europe to sell Blue Man’s 
products. 
Blue Man starts export activities. 
1975  
1976 Blue  Man  receives Brazilian export award. 
1977  
1978  
Bikini introduction phase. 
 
Initial export activities – sporadic. 
1979  Bumbum is created and opens the first store totally 
dedicated to bikinis in Rio de Janeiro. 
1980  
1981  Águia starts export activities. 
1982  Salinas starts operations in Rio de Janeiro. 
Lenny starts operations in a small office in Rio de 
Janeiro. 
1983  Blue Man opens its first store in Rio de Janeiro. 
1984  
1985  Salinas opens first store in Rio de Janeiro. 
Lenny moves to a plant in Rio de Janeiro. 
Bumbum opens a store in Ibiza, Spain. 
1986  
1987  
1988  Bumbum opens a store in Los Angeles, California. 
New entrants in the industry. 
 
Domestic market development. 
1989  Rosa Chá starts operations in São Paulo. 
Bumbum closes the store in Ibiza. 
1990  Blue Man opens a store in Miami, Florida. 
Cia Marítima is created. 
1991  Salinas starts export activities. 
Cia Marítima starts export activities. 
1992  
1993  Foundation of Lenny. 
Lenny opens first store in Rio de Janeiro. 
Lenny starts export activities. 
Rosa Chá opens its first store in São Paulo. 
1994  
1995  Lenny wins Brazilian export award. 
Increased competition. 
 
Cost reduction and price cuts. 
 
Modernization of the industry. 
 
Heavy imports of machinery.  
1996  Blue Man closes store in Miami. 
Salinas organizes for exporting. 
Rosa Chá starts export activities. 
 
First Morumbi Fashion Week  
 
Creation of the Brazilian Fashion 
Calendar 
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Year  Firm Facts  Industry Events 
1997  Salinas bikini featured in Sports Illustrated. 
Rosa Chá enters the U.S. market. 
1998  Salinas opens commercial office in the U.S. 
Lenny has problems with payment defaults. 
Foundation of Vix to serve the U.S. market. 
1999  




2000  Blue Man celebrates contract with Universal Gear. 
Salinas’ U.S. office coordinates sales to Europe. 
Lenny starts partnership with Vix . 
Rosa Chá participates in the New York Fashion Week. 
Rosset starts private label exports. 
Export boom starts. 
 
São Paulo Fashion Week dedicates 
a whole day to beachwear. 
2001  Lenny celebrates contract with Victoria’s Secret. 
Lenny receives Quality Brazil Award – Exporter’s 
service. 
TDB starts private label exports. 
2002  Rosa Chá enters the European market. 
Rosa Chá opens first store in Portugal. 
2003  Lenny establishes distributor in Europe. 
Lenny opens seasonal store in Portugal. 
Rosa Chá opens first store in the U.S. 
2004  Rosa Chá celebrates contract with Speedo. 
2005  Salinas opens store in La Jolla, San Diego, California. 
Rosa Chá has first fashion show in Paris. 
Rosa Chá launches the Naomi Campbell product line. 
2006  Salinas’ store in San Diego is closed. 
2001 – Creation of the Fashion 
Forum in Rio. 
 
Rise of private label manufacturers 
 
2002 – First Rio Fashion Week 
 
2003 – Foundation of ABEST (the 




The following analysis tries to link together the evidence collected during the interviewing 
process and from secondary data. It is to some extent speculative, since we were only able to 
obtain indirect clues of certain links between facts. Figure 4 tries to link the various players in 
the diffusion process of exporting as an innovation in the Brazilian swimwear industry.  
 
The legend indicates the type of links that come from solid evidence, those for which there is 
only limited evidence, and those that are only hypothesized links based on indirect clues 
obtained in the research process. The first number in the parenthesis under the firm’s name is the 
year of foundation; the second number is the year when the firm started exporting; the next two 
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Figure 4 




The first mover was Blue Man, the entrepreneurial firm founded by David Azulay. Almost after 
its inception, the firm received unsolicited orders. Moved by the desire to see his creations in 
foreign markets, he visited potential customers and started exporting. The immediate follower 
was Bumbum. As mentioned earlier we do not have enough evidence of Bumbum’s role in the 
diffusion of exporting within the industry. Yet this company contributed significantly to the 
industry growth. It was the first one to open specialized stores, in Rio de Janeiro and Ibiza, 
establishing a business model that was followed by Blue Man four years later, and by other firms 
in the industry until now. In Figure 2 we have represented the link between these two companies 
by a double-sided arrow. The relationship between these companies’ strategies is speculative, 
since there is no real evidence of such. 
 
Other firms appeared during the 80s, whose export initiation was similar to Blue Man’s initial 
sporadic sales abroad, using friends, relatives, flight attendants, tourists etc. This part of the 
export adoption process cannot be attributed to Blue Man or Bumbum, and should be seen as 
random events. In fact, while David Azulay claims that Blue Man influenced these new firms, 
managers and entrepreneurs in these firms do not recognize such influence. In fact, the only 
sound evidence of the influence of Blue Man comes from Salinas, whose owner worked as a 
model for Blue Man, and hired a professional manager from Blue Man to develop Salinas’ 
export activities. Willingly or not, aware or not, this manager brought with her experiential 
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One company that seemed to have exported totally independently from others was Malharia 
Águia, part of the Águia Group. We were not able to determine connections between the first 
mover and the second mover and this company’s export initiation. 
 
We believe the diffusion process continued by the action of foreign buyers working for 
established retailers who came to Brazil to visit local manufacturers. These buyers were already 
aware of the cut, fit, and style of the Brazilian product, thanks, among other factors, to Blue 
Man’s and Bumbum’s pioneering export activities. These foreign buyers became important 
actors in the diffusion process. 
 
In the 90s, a number of brand-name firms, particularly Salinas, led a process of structured 
international expansion, hiring professional managers and planning their export development. An 
early adopter of exporting, Salinas seems to have also been a role model for other firms in the 
industry. Cia Marítima started to export almost as the same time as Salinas. Lenny was slightly 
later in exporting, and it is possible that it was somewhat influenced by Salinas and Blue Man, 
but we did not get any evidence supporting this hypothesized link.  
 
A later entrant in the industry, Rosa Chá started its operations in São Paulo. This suggests a new 
step in the diffusion process, moving from Rio de Janeiro, the capital of swimwear fashion, to 
São Paulo, the industrial center of the country.  
 
At this point, diffusion became generalized and it is extremely difficult to separate reciprocal 
influences, if they existed. The creation of an annual calendar of fashion shows (The Brazilian 
Fashion Calendar) also contributed significantly to the diffusion process, attracting foreign 
buyers and putting them in contact with local firms. It also created a climate that permitted the 
exchange of experiences, cross-fertilization, and stimuli to creativity and entrepreneurship. At 
the same time, it increased rivalry in an industry characterized by strong individualism. In fact, 
articles in newspapers and fashion magazines are full of anedoctal evidence of disputes between 
designers. One newspaper article referred to these rivalries as the “pins war”.  And Lenny 
Niemeyer declared in an interview that the dispute between Rio and São Paulo beachwear 
designers was an unnecessary “bonfire of the vanities”.
25 Information also flows among 
companies by means of consultants and turnover of employees, facilitating the diffusion process. 
 
The years 2000s saw the emergence of a new type of exporter, selling to foreign buyers under 
private label contracts. These firms export much larger volumes than brand name exporters. 
Thus, at present the two relevant strategic groups in the Brazilian swimwear industry are, on one 
side, leading designer firms that define fashion trends in Brazil and have a growing influence on 
international styles, contributing to the international exposure of the made-in-Brazil beachwear; 
on the other, larger-scale producers, who are responsible for the expansion of Brazilian exports 
in recent years. These two groups have followed different trajectories, and it cannot be said that 
one had much influence on the other. We hypothesize that private-label producers were 
influenced by the effects of the generalized diffusion process, at the same time that they were 
contacted by foreign buyers who already worked with designer firms and searched for larger 
                                                 
25 www.ego.globo.com/entretenimento/ego/entrevista...   Access in October 15,2006.   95
volumes at similar quality and lower prices, or looked for suppliers capable of delivering larger 
volumes, such as Rosset and TDB. 
 
Finally, the third strategic group, smaller firms without export experience, entered the market in 
the 1990s. They were influenced by the general diffusion process and benefited from the recent 
export boom. Government actions had a paramount influence in moving these firms to 
international markets, by promoting and subsidizing their international marketing activities. 
Other agents of diffusion have been in place. One is the media specialized in fashion events. 
Success stories
26 are spread by fashion magazines and newspapers. Leading firms in the industry 
believe that media coverage signaled to new entrants and very small firms the existence of 
international customers interested in Brazilian swimwear.  
 
Government export promotion campaigns also contributed to the diffusion process by selling the 
idea that exporting is simple, and often using swimwear manufacturers as examples of success. 
In fact, to export swimwear in small volumes and sporadically is easy for a small manufacturer 
because of the small size and weight of the product. This process was made easier by the creation 
of a fast courier service called Exporta Fácil, which permits to export small orders of less than 
US$10,000. Thus many firms could easily become passive exporters, fulfilling small unsolicited 
orders without having to change their structure and avoiding bureaucratic work. 
 
 
6. Case Study Analysis and Conclusions 
 
The Brazilian swimwear industry represents a small segment of the domestic and the 
international apparel industry, but one that attained international recognition. This case study 
investigated the phenomenon of the international expansion of this small segment of the apparel 
industry and the reasons behind its success, when compared to other segments, such as the 
underwear. The assumption here was that the study of this industry’s evolution process might 
bring some light into such reasons. 
 
Research results from this industry study suggest that the understanding of the adoption and 
diffusion process can be quite complex, especially in an industry where: 
 
•  Most firms, especially brand-name designers, are small and entrepreneurial. Most of them 
are family-type businesses managed by the founder. Exceptions to this are the leading 
private label exporters, which are larger diversified textile conglomerates. 
 
•  Decision-making processes in smaller entrepreneurial firms are typically unstructured 
and little planning is made. Decisions are often opportunistic and strategies emerge from 
opportunities and threats faced by each firm. 
 
•  There are very few firm or industry records; one has to rely on interviewees’ memories 
collected during personal interviews. 
 
                                                 
26 These success stories are not always real; they often refer to one single successful transaction, but they may inspire other firms.   96
•  There is intense rivalry among firms and personal jealousies among company owners, 
typically designers.  
 
 
6.1. The Nature of the Discovery 
 
The “discoveries” that led to the development of the swimwear industry were:  
 
•  the change of the bikini from a commodity to a differentiated product under a 
recognizable brand name;  
 
•  the exporting of the Brazilian bikini as a differentiated product; and 
 
•  the creation of brand-name stores specialized in beachwear.  
 
 
6.2. Was There a First Mover? 
 
There is quite a dispute in the industry if there was in fact a first mover and, if so, who was it. 
The interview process pointed out to Blue Man as a first mover in the industry. This firm was 
responsible for the first two above-mentioned steps. The third step was the initiative of another 
company, Bumbum, the second mover. 
 
Blue Man triggered the industry’s internationalization process during the 1970s and was the first 
Brazilian company to export and attract attention from international media. David Azulay, Blue 
Man’s owner, stated that other firms in the industry copied his company’s structure and export 
strategies. In his perspective, Blue Man was in fact the pioneer in the internationalization process 
of Brazilian swimwear manufacturers.  
 
How much of an innovator was he? Azulay was the first to sell designer bikinis; until then 
bikinis were typically an undifferentiated product. He was also without a question the first to 
actively search for export opportunities. He also was – and still is – one of the leading designers 
in the Brazilian swimwear industry, responsible for creative collections and fashion shows. 
 
Another important name in the early development of the Brazilian swimwear industry was 
Bumbum, whose owner also claims to have been the pioneer both in the domestic and in the 
international market. Bumbum’s main contribution to the industry was a new retailing concept: a 
store specialized in beachwear. This was also an innovation, since up to that time bikinis were 
sold in general apparel stores and fashion boutiques with a limited assortment.  
 
An examination of historical events and dates, however, shows that Blue Man came first, both as 
a domestic manufacturer of brand name bikinis and as an exporter. Nevertheless, our 
understanding is that Bumbum did not copy Blue Man in its initial steps, either in the domestic 
or in the international market, although we believe that these companies influenced each other to 
some extent in their subsequent development. Bumbum’s impact on the industry was due mainly   97
to the opening of specialized stores – a revolutionary concept at the time that was copied by 
almost every brand-name manufacturer. 
 
 
6.3. Influence of the First Mover and the Second Mover on the Diffusion Process 
 
Both Blue Man and Bumbum’s owners claim to have been role models for the rest of the 
industry, and there are good reasons to believe they are both right, at least partially. Yet this 
influence may be overestimated by them. Although Blue Man is recognized as a pioneer, its 
export volume remained limited, and it decided to prioritize the domestic market already in the 
90s, before the export boom of the years 2000s. Bumbum was even less successful than Blue 
Man in its international activities. Its growth in the domestic market, and its influence on other 
designers appears to have been more limited. 
 
Salinas, presently one of the most influential names in the industry, would be one of the 
companies directly influenced by Blue Man. In this particular case, according to various 
sources
27, a former Blue Man’s export specialist was hired by Salinas, and the company adopted 
an export strategy similar to Blue Man’s, as well as some other strategies used by Blue Man. 
Another indication that Salinas followed Blue Man’s model is the fact that the company owner, 
Jacqueline de Biase, worked as a swimwear model for Blue Man for many years. Azulay himself 
mentioned this fact, and stated that De Biase “learned everything from Blue Man”.  
 
On the other side, however, Salina’s owners deny any link between their strategy and Blue 
Man’s. They claim that their strategic choices were oriented towards reducing seasonality 
impacts on the business, and that their learning process was based on trial-and-error. Antonio De 
Biase, one of Salinas’ owners, suggested that “…exports are a natural option for a company that 
produces swimwear since it lives from the summer and it must run after it.”  According to 
Salinas’ export manager (formerly a Blue Man employee), Blue Man should not be considered 
an export role model since the company gave up its internationalization process in the mid-
nineties. In addition to Salinas managers’ perceptions, most other executives interviewed 
reported that their firm’s management was not influenced by any other firm, its primary 
motivation to export being the desire to reduce seasonality
28, or the desire to take advantage of 
new opportunities, as foreign buyers visited their firms. 
 
Executives from São Paulo firms tended to see a combined pioneering effect of the Rio de 
Janeiro original beachwear cluster, but they do not separate one firm’s influence from another. 
Salinas is probably the most often quoted firm from Rio de Janeiro. One top executive of TDB, 
the second largest private label exporter, attributed the industry’s export initiation to the people 
that carried Brazilian bikinis to sell abroad. He did not recognize one single pioneer, although he 
was aware of David Azulay’s activities: 
 
“David Azulay, from Blue Man, he makes bikinis since the 70s. He had a guy that worked 
for him who knew everything about bikinis… Azulay did a lot, he knows a lot, but alone he 
                                                 
27  Interview with David Azulay- Blue Man, Rubim (2004) and Bianco, Borges & Carrascosa (2003).  
28 Sales during winter months (three months a year) are the equivalent of 20% of summer sales.   98
is just one drop into this ocean… He was not the only one. He and others. And he was too 
small at the time.” 
 
Despite these divergent opinions, the pioneering role of Blue Man and Bumbum is recognized by 
industry experts and specialized media. Both companies made the initial steps to create a 
Brazilian bikini concept, both in the domestic and in the international market. However, their 
impact on others was limited to the second generation of designer beachwear firms, and many 
other factors were responsible for the diffusion process. 
 
 
6.4. First Mover and Second Mover Characteristics 
 
Both firms – Blue Man and Bumbum – were small entrepreneurial firms, led by the original 
founder. David Azulay, the owner of Blue Man, was a fashion designer, while Cidinho, the 
owner of Bumbum, was more of a marketer. Both firms were totally dependent on their founders.  
 
 
6.5. First Mover and Second Mover Motives and External Stimuli 
 
The motives to enter international markets were in both cases to some extent typical of 
entrepreneurial behavior. 
 
Azulay entered the swimwear industry by accident, after the initial success of a bikini he had 
made for a girlfriend. He stated that his main motive to export was “to see the world wearing his 
creations”, and had nothing to do with rational business motivations. According to a fashion 
marketing consultant interviewed, the desire to go international is a matter of ego typical of 
fashion designers. In the case of Blue Man, an external stimulus was the exposure to the 
international media, which took him to New York, London and Paris, in search of export 
opportunities. 
 
Cidinho, the second mover, also followed his impulses. He opened a store in Ibiza mainly 
because “it was the right place” for him. He himself claimed that he decided to open another 




6.6. Difficulties Faced by the First Mover and the Second Mover 
 
Blue Man’s initial efforts to export were not very successful although he got a few initial orders, 
and made a number of contacts that proved to be fruitful in the future. His difficulties could have 
been reduced if the company had had any previous planning of its international activities. 
 
As to Bumbum’s difficulties, they were associated to the nature of an entrepreneurial firm, which 
had no administrative structure, and basically depended on the owner both for decision-making 
and for implementation. 
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6.7. Impact of Diffusion on the First Mover and the Second Mover 
 
Neither Blue Man or Bumbum benefited from being the first and the second mover respectively. 
Why didn’t these firms benefit from their pioneering activities? 
 
The reason again is clear and the same for both companies. These entrepreneurs were not 
interested in developing a professional firm, but they searched for personal experiences.  There 
was an identification between these companies and their owners, to the extent that the firm 
served the owners’ desires and interests. 
 
David Azulay turned his focus back to the domestic market when he realized Blue Man had lost 
the lead in the Brazilian market to competitors, due to what he called his “vanity”. And Cidinho 
lost interest in Bumbum, totally leaving it during a period of almost ten years, while he was 
dedicated to other businesses. Without the owner’s support, and without a professional 
administrative team with the resources and autonomy to manage the firm, Bumbum lost its initial 
growth impetus. 
 
As a result neither of these two firms had a large share of the industry exports in the following 




6.8. Characteristics of Later Entrants in Exporting 
 
We cannot use the term “imitating firms” to describe the companies that entered the export 
activity at a later point in time. In fact, as previously discussed, the only firm that seemed to have 
received a direct influence from Blue Man was Salinas, and even this firm does not recognize 
such influence as relevant. In fact, it is possible that Salinas itself, together with Lenny and Rosa 
Chá, had more influence over other firms than Blue Man and Bumbum themselves. To some 
extent, it could be said that these later entrants received some of the influence of the first and the 
second mover, but translated these experiences into their own strategy in ways that were more 
creative than simple imitation. 
 
This second generation of brand-name manufacturers – Salinas, Lenny, Rosa Chá, etc. – was also 
entrepreneurial, but these firms’ administrative processes were better structured. Quite early in 
their development they hired professional managers to conduct the administrative aspects of the 
business. Also, at least in two cases – Salinas and Rosa Chá – there was formal export planning 
before entering international markets. 
 
 
6.9. Strategies Followed by Later Entrants 
 
We have developed in section 2 a more detailed analysis of the strategic behavior of later 
entrants in exporting. There are four strategic groups in the industry, three of which are involved 
with export activities. Each strategic group follows different export strategies. 
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Private label exporters presently have the largest export volume. The two most important firms 
in this category are part of larger textile conglomerates that also manufacture fabrics for the 
swimwear industry and integrated vertically to take advantage of its own production and expand 
the final market for it. These firms entered exporting mostly in response to opportunities coming 
from foreign demand after the 1999 devaluation. They were not directly influenced by the first 
and the second mover, but they benefited from the international awareness of Brazilian 
swimwear. They are threatened by Chinese competition, although the Made in Brazil label gives 
them a certain protection. 
 
Brand-name manufacturers were the ones that suffered most the influence of the first and the 
second mover. They tend to sell under their own brand-name and export small volumes to the 
high-end market. In general, only a small amount of their production is exported. Because of 
differentiation, they are less vulnerable to Chinese competition. 
 
Small firms export in joint cooperative marketing groups under the auspices of the Brazilian 
government. These firms are the most vulnerable to Chinese competition, since their quality is 
low and they compete on price. 
 
 
6.10. External Events Influencing Discoveries and Diffusion 
 
The three discoveries did not seem to be much influenced by external events. Yet the diffusion 
process was strongly influenced by one major externality: the “Made in Brazil” effect. 
 
How was this “Made in” image created? All the interviewees recognized the existence of this 
effect on their companies’ exports, with the exception of the first and the second mover, who 
were not seriously involved with exporting activities at the time this effect was underway. 
 
A number of factors seemed to explain how bikinis, and swimwear, became associated to the 
country image:  
•  the natural association between Brazil and its beautiful tropical beaches, specially those 
in Rio de Janeiro, first Copacabana and later Ipanema; 
 
•  early events such as the presence of the French actress Brigitte Bardot in Buzios in the 
60s and the song Girl of Ipanema; 
 
•  the actions of the first mover, Blue Man, and the second mover, Bumbum, and their 
exposure to the international media; 
 
•  creation of Brazilian fashion shows and their broadcasting by cable TV; 
 
•  further media exposure of the second-generation brand names; 
 
•  the ascent of Brazilian top models, especially Gisele Bündchen; 
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•  the use of Brazil as the environment for swimwear catalogs by the American firm 
Victoria’s Secret in its catalogs; 
 
•  the use of Brazil’s name by Italian and French firms in their labels and events associated 
to swimwear. 
 
The “Made in Brazil” effect seems to have influenced more bikinis than other kind of swimwear, 
but the latter also benefited from this influence. For example, the exportation of man’s 
swimming suits also increased, and they are also featured in foreign retailers’ catalogs in 
association with Brazil. Yet the made in effect did not seem to impact related products, such as 
underwear (see counterfactual analysis in section 4). 
 
 
6.11. Coordination Issues and Spillovers 
 
One characteristic of the swimwear industry is the absence of one or more flagship firms leading 
the industry, as identified in the previous case. No firm was recognized as the industry leader in 
any moment in time, although various players in the industry influenced others in various 
moments. Even when considering the Rio de Janeiro and the São Paulo clusters, no leaders can 
be identified. 
 
A major element in the coordination of industry activities was the Brazilian Fashion Calendar, 
and, specifically, the Rio de Janeiro and the São Paulo Fashion Shows. In the opinion of a 
fashion marketing consultant interviewed for this research project, however, unfortunately these 
shows have “owners”
29, and although these two people have played a relevant role in the 
development of the fashion industry in Brazil, in other countries it is usually a non profit agency 
or the government that are in charge of organizing these events. The “personalization” of these 
events generates unnecessary disputes, with designers claiming they have been unfairly excluded 
from the show. 
 
Positive spillovers came again as a result of the action of foreign buyers, that brought models, 
designs, fabrics, etc. An outstanding testimony was given by Rosset’s managers, the leading 
private label exporter, who claimed that the company learned a lot from selling to international 
retailers, thus increasing its productivity and quality. It is believed that private label 
manufacturers had more opportunity to learn from foreign buyers because of the need to comply 
to rigorous specifications, while brand-name manufacturers typically sold their own models and 
styles. Positive spillovers to other manufacturers also come from the improved quality of 




6.12. Role of Private and Public Support Institutions 
 
                                                 
29 Paulo  Borges and Eloisa Simão are the promoters and organizers of the São Paulo Fashion Week and the Rio Fashion Week respectively.   102
Government actions were not associated to the development of the industry exports, although 
smaller firms that were late entrants benefited from them. 
 
An alert should be given when considering the Brazilian government role in the diffusion 
process. Designer exporters have complained that the present characteristics of government 
export promotion programs for the swimwear industry are prejudicial to the industry. While 
brand-name exporters lack sufficient government support, it is much more generously given to 
firms that do lack the minimum requirements to compete internationally, firms that otherwise 
would not be able to export. These companies sell low-quality products which are unauthorized 
copies of well-known brands, damaging the country’s image. This heterogeneity among firms in 
the Brazilian swimwear industry is said to be behind its international fame of creative design but 
uneven quality and lack of compliance with delivery schedules. 
 
The Brazilian swimwear industry emerged and grew substantially during the last 17 years, but it 
cannot be listed yet as a true export success. It is rather in its initial development path to conquer 
international markets. The international presence of Brazilian firms is still fragile, and part of its 
recent growth is a result of the devaluation of the Brazilian currency. Government export 
promotion seems to be causing unexpected negative effects that need to be controlled. Threats in 
the near future are the appreciation of the real and the growing competition from Chinese firms. 
 
 
CASE 3 – SOYBEANS IN THE SAVANNAHS 
 
 
1. General Description 
 
Soybean is one of the most illustrative example of Brazil’s competitiveness in agribusiness, and 
the best example of EMBRAPA’s technological success. Brazil ranks second in terms of soybean 
production, and it is the world’s largest soy exporter, with over US$10 billion in soybean exports 
in 2005 (Graph 11). Soybeans are the second export product of the country, with 10.4% of total 
Brazilian exports. Between 1994 and 2004, soybean exports doubled. Of total soybeans exports 
in 2004, grain corresponded to 54%, bran and flour 33%, and oil 13%. Around 60% of Brazilian 
production is exported. Part of this performance is due to the agricultural technology developed 
by EMBRAPA, an institution that promoted a dramatic expansion in the Brazilian agricultural 
sector and generated an enormous increase in agricultural productivity. Other factors such as 
public support, international demand, and trade policies have also influenced the sector’s 
development. 
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Graph 11 
Brazilian Exports of Soybean Products  
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Source: ALICE System/SECEX 
 
 
To illustrate the role played by EMBRAPA in the Brazilian agricultural sector, crop yields rose 
by 65% between 1988 and 2003, from 1,693 kilos to 2,800 kilos per hectare, while in the USA, 
the world’s largest soybean producer, productivity has increased by only 6.5% in the last ten 
years. Such gains in productivity coupled with an increase in the planted area enabled the 
Brazilian soybean production to grow by an average of 20.7 millions of tons per year. The 
Brazilian soybean producers rely on technology improvements, which are the main competitive 
advantage of the Brazilian agriculture, while producers in other countries are dependent on 
production and marketing subsidies to stay in the market  (Jank and Nassar, 2005). 
 
Examples of technologies that have been applied to soybean production and that have been 
developed by EMBRAPA in its 33 years of existence include the development of 200 different 
types of soybeans, the inoculation of nitrogen-fixing bacteria before sowing, which serves as a 
substitute for the use of nitrogen fertilizers, and the development of fungus resistant varieties. 




                                                 
30  Portal Exame (www.exame.com.br)   104
2. The Discovery and the Diffusion Process: Historical Overview 
 
The process of discovery and diffusion of soybeans as an exporting crop was led by the Brazilian 
government, which developed and implemented a whole set of policies and actions to promote 
its development. 
 
In the 1970s the Brazilian government decided to expand the agricultural frontier to make the 
country self-sufficient in food products. The government viewed the expansion of the 
agricultural output as a necessity for the supply of inputs to exporting industries and for the food 
consumption needs of the increasing urban population (Bertrand et al., 1987). The purpose was 
to develop the Brazilian cerrado region (savannahs), mostly located in tropical areas, which 
covers a considerable part of the country’s territory, and which up to that point was not used for 
commercial agriculture purposes. The savannahs had low fertility soils and were located in 
regions with irregular rainfall. 
 
The decision to develop the savannahs was based on two other reasons. First, a window of 
opportunity in the foreign market opened in 1968, when a huge crop failure drastically raised the 
prices of almost all international trade commodities. This price increase turned the Brazilian 
production in the savannahs profitable despite its low productivity. Second, the development of 
the Brazilian agriculture was considered strategic, and several government officials wanted to 
invest funds in national agricultural public research. Such vision turned into more concrete 
actions during President Geisel’s government (1974-1978), which put into office Alyson 
Paolinelli as the Ministry of Agriculture, a former Secretary of Agriculture of the Minas Gerais 
State. Paolinelli had previous experience with programs that tried to exploit the economic 
potential of the Brazilian savannahs. He was one of the main supporters of EMBRAPA and 
worked for the investment of huge amounts of resources in human capital development. During 
his mandate, more than 1,500 researchers enrolled in post-graduated programs abroad.  
 
Soybean was considered a strategic crop that deserved investments as a result of the increasing 
international demand for this product. At that time, foreign markets had been avid for a new 
protein source to substitute fish flour, and soybean was already cultivated in the South of Brazil, 
a temperate climate region. However, little land was available for the expansion of production in 
the South. Farmable land could only be found in the Mid-West, a region covered by savannahs, 
which was not considered suitable for agricultural production due to the poor quality of its soil. 
Furthermore, soybean production was considered to be a temperate climate crop. Thus, it was 
necessary to overcome two challenges in order to make soybean production in the savannahs 
viable: to create new soybean varieties adapted to low latitudes, and to develop better 
conservation and handling techniques, and better fertilizing and ploughing processes to increase 
soil fertility. 
 
One can distinguish two major phases in the development of soybean as a large-scale crop in 
Brazil. The first phase started in the mid-seventies during the military regime and was marked by 
heavy state intervention and support. The second phase in soybean production began in the early 
90s after the economic liberalization.  
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The systematic expansion of the soybean sector in Brazil started in the early seventies. The 
development of soybean varieties suitable for the savannahs and soil correction made possible 
for the agricultural frontier to move towards the Mid-West. This phase is characterized by a great 
expansion in the cultivated area, which increased two-fold in fifteen years, from 6.9 million 
hectares in 1976 to 12.9 million hectares in 1989 (Conab, 2005). The agricultural frontier began 
to expand during the seventies from the Rio Grande do Sul State to the Paraná State – a transition 
climate zone between the temperate and the tropical climate – and to a lesser degree to the São 
Paulo State. In the eighties, soybean production spread to Minas Gerais, Mato Grosso do Sul, 
and Goiás states, but the Southern states (Rio Grande do Sul and Paraná) remained the main 
soybean producers (Figure 5). The development of agricultural technology was the first step in 
the exploration of the savannah region, which also rested on several other public policies that 










Source: CONAB/Dall´Agnol/EMBRAPA Soja 
 
 
2.1. The First Movers 
 
There is no single individual or company that can be selected as the first mover in the soybean 
sector. Yet, it is possible to identify the type of rural grower that initiated the migration process 
that shaped the movement to the cerrado.  
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The production of Brazilian soy during the 1960s and 1970s was concentrated in the north of the 
Rio Grande do Sul state, where the productive organization was the small family-owned farm 
(with a maximum of 50 hectares). The growth of family farms demanded the fiscal expansion of 
the properties and therefore land in Rio Grande do Sul became scarce. This led to the expansion 
towards other states. The first growers that left Rio Grande do Sul migrated towards Santa 
Catarina and Paraná. However, the land available was not enough to serve all needs. Starting in 
the 1960s, producers from Rio Grande do Sul began to occupy the South of the Mato Grosso do 
Sul state. This area was known as the Dourados region. It was located at similar latitude, and was 
appropriate for soybean cultivation. In the cerrado, growers were able to buy for the same 
amount of money plots of land twenty times larger than in their home state (D’Carli, 2005). 
 
This movement was intensified in 1973 with the explosion of the soybean price in the Chicago 
stock exchange, when the price of a ton of beans increased 150% in less than three months. A 
researcher from EMBRAPA, Amélio Dall’agnol, made the following remarks concerning the 
1973 commodity prices: 
“There was a great frustration concerning fish flour in Peru, the main protein source to 
feed animals up to that time. When the available volume of fish flour decreased, the 
demand for soybeans exploded. At that time soybean production was one fifth of what it is 
today. When this demand suddenly increased to 12 million tons of soy flour... one can 
understand why the price increased.” 
 
Price increases led to more demand for land in the cerrado region. It also led to investments of 
larger producers from Rio Grande do Sul. The larger producers from the Southern part of the 
country owned land that had approximately 500 to 1,000 hectares. The group of settlers that 
moved to the cerrado region was formed by large and small farmers, but it was a very selective 
group. Both small and large farmers possessed a large degree of efficiency with their crops, and 
could only be differentiated by the amounts of money they had available for investment. Larger 
producers had achieved larger profits after the increase of soybean prices in the early 1970s. The 
new producers from the South already had experience with soybean production, and knew how 
to handle both the machinery and the inputs, and had no adoption barriers to the new growing 
techniques (Macedo, 1998). 
 
Original producers from the South of Brazil (the “gaúchos”) also had previous experience and 
knowledge of channels of distribution for the product. Soybeans had always been sold in foreign 
markets using international trading companies, cooperatives, and national processors. During the 
1970s, a large part of the soy exported from Brazil was commercialized by cooperatives.  
 
At the same time these events were taking place, international trading companies increased their 
participation, and today they are the main soy marketers in the country.  In addition, large 
national processing firms, such as the Maggi Group and Caramuru, started to sell their output, 
and to resale the production of smaller farmers in the region.  
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2.2. The Immediate Followers 
 
The idea of moving production to the cerrado region was diffused through local family 
networks. Success stories of rural producers that left the South in search for more land inspired 
families and friends of those who had already gone. These people followed the footsteps of the 
pioneers and established farms in the cerrado. The following extracts from an interview with a 
researcher from EMBRAPA illustrate this trend: 
 
“As a member of a family of Rio Grande do Sul moved to the cerrado and did well, the 
whole family would follow. This was a normal process, I know this because I am from a 
small community in Rio Grande do Sul, and I know that the fever started in the Eastern 
part of Paraná. It was the first fever, everyone would go and buy land because one 
person would go and confirm that the land was good. They would say that the terrain was 
flatter and that the land was fertile. This soon attracted one after the other. From a 
community of 100 families, 50 would go to the same place. This is what happened.” 
 
The migratory process that began during the 1960s and 1970s by agricultural producers from the 
South towards the cerrado in search of cheap land continued throughout the 1980s.  
When a rural producer arrived to the lower latitudes of the cerrado, he/she encountered two main 
problems: first, poor soil without nutrients, and second, the lack of soybean varieties adapted to 
the latitude of the region. Growers did not have any information that would let them know if 
soybean cultivation would go well in that specific region. In fact, in the very beginning they were 
not successful with their crops, since the soybean varieties that were planted flourished 
prematurely. This led to the cultivation of rice, due to its resistance to weak soils with low levels 
of fertility.  
 
After one or two harvests of rice, growers started to gravitate towards soybeans, putting pressure 
on research institutions for help in developing varieties that would adapt to the region’s 
environment as well techniques to improve the soil. The research institutions that were sought 
after included the Research Department of the Ministry of Agriculture, national companies of 
agricultural research, and later EMBRAPA. EMBRAPA’s creation in 1973 was useful in 
bringing together research material that was already available in other public research institutions 
and universities. Its creation also proved to be valuable in showing growers that production was 
possible with what was already available.  
 
 
2.3. The Diffusion Process 
 
Despite initial challenges, soybean producers persisted. Large soybean production remained 
restricted to four countries: U.S., Brazil, Argentina, and China, even though only the first three 
were exporters. These factors encouraged Brazilian producers to bet on soybean production. It 
was always cultivated with the goal of exporting the product. Amélio Dall’agnol, an EMBRAPA 
researcher, explained:  
 
“Ever since soybeans appeared in Brazil, it has been a product that has been easily sold. 
There are no market problems, it does not depend on the domestic market, it is   108
completely influenced by the international market and it is marketed in dollars. There 
isn’t another product sold internationally in the way soybeans are.”
31 
 
By the end of the first phase, soybean production had succeeded in reaching maturity in Brazil. 
Soybean production increased ten times between 1970 and 1980. By the 1980s Brazil had 
already become the world’s second largest soybean producer, and had a market share of 18.7%, 
much larger than in 1970, when Brazilian soybean production accounted only for 3.6% of the 
world’s production (Santos and Bacha, 2003). 
The success of the soybean production also led to several spillovers to a range of inputs and 
services. As a result, between 1970 and 1982, the production of vegetable oils, fertilizers, seeds, 
chemical products, machinery, animal food, chicken, pork, transportation and storing services 
rose dramatically. The increasing demand for those products led to the assembling of a strong 
agricultural infrastructure (D’Carli, 2005). 
 
This was the starting point in the creation of a huge industrial complex for soybean and other 
types of seed-crushing plants, as well as for oil extraction and bran production. The availability 
of large amounts of soybean and corn bran allowed the development of modern pork, bovine, 
chicken, and milk production, which in turn increased the profitability of the grain value chain. 
Several municipalities were created around the different production and processing areas of soy 
(D’Carli, 2005).  
 
The second phase, starting in 1990, is characterized by a substantial increase in productivity, 
which rose from 1,740 kg/ha in 1989/1990 to 2,329 kg/ha in 2003/2004, the prominence of Mato 
Grosso as the leading soybean producer in the country (Graph 12), and a reduction in 
government support.  
 
                                                 
31  Note that the easiness with which soybeans are sold goes along with the lack of protectionist measures against grains, as well as a lack of 
health requirements, different from meat and dairy markets.  
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Graph 12 
Evolution of Soybeans Production by State of Brazil (thousand tons) 
 
 
 Source: CONAB 
 
 
The deregulation of the domestic market, foreign investment liberalization, political changes in 
commerce, and the creation of Mercosur in 1991 contributed to the increase of industry 
competitiveness. As a result, production subsidies which guaranteed minimum prices for soy 
disappeared and subsidized credit was drastically reduced, from more than 35 billion reais in 
1980 to less than 10 billion in 1990, almost reaching zero by 1998 (Bernardes, 2005). Producers 
were forced to become competitive by increasing their productivity (the productivity level of the 
eighties did not guarantee profitability).  
 
A reduction in government investment capacity also negatively impacted rural extension 
services.
32 EMATER, the main public agricultural extension company, interrupted its activities 
in 1991. With the extinction of EMATER, smaller farmers had to use state rural extension 
services, whose quality varied considerably from one unit to another, and that were not able to 
absorb the farmers’ demand due to lack of resources. The private sector started to play the 
government’s role in rural expansion (both in extension and working capital). Farmers allocated 
their own personnel to keep in touch directly with EMBRAPA in order to learn new technologies 
being developed. Producer cooperatives were another relevant source of technology diffusion in 
some regions.  
 
                                                 
32 EMBRATER, the main public agricultural extension company, interrupted its activities in 1991. Other state extension institutions continued 
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In the mid-1990s the appreciation of the Brazilian currency brought new challenges to the 
industry. Currency appreciation made Brazilian commodities less competitive in international 
markets. In addition, the tight monetary policy used to restrain inflation allowed the interest rate 
index to reach historical highs, thus increasing the cost of credit. This new context called for 
efficiency gains. In order to become more competitive, farmers started investing in machinery 
and industrial equipment. The incorporation of technology became a continuous process. As a 
result, there were substantial gains in productivity, and productivity gains became the major 
driver of increases in soybean production.  
 
During this new phase, the state of Mato Grosso turned into the main producer of soy in Brazil. 
This was due to its natural advantages including: perfect climate for summer crops, low prices of 
land, and good quality soil, which favored the mechanization of production. Mato Grosso’s 
success as a soy producing state triggered the development of other sectors, such as agricultural 
machinery and animal production. This process generated an agglutinating effect. Poultry and 
beef industries, and large soy processing and crushing industries migrated towards the region in 
order to reduce transportation costs. These trends started during the eighties and increased during 
the nineties and the first years of the present decade.
33  
 
Many companies developed, especially after 1995. Four soybean processing multinationals 
(Bunge, Dreyfus, ADM, and Cargill) purchased 12 Brazilian firms and increased their crushing 
capacity to 43% of the total industry capacity in 1997, compared to the 31% in 1995 (Jank et al, 
2001). These multinationals took over the role of financing production. The importance of the 
sale of soy futures promoted by these crushing companies can be seen in the situation of the 
Mato Grosso state: in 2005, they financed 70% of its soy production. This took place even with 
these crushing companies charging higher interest rates than Banco do Brasil, because they had 
fewer requirements for larger loans.
34  
 
By the end of the nineties, other important actions implemented benefited the sector. First, in 
1997 the government eliminated export taxes on commodities, cutting costs by 10-20%. Second, 
there was an increase in the soybean world price in 1996/1997. Finally, in 1999, the Real 
devaluation took place. The devaluations between 1999 and 2002 strongly increased the 
competitiveness of Brazilian soybean in foreign markets. Graph 13 illustrates the increases in the 
international soybean price between 1997 and the end of 2003. It also shows the large price gains 
in reais that the two devaluations brought to Brazilian growers. With high world prices and the 
weakest domestic currency in the history of the Real, these years were called the Golden Age of 
the Brazilian Soybean.  
 
                                                 
33 Despite the fact that soybeans production in Brazil is mainly oriented towards exporting, the growth of industries based on meat and the high 
internal consumption of soy oil for cooking gave the domestic market also a large share of domestic production (30% according to Dall’agnol). 
34 Banco do Brasil is the largest bank in the country and is the responsible for the financing of the poultry sector. The crushing industries granted 
loans with 15% and 17% interest rates a year, while Banco do Brazil charged between 8,75% and 13%. (Bernardes, 2005).   111
Graph 13 
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Source: CEPEA / ESALQ 
 
 
During the 1990s, with the relative increase in land prices in the cerrado of the Central region of 
Brazil, new areas of the cerrado in the Northeast started to be occupied by soybean plantations. 
This was especially true in the states of Bahia, Maranhão, and Piauí. The growers that explored 
these new cultivation areas were initially the same gaúchos, or the generations that followed the 
pioneers. The cerrados are the last agricultural frontier in the world. 
 
Since 2002, Brazil became the leading world exporter of soybeans, with 31% of global exports. 
Argentina, the United States, and Brazil have around 90% of global exports. This recent 
performance of Brazilian exports of soybeans was also the result of various factors, such as 
climatic problems that affected U.S. crops, and the expansion of Chinese protein consumption.
35 
Future challenges are the appreciation of the Brazilian currency and commercial barriers in 
developed countries, specially to value-added products. Also, the country urgently needs 
investments in infrastructure, mainly in transportation systems (roads, railways, ports), in order 
to remain competitive. 
 
 
                                                 
35 Anuário Análise Comércio Exterior 2005-2006. São Paulo, Análise Editorial, 2006, p.183.   112
3. Role of Support Institutions 
 
 
3.1. The Brazilian Government 
 
Contrary to the two manufacturing cases earlier examined in this report, the Brazilian 
government played a very important role in the “discovery” and diffusion of soybeans 
production and exports. A large amount of resources was allocated to the development of 
soybeans agriculture and exportation. Two specific agencies related to the federal government 
had a very important role in this process: EMBRAPA and EMATER 
 
EMBRAPA is the Brazilian federal agency for agricultural research, under the Ministry of 
Agriculture. It was created in 1973 and has presently 37 research centers with 8,600 employees, 
of which 2,220 are researchers, 53% with PhD degrees. Its present budget is around 1 billion 
reais. 
 
In 1975, EMBRAPA – SOJA (a division inside EMBRAPA dedicated to soybean) was created 
with the mission to “tropicalize” soybean. Similarly, in 1975 EMBRAPA – CERRADO (a 
division inside EMBRAPA dedicated to the savannahs development) was created to develop 
better soil handling techniques to make commercial agriculture viable in the savannah region. 
Other EMBRAPA units joined efforts, such as EMBRAPA Agropecuária Oeste (West 
Agricultural EMBRAPA). In 1980, EMBRAPA – SOJA succeeded in creating the first soybean 
variety exclusively developed for the Brazilian savannahs soil, which supported the first phase in 
the soybean production expansion that lasted until the end of the 1980s. Throughout the years, 
other varieties that were even more fertile and adaptable were developed.  
 
Government’s role in the development of soybeans production and exportation was not restricted 
to technology development and diffusion. One of the main government policies for soybean 
development was the creation of special and subsidized credit lines that allowed farmers to 
finance investment and adopt new technologies during the first phase of soybean development.
36 
Credit was granted exclusively to farmers willing to adopt the technologies developed by 
EMBRAPA. These credit lines facilitated technological adoption and were supported by 
EMATER, the public agency responsible for rural extension.  
 
The technology diffusion process was managed by EMATER until 1991, when the agency was 
closed. The research made at EMBRAPA was diffused also through extension agencies in the 
states. The government trained agents in a system of technological packages, which consisted of 
a number of technologies considered adequate for a particular agricultural producing area after 
careful study of available resources and characteristics of the area. It is important to highlight 
that the main rural producers had sufficient resources to hire their own staff and did not need to 
use public services for rural extension.  
 
                                                 
36 Credit to buy land was not granted because land prices in the region were already very low.  
   113
In addition, the government invested in basic transportation infrastructure and set policies for 
price control, which affected almost all producers. Important programs to stimulate production 
associated to credit were launched. The first set of programs was created in 1971. This included 
the Mid-West Development Program (Prodoeste), which aimed at fostering the regional 
integration and infrastructure, and the Brazilian Savannahs Development Program (Polcentro), 
which aimed at modernizing the local agricultural plantations by means of rural credit (Mueller, 
1990). Proagro was established in 1973, which consisted in a type of insurance for the producer, 
with an additional amount paid to the producer to cover agricultural defrayal costs, in cases of 
natural disasters, pests and sicknesses that could affect assets, herds, or harvests. Additionally, 
the program guaranteed coverage for resources used by the producer in defraying agricultural 
costs due to losses for the aforementioned reasons. Another program was formalized in 1978 – 
the Japan-Brazil Savannahs Development Program (Prodecer) – which planned the settlement of 
landless farmers in new productive areas in the Brazilian savannahs region.  Programs such as 
Prodecer, Polcentro, and Prodoeste also provided subsidies to remove vegetation from the 
cerrado, buy fertilizers, and other financing options for the construction of silos, as well as tax 
benefits.  
 
Cooperatives were another form of organization and support stimulated by the government for 
the development of soybean cultivation and of the savannahs area was the cooperative. Soybean 
cultivation in the Brazilian savannahs is largely cited as an example of the consolidation of 
cooperativism in the 1970s. Gaúcho farmers used to organize into cooperatives to buy large 
properties and divide them (Macedo, 1998). The Agricultural Promotional Company (CAMPO), 
with resources from Prodecer, organized these cooperatives, providing land, tools, and a supply 
contract with the Japanese government. These programs were supported by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and financed by the Japanese government. 
 
During the 1990s, government support to the sector was substantially reduced. An exception was 
the credit program for agricultural mechanization known as   
Moderfrota, created in 2000. This program was managed by the National Economic and Social 
Development Bank (BNDES). Until the creation of the program, heavy agricultural machinery 
was financed by BNDES using a special credit line (Finame) created in 1996. Moderfrota 
brought producers more advantageous conditions: a lower than ever interest rate (between 9.75% 
to 12.75% a year, compared to Finame’s 13.95%). 
 
Moderfrota played a fundamental role in the modernization of Brazilian agricultural machinery 
with direct impact on productivity, which increased from 2.18 t/ha to 2.60 t/ha between the 
harvests of 2000/2001 and 2003/2004. Until 2003, the program had already permitted the   
renewal of around 20% of the agricultural fleet and until 2005 it had financed approximately 
US$ 5.84 billion (Lopes, 2005). 
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4. Counterfactual Analysis 
 
Soybean is a commodity with large international demand produced in temperate regions of the 
country, which received sizeable R&D investments from the government to increase crop 
productivity. However, soybean is not the only commodity with such characteristics. Wheat is 
very similar in the way it is harvested; it is also cultivated in temperate regions, has strong 
international demand, and received government grants for research and development. However, 
wheat exports do not measure up to soybeans, with irregular export levels that have reached 
US$102 million in 2005. Brazil still is a net importer of wheat, having imported almost US$764 
million of the grain in 2005. Following is a brief overview of wheat production in Brazil. The 
major points highlighted as success factors of soy production are revisited.   
 
Wheat is responsible for approximately 35% of the world’s total grain trade.
37 In 2005/2006, 
China stood out as one of the world’s leading producers of wheat, harvesting approximately 97 
million tons; it was followed by the U.S. with 57 million tons and Russia with 48 million tons. 
The European Union produces another large portion of total world output, with 123 million tons. 
Within Latin America, Argentina is the region’s largest producer, with 12 million tons. The main 
wheat exporters include the United States with 27.5 million tons, Canada and Australia, with 
16.5 million tons each, followed by the European Union with 14.5 million, and Russia with 
another 10 million tons.
38 
 
Brazilian production reached approximately 6 million tons in 2005, an insufficient volume to 
supply the domestic market, which demands approximately 11 million tons a year. In 2002, 
wheat imports totaled 6.5 million tons, at a cost of US$ 878 million, or 1.9% of the country’s 
total imports. Wheat remains the second largest commodity import for Brazil, right below oil. 
Brazil’s largest wheat producing regions are in Rio Grande do Sul and in Paraná. 
 
Domestic wheat production fluctuated during the last years. This lack of regularity in supply has 
generated substantial market uncertainty. Unlike soybean producers, domestic wheat producers 
did not create a reputation for quality and regularity, and were thus unable to competitively 
position their product in international markets.  
 
The instability of wheat crops is related to production volatility. Soybean and wheat do not 
require specific assets and they are considered complementary crops (they do not compete with 
each other since they are cultivated in different seasons). Therefore, it was expected that wheat 
would enjoy the same success as soybeans. But wheat lost to other crops that proved to be more 
profitable because they adapted better to climatic and land conditions in the highlands: 
leguminous plants like black beans, potato crops, carrots crops, as well as other vegetables. The 
cultivation of leguminous plants and vegetables has increased substantially, and it demands 
severing a cycle of production when a type of “hay” is introduced, which is the case of wheat. 
Therefore, wheat production became erratic, regardless of the technological advances achieved 
in this area. 
 
                                                 
37 Estado de São Paulo, June 11, 2003. 
38 Source: ABITRIGO.   115
There are four commercial types of wheat, of which one corresponds to more than half of the 
Brazilian production, and is used to manufacture bread. Not all four types can be produced in 
Brazil at this point, due to climatic and land conditions. This is the case of Durum wheat, used 
abroad for the production of dough. Durum wheat must be cultivated in dry regions and is very 
sensitive to illnesses. This type of wheat has not shown good adaptation to Brazilian 
environmental conditions. Even if these problems were solved, Brazil does not have industrial 
facilities to process Durum wheat.  
 
 
4.1. Producer Profile  
 
Soybean and wheat production were started by the same type of producer: the gauchos from the 
South of Brazil. Soybean production expanded to the Central region of the country and the 
tropical savannahs, while wheat production remained in the Southern region, mainly in Paraná.  
 
Because of these distinct expansion patterns, wheat producers differ from soy producers in the 
size of their properties. This is due to the scarcity of land available and the high land prices in the 
South for the production of wheat, compared to a good number of soy producers in the Brazilian 
savannahs with  large properties. 
 
Agricultural producers from the South of Brazil are recognized for their good technical and 
educational level, being receptive to the introduction of new technologies, and for their 
entrepreneurial spirit. They are behing both wheat and soybeans production. 
 
It is also important to highlight that wheat was the first crop in which technological 
developments were introduced to improve its commercial potential. Wheat was part of the 
genesis of agricultural cooperativism. Beginning in the 1950s, agricultural cooperatives were 
formed, with wheat as their main or only source of profits. 
 
 
4.2. Role of the Brazilian Government 
 
During the 1970s, government stimulated wheat production, moved by the desire of supplying 
the domestic market. The military government considered self-sufficiency in wheat a strategic 
goal for the country’s development and for national sovereignty. Tight controls were established, 
with the total volume of wheat grinded registered and flour imports prohibited. Because of 
government intervention, wheat prices in the domestic market differed substantially from 
international prices. 
  
Processing plants adopted specific measures in order to break the rules imposed by the 
government. The government then decided to intervene by means of Law nº 210/1967. The 
country was divided in eight consumption zones with wheat quotas. This led to a reduction of the 
number of processing plants between the years 1967 and 1990, from 420 to 178. 
39 
                                                 
39 BNDES Setorial, Rio de Janeiro, n. 18, p. 193-220. 
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The government also defined the types of flour to be produced, as well as the prices of wheat 
products. Banco do Brasil became responsible for the purchasing of domestic wheat, and a 
committee was created to manage international purchasing. Domestic and international wheat 
were purchased by the government and sold to processing plants during 23 years. These policies 
discouraged quality investments, since quality improvements could not be transferred to prices. 
 
A number of concurrent actions were taken to stimulate technological advancement in the 
Brazilian wheat production. In 1974, CNPT, EMBRAPA’s National Research Center for Wheat, 
was created. EMBRAPA did genetic research to adapt the crops to Brazilian environmental 
conditions, and developed management techniques to permit the exploration of different soils 
and climates. 
 
Wheat production expanded and almost reached self-sufficiency during the period from 1986 to 
1990. Prices were kept artificially high, and credit was made available. Producers were 
encouraged to abandon regular technologies they used and urged to adopt technology packages 
that were compatible with higher prices (and higher returns). Once again, the mechanism 
adopted isolated internal market prices from international parity. Producers responded with the 
expansion of crops that had guaranteed prices.  
 
In 1990, the situation radically changed, with the end of this quota system. Prices were 
liberalized in 1991, leading to a restructuring of the industry and a reduction of production. The 
combined effect of decades of self-sufficiency programs, consumption subsidies, price controls, 
and government intervention in the market was an industry unprepared for competition. 
 
It is thus possible to identify three wheat production periods in Brazil. The first two are 
characterized by government intervention. The first phase covers the period between 1970 and 
1984, when production reached 2 million tons per year. The second phase, between 1985 and 
1989, was characterized by an increase in the cultivation area and almost reaching self-
sufficiency, with wheat production surpassing 6 million tons per year. The third and current 




4.3. A Comparison of the Two Products 
 
By briefly analyzing wheat production trajectory, it is clear that both crops had a number of 
aspects in common: 
 
•  Both received strong government support since the early 1970s, and both were 
considered priorities. 
 
•  Both crops benefited from advanced research from EMBRAPA. 
 
•  Farmers involved with both types of crops had a similar profile, and both crops used 
skilled labor capable of adopting technical advances.   117
The two products differ, however, in two crucial aspects:  
 
•  The domestic market for wheat was huge and exceeded domestic production. In contrast, 
there was a larger supply of soybeans than the domestic market could absorb. This led to 
much higher levels of return from soybeans than in the case of wheat.  
 
•  Excessive government intervention in the wheat sector, which was not paralleled in the 
soybeans sector, made producers less competitive, discouraging investments in quality 
and productivity.  
 
Table 19 compares soybeans and wheat.  
 
Table 19 
A Comparison between Soybeans and Wheat 
  Soybeans  Wheat  
2005/2006 Crop (tons)  53,053,000   4,873,100  
2005 Exports (millions of dollars)  5,345 (4,132 of flour and oil)  102.5 
2005 Imports (millions of dollars)  83.8 ( 38.4 of flour and oil)  763.7 
Main Producing States  Paraná, Mato Grosso, Rio Grande do 
Sul, Goiás and São Paulo 
Rio Grande do Sul and 
Paraná 
Main Producers  US, Brazil, Argentina, China and India.  E.U., China, India, U.S., and 
Russia. 
Main  Exporters  U.S., Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and 
the E.U. 
U.S., EU, Canada, Australia 
and Russia 
Average International Price (2005)  US$235.01/ton  US$130.67/ton 
Agricultural research 
Large government efforts beginning in 
the 1970s. After the commercial 
liberalization of the 1990s, larger 
private sector participation. 
EMBRAPA’s role still relevant. 
Large government efforts 
beginning in the 1970s. 




Price controls and restrictions to 
international trade until economic 
liberalization. Credit and insurance; 
Subsidies for the purchase of 
agricultural machinery. 
Excessive government  
intervention. 
Credit and insurance; 
subsidies for the purchase of 
agricultural machinery. 
Producers Profile 
Gaúchos and their descendants. 
Receptive to the introduction of new 
technologies. Entrepreneurial spirit. 
Gaúchos and their  
descendants. Receptive to 
the introduction of new 
technologies.  
Entrepreneurial spirit. 
  Source: ABIOVE, ABTRIGO, SECEX/MIDIC, CONAB 
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5. Case Study Analysis and Conclusions 
 
This case study did not permit the identification of a first mover. It shows, however, the relevant 
role played by the Brazilian government in promoting the expansion of the agricultural frontier 
to the cerrado region. The case of soybeans can be seen as a government-led effort to expand 
Brazilian production and exportation of this crop. 
 
 
5.1. The Nature of the Discovery 
 
The discovery in this case was basically the use of the cerrados region to produce soybeans to be 
exported to international markets. 
 
This “discovery” would not have been successful without government intervention, the most 
important of which was the role played by EMBRAPA in developing soybean varieties adapted 
to the cerrados climate and soils. 
 
 
5.2. First Movers Characteristics  
 
The analysis of this case did not permit the identification of one individual or company that was 
a first mover. Rather, a large group of individuals migrated from the South of Brazil to the 
cerrados region in search of new land. 
 
The pioneers in the cultivation of soybeans were the gaúchos, inhabitants of the state of Rio 
Grande do Sul, that had some experience with these crops in the Southern part of Brazil, a region 
with adequate climate and conditions for soybean agriculture. They had a higher than average 
level of education, and extensive experience with farm production and equipment. Such 
experience and technical capabilities allowed them to experiment with soybean cultivation in 
other regions of the country at a time when international markets started to demand higher 
volumes of soybeans. 
 
Gaucho pioneers inspired the movement of other populations from the Southern regions of the 
country to the Mid-Western regions and, more recently, to the Central and Northeast regions of 
Brazil. The success of these adventurers spread by word-of-mouth and by personal mechanisms 
of network diffusion, such as friends and family. 
 
 
5.3. First Movers’ Motives and External Stimuli 
 
The motivations that drove the first gaucho producers to the cerrado can be summarized in three 
elements: the scarcity and high cost of lands in the South, government incentives of various 
sorts, and international demand.  
 
Gaucho families proliferated and their properties could no longer absorb new family members. 
In fact, the continuous division of land in the South created very small properties – called   119
“minifúndios” – that were too small to be productive, or even to generate enough income to a 
family of average size. As a result, the high cost of land in the South was prohibitive to many 
young people trying to establish their own families. This encouraged farmers from the South to 
look for more land at cheaper prices. 
 
Larger farmers also participated in the first phase of the development of the cerrado region. They 
bought larger pieces of land, but they were not very different in their characteristics from smaller 
farmers. 
 
Structural factors provided the basis and the encouragement to develop soybean production. The 
growing international demand was crucial for the development of this crop in new latitudes of 
the Brazilian territory. The government invested heavily in this region with a strategic vision of 
the expansion of the agricultural frontier. Heavy investments in agricultural technology during 
the 1970s and the early 1980s allowed for drastic cost reductions for domestic growers, making 
possible the exploration of the cerrado. These innovations were carried out by research 
institutions such as EMBRAPA. They were important for the first steps of this process. Other 
government actions can be seen in a variety of subsidized credit lines available to Brazilian 
agricultural producers, offered by means of various programs. 
 
It is also important to note that soybean production in Brazil was from the very beginning a very 
dynamic activity. Large private firms provided credit and channels of distribution. This was 
possible because of large international trading companies operating in the Brazilian market that 
were in charge of a large part of the international soybean commerce. 
 
 
5.4. Difficulties faced by First Movers 
 
First movers had to face the challenge of transplanting a crop that worked very well in the good 
soil and temperate climate of Rio Grande do Sul to the cerrados region, much drier and warmer, 
and with a soil considered up to that point of poor quality. In fact the low price of land in the 
cerrados was exactly because of these characteristics. 
 
Two challenges had to be faced before the cerrados could be used for the production of 
soybeans: 
 
•  To create soybean varieties adapted to the cerrados climate; 
 
•  To develop soil management techniques that permitted to increase the productivity of the 
land in the cerrados. 
 
In fact, first movers faced the failure of their initial soybean crops and moved to rice. Yet they 
remained interested in soybeans because of its extraordinary potential and they put pressure on 
research institutions to help solve initial problems. 
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5.5. Impact of Diffusion on First Movers 
 
First movers did collect the benefits of their pioneer move to the cerrados. There were no 
histories of failure and bankrupt, although we are sure that these must have happened in one case 
or another. In general, however, positive word-of- mouth and the growing number of followers 
suggest positive outcomes for the pioneers. 
 
 
5.6. Characteristics of Imitators 
 
Imitators were not different from the original settlers in the cerrado region. They were also 
gauchos. In fact, they tended to come from the same regions, often from the same towns and 
surroundings, in such a way that family and neighborhood networks were transplanted to the new 
environment. According to the interviews, it was often the case where half of the population of a 
given area in Rio Grande do Sul would move in successive waves to a specific area of the 
cerrados, forming a new community with the same kin and neighborhood ties.  
 
This type of migration reduced uncertainties and difficulties for the followers, since they could 
quickly learn from first movers. Also, first movers would be more open to transferring their 




5.7. Strategies Followed by Imitators 
 
Imitators were not different from first movers, and they imitated them. There are no specific 
differences that were determined to exist between first movers and followers’ strategies. 
 
 
5.8. External Events Influencing Discoveries and Diffusion 
 
Table 20 lists the main external events influencing the discovery and the diffusion process of 
soybeans in the cerrados. 
 
Table 20 
Externalities in the Process of Discovery and Diffusion in the Cerrados 
Phases in the Cerrado 
Development  Externalities Observations 
1968 world crops failure  Positive impact 
Growing international demand for soybeans  Positive impact 
Phase 1 (1970s-1989) 
1973 price increase   Positive impact 
1996/97 increase in international prices  Positive impact 
Climatic problems in the U.S.  Positive impact 
Devaluation of the Brazilian currency  Positive impact 
Expansion of the Chinese economy  Positive impact 
Phase 2 (1990-2006) 
Appreciation of the Brazilian currency  Negative impact   121
The growing international demand for soybeans was probably the most important externality in 
the early phase of soybean cultivation in the cerrados. Together with price increases it stimulated 
farmers to accept risks. 
 
Presently, the expansion of the Chinese economy and its insatiable demand for proteins permit 




5.9. Coordination Issues and Spillovers 
 
Coordination issues were in large part handled by informal networks, during the early phase of 
the settlement in the cerrado region. Also, the formation of cooperatives of producers helped to 
organize production and to access foreign markets. 
 
Technology transfer was coordinated by EMATER, the government diffusion agency, which 
played a very important role in various aspects of the technology transfer process. The extinction 
of EMATER in 1991 was said to have made much more difficult the transfer from EMBRAPA 
to farmers. Yet it probably did not affect as much soybean farmers, since they were already in an 
advanced phase of development. 
 
Even in the initial phase of soybeans production in the cerrados, there were already several 
positive spillovers. For example, between 1970 and 1982, there was a substantial increase in the 
production of various related industries such as: vegetable oils, fertilizers, seeds, chemical 
products, machinery, animal food, chicken, pork, transportation and storing services. In some 
cases these industries were suppliers to the soybean industry. In other cases, soybean products 
were inputs in other industries’ value chain. Altogether, it permitted the creation or expansion of 
a large variety of new economic activities. 
 
There were also spillovers to other non-related activities, under the form of advantages from 
technological advancement in various production processes, such as oil extraction from other 
types of seed-crushing plants; advances in fertilization technologies that could also be applied to 
other crops, etc. 
 
Finally, the migration created a number of new municipalities, which required infrastructure and 
all kinds of support services, public and private. 
 
 
5.10. Role of Private and Public Support Institutions 
 
The role of the Brazilian government in this process cannot be underestimated. By supporting 
soybeans growers until the liberalization in 1991, it permitted an infant sector to grow, 
stimulating individual entrepreneurs to accept risks that would be otherwise difficult to deal with. 
Also, the end of government protection permitted the industry to become fully competitive. A 
more detailed review of this activities was presented in section 3.1.   122
The most important government action however was developed by EMBRAPA, the research 
agency of the Ministry of Agriculture, which has a large part of the responsibility for the success 
history of soybeans cultivation in the cerrados of Brazil. 
 
 
CASE 4 - FRUITS IN THE PETROLINA-JUAZEIRO REGION 
 
 
1. General Description 
 
Brazilian fruit production boomed during the last two decades. Total fruit exports increased from 
$185 million in 1989 to $ 676.8 million in 2005
40. Grape exports have been one of the most 
successful cases, having increased from $1.8 millions in 1989 to $107.2 million in 2005.
41 The 
region of Petrolina and Juazeiro, which is part of the San Francisco river basin, in the 
Northeastern states of Bahia and Pernambuco, is responsible for this export performance. 
Growers in Petrolina-Juazeiro produced 95% of the country’s table grape exports in 2005. In the 
region, over 600 growers cultivated 6,000 hectares of grapes, and hundreds of other farmers 
produced mango, bananas, coconuts, watermelons, and other crops.  These crops employ more 
than 29,000 workers in the region (Gomes, 2004). 
 
The region’s good climate, its state-of-the-art irrigation system, and advances in biotechnology 
have allowed yields in this area to be much higher than those of the Southeastern region of 
Brazil. These districts are blessed with a continuous supply of sun, about 3,000 hours, or 300 
sunny days per year, fertile soil, and low levels of humidity (Hirsch, 2005). All these factors are 
beneficial to certain crops, creating an environment resistant to plagues and disease. Such 
favorable weather conditions enable farmers to harvest two to three times a year and to supply 
the European Union during marketing windows, particularly the month of November, when 
production worldwide is low. Brazil’s strategic access to the European market during the off-
season allows to get better prices for its exports. 
 
The region, described as an open-air greenhouse by The Economist, changed due to irrigation 
projects implemented during the sixties and seventies. Since the early 1990s it became one of 
Brazil’s most successful fruit exporters. Since then, the region has been exporting high quality 
fresh fruit to several countries including Europe and the United States. 
 
We have selected to analyze grape exports from the Petrolina – Juazeiro region as an additional 
case study related to the development of agricultural exports in Brazil. Graph 14 shows the 
evolution of grape exports from this region. 
                                                 
40 It is estimated that the world’s fresh fruit market represented over US$20 billion in 2004.  
41  ALICE System/SECEX   123
Graph 14  
Grape Exports from Petrolina-Juazeiro (1996-2005)  
(value and weight) 
 





The development process in the Petrolina-Juazeiro region began in the late 1960s, when this area 
was no different than most rural areas in Northeast Brazil, underdeveloped, and lacking basic 
infrastructure. Government infrastructure investments, particularly large-scale irrigation projects 
(reservoirs, delivery canals, and land settlement-like irrigation schemes), triggered the region’s 
development. CODEVASF, a federal government agency created to promote the development of 
the São Francisco River Basin, carried out most of these projects.  
 
In Petrolina – Juazeiro, CODEVASF expropriated land and implemented six large projects. The 
expropriated land consisted of lots that contained 6 to 200 hectares, and covered a total of 38,000 
hectares (Damiani, 1999). These lots were distributed to small and large farmers. CODEVASF 
also built irrigation infrastructure to channel water from the Sobradinho dam to each individual 
lot, and facilitated credit and market access to small farmers
42  (Gomes, 2004).  
 
The initial CODEVASF’s strategy was the establishment of a tomato-processing industry during 
the early 1980s. Yet, this industry turned out to generate limited results and not to deliver the 
expected development effects.  
                                                 




















1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 2002 2003  2004  2005 
US$ FOB  Net weight (Kg)  124
According to Damiani (1999), the Pernambuco state was at the time the second largest tomato 
producer in Brazil, and CODEVASF decided to promote the cultivation of tomatoes for 
industrial use. CODEVASF attracted tomato-processing industries to the region with the idea 
that producers in Petrolina-Juazeiro would use irrigation and thus could obtain tomatoes during 
the off-season when the tomato processing industry could not purchase the crops in other 
regions. CODEVASF thus hoped to stimulate the industrial development of the region. 
 
However, the conditions that gave rise to the tomato boom changed dramatically during the late 
1980s, and drastically reduced these crops. A series of factors led to its deterioration. First, the 
emergence of a new pest (named “traça”) harmed tomato crops in 1988, leading to very low 
yields and big losses. Farmers were forced to use expensive pesticides, thus increasing 
production costs, even though the processing industry had supplied technological packages to 
target pests since the early 1990s. Second, as a consequence of these events, the trust relationship 
between farmers and the processing industry deteriorated.  Lastly, the federal government 
implemented lower tariffs for imports, which made imported tomato products more competitive 
than domestic ones. The presence of the tomato industry was crucial for the Petrolina-Juazeiro 
region, for it played an important role in the learning process of the production of irrigated crops. 
It was by this process that producers learned important techniques that were later on applied to 
other crops that became important export products. 
 
The region was also an important melon producer before it became a leader in grape and mango 
production. Yet, production problems due to the heterogeneity of products and the inability to 
guarantee a certain level of quality led to a decrease in prices, and production was interrupted. 
Grapes and mangoes then became the main export products of the region. Investments in 
production began during the 1980s, but it was only during the late 1990s that exports started to 
grow due to the introduction of seedless grapes. The grape export growth trajectory was only 
interrupted in 2004 mostly due to weather fluctuations: strong and abnormal rainfall, and the rise 
of humidity levels, which damaged some of the crops.  
 
 
2. The Discovery and the Diffusion Process: Historical Overview 
 
The first firm to export grapes in the region was Cotia, a São Paulo-based cooperative founded in 
the 1950s by Japanese immigrants that was the largest agricultural cooperative in the world in 
the 1980s. Cotia began its work in the Petrolina-Juazeiro region in 1978, when it leased an area 
of 1,927 hectares (834 of them irrigated), establishing 36 of its members from São Paulo and 
Paraná (Damiani, 1999). The first grape exports took place in 1985 after previous attempts with 
other fruits. 
 
Cotia already had some experience exporting fruits (including grapes) in other regions of the 
country, but it was not the first to produce grapes in the region. When Cotia arrived in Petrolina – 
Juazeiro, Fazenda Milano had already been producing grapes for the domestic market. These 
first attempts to produce grapes started in the 1950s, but experienced several adaptation problems 
given the region’s tropical climate. Molina, a Spanish national, was in fact the first grower to 
cultivate grapes in a large commercial scale starting in 1958. Yet these first attempts did not 
generate an enduring cultivation of grapes, neither the output was successfully exported.   125
Other firms followed Cotia, as well as smaller local farmers. But it was only in the 2000s, after 
Cotia had bankrupted, that the exporting of seedless grapes, introduced in the end of the 1990s, 
led to outstanding export growth rates. 
 
 
2.1. COTIA, the First Mover 
 
Cotia was attracted to the region because of its dry climate, and of CODEVASF’s policies aimed 
at bringing new firms to the region. 
 
In the end of the 1970s, Cotia already exported grapes produced in the São Miguel and São Paulo 
regions to the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. Yet, this production was constantly 
damaged by excessive rainfall in those regions. Knowing the problem, and with a South African 
experience in mind, a British customer suggested that the cooperative should look for a region 
with less rainfall. 
 
COTIA had previous knowledge of the fruit production potential of the Petrolina – Juazeiro 
region. In fact, the cooperative had bought melon produced by two irrigated projects in the 
Northeast since the mid-1970s. In addition, managers knew that the region could produce table 
grapes all year round.  
 
At the same time, CODEVASF’s officials were trying to draw potential investors to the agency’s 
irrigation projects in the Northeast. Cotia’s success was recognized all over Brazil, and the 
cooperative was known as an important exporter of several agricultural products (e.g., coffee, 
soybean, apples, and cantaloupes). It was also recognized for buying production from affiliated 
farmers and successfully exporting their output. CODEVASF believed that Cotia could play a 
leading role in diversifying the crops produced in its irrigation projects, not only in Petrolina-
Juazeiro, but also in the other regions of the São Francisco Basin where the agency was initiating 
new irrigation projects. With this potential in mind, CODEVASF offered Cotia an irrigated area. 
 
In addition, according to Damiani (1999), one of the strongest appeals to Cotia was the 
possibility of its members’ children to own land in the area. These young men were interested in 
becoming farmers themselves, but had difficulties in finding low-priced land in the São Paulo 
and Paraná states. 
 
Grapes were not the first product to be produced and exported by Cotia members in the 
Petrolina-Juazeiro region. Its members first attempted the cultivation of tomato and melon crops 
in the region and failed for the reasons earlier described (see section 1). 
 
Tomato production had been heavily promoted by CODEVASF in the beginning of the 
Petrolina-Juazeiro development, but production and market conditions changed dramatically 
during the late 1980s, and drastically reduced this type of crop.  
 
Melon production was started in the early 1980s by a group of Cotia growers who sooner became 
the main suppliers for the domestic market, and the only producers from Petrolina-Juazeiro to 
export melon to Europe. The initial success of Cotia growers and the good prices obtained for   126
their fruit inspired other growers. The subsequent increase in production attracted several 
exporters from São Paulo and other cities of the Northeastern states. By 1984, Petrolina-Juazeiro 
had turned into the main Brazilian exporter of melon. 
 
But the entry of new producers (most of them settlers from other regions) brought a large variety 
of production techniques (e.g., different varieties, application of several fertilizers and pesticides, 
etc.). Accordingly, the quality of production was very diverse, and the region produced different 
types of melons, with different taste.  New problems arose, since it was not possible to assure the 
quality of the melons exported, leading to a substantial decrease in price, as bad quality fruit was 
being shipped to Europe. In 1986, the price of melons decreased dramatically and reached levels 
that could no longer cover export costs. This decrease in prices led to the collapse of the crop and 
to the default of many small farmers that participated in government-sponsored irrigation 
projects. Melon cultivation declined from 1987 on and production never recovered to its original 
levels. Melon production in the area covers less than 1,200 hectares (Damiani, 1999) 
 
It was at this point that Cotia got directly involved with the cultivation of grapes in the region. 
The main uncertainty Cotia faced with regards to grape exports was in production. Even though 
grapes had already been produced in the region, many problems still remained. Some producers 
were unsure about producing in sandy terrains. The production technology had to be adapted 
(and continues to be adapted until today). Initially, the grapes were too small and productivity 
was low. New levels of productivity were reached due to the use of new processes and new 
technology. 
  
The cooperative did not face many obstacles in marketing its grape production. Cotia had a long 
experience exporting agricultural output, including coffee, soybean, and fresh fruits like melon 
and apples, crops that its members already grew in other regions. Among the distribution 
channels utilized was an international office in Rotterdam, established during the mid-1960s to 
market the cooperative’s output in Europe. With this office, Cotia was able to maintain a direct 
relationship with several buyers, who often visited production sites in Brazil.   
 
Since production was labor and technology intensive, Cotia’s members had to hire people and 
train them in order to properly cultivate the grapes. This led to the creation of a qualified labor 
force. One of the most important growers in the region, Nelson Costa, commented Cotia’s role in 
the region: 
 
“Cotia was an inspiration for the region. They arrived in the region and contacted the 
families there. They hired and trained these people, and the people learned. COTIA 
began an extraordinary process: education for the use of agricultural techniques. These 
included pruning and the know-how to manage the vineyards. Cotia’s contributions to 
the region are outstanding. They professionalized and provided a higher standard of 
living to people of the semi-arid Northeastern region of the country, who prior to Cotia’s 
arrival had lived without any expectations of professional development.” 
 
Cotia spread its experience and expanded the agricultural frontiers of Brazil until 1994, when it 
collapsed because of an overextended bureaucracy, and financial problems. The group of   127
producers in Petrolina-Juazeiro that were members of Cotia created the Agricultural Cooperative 
of Juazeiro (CAJ), which has presently eighty members. 
 
2.2. The Diffusion Process 
 
Cotia’s example was followed by many others. At first, smaller local farmers started to cultivate 
grapes. In sequence, the region underwent two important expansion periods, one from the end of 
the 1980s to the end of the 1990s; and the second from the end of the 1990s to the present days, 
with the introduction of seedless grapes. 
 
The first period took place at the end of the 1980s, when different companies were attracted to 
the region by Cotia’s success. The companies that arrived and invested in the region following 
Cotia were quite different from those in other areas of the Northeast. These were firms from 
other sectors
43, mainly from industrial sectors, which had capital, and an entrepreneurial vision 
of agriculture. Additionally, they had a strong desire to export their products.  
 
By the mid-1980s, not only the members of Cotia were growing grapes in the Petrolina – 
Juazeiro region, but also six or seven other firms with large farms.  The quality of production of 
most producers was very heterogeneous, each one obtaining fruit of both very good and very 
poor quality. The earlier failure in exporting melon was a reminder that the same problems could 
emerge again, once many producers with different product quality were exporting to the same 
markets from the same region. 
 
Avoiding these potential problems would require cooperating with other exporters to work out a 
way of jointly achieving similar quality standards in production, classification, and packaging. 
Cotia managers concluded that they would need to become more involved in agricultural 
production to help other farmers with production technology, and to coordinate a joint effort with 
the other exporters, by supporting the creation of an association of fruit exporters.  
 
As a result, in 1992 seven table grape producers created the Brazilian Grapes Marketing 
Association (BGMA). Even though, BGMA’s creation was Cotia’s initiative, the association was 
established as a special division of Valexport, the association of the San Francisco Valley 
Exporters, created in 1988. BGMA became part of Valexport to avoid having decisions 
monopolized by Cotia. Despite of it, Cotia continued to play a crucial role in BGMA’s evolution. 
Cotia provided BGMA managers and information to help address issues related to the export of 
fresh agricultural products. In addition, BGMA used Cotia’s offices in Rotterdam, taking 
advantage of the cooperative’s contacts with European buyers.  
 
BGMA played a crucial role since then in the export growth of seedless grapes from the region. 
Producers agreed to enforce certain quality standards, and designed a joint production and 
marketing strategy. The idea was to avoid predatory competition and to market a common brand. 
They also made joint contracts for transportation and packaging materials and negotiated with 
the government infrastructure investments in the region. A brand name was developed under 
which the authorized production of BGMA members was sold in foreign markets. 
                                                 
43 One of the companies that was attracted to the region was Carrefour.   128
 
Sound policies of quality control were adopted with penalties to those who did not comply with 
the rules. The production was sampled and inspected by a quality control team, following 
specific rules dictated by a quality manual. Producers that did not adhere to the standards set by 
the association were not allowed to export. (BGMA’s president is proud to state that every 
producer that did not comply with the rules at any point was penalized, regardless its political 
importance.) Foreign buyers also monitored quality and complaints in European and U.S. 
supermarkets. Distributors were informed of any problems and this information was sent to 
BGMA, which in turn informed the faulty producers, that were then subject to price penalties.  
 
The first expansion phase started in the late 1980s and continued throughout the 1990s, with a 
rather slow progression. Macroeconomic conditions, particularly the appreciation of the Real, 
made exports less attractive during the second half of the 1990s. 
 
 A second expansion started by the end of the 1990s, with the introduction of seedless grapes. 
These crops were extremely attractive because of their high returns (about three times more 
profitable than the common grape). But there were technological challenges to overcome before 
the crop could be adopted. EMBRAPA had already been involved with seedless grape 
(Thompson type) experiments in the Southern regions of the country. Some farmers imported 
samples of a seedless grape species developed in California, and planted them in an experimental 
area with the financial support of SEBRAE, the Brazilian support service for small and medium-
sized enterprises. Other entrepreneurs planted seedless grapes at their own risk. By the end of the 
1990s, after a trial-and-error period, seedless grape crops in the region succeeded, and were 
responsible for an increase of more than 1000% in the region’s exports. 
 
The production of seedless grapes during production periods different from those of other 
producing countries was three times more profitable than common grapes. With this profitability 
prospect, the cultivated area in the region rapidly increased from 4,200 to 12,000 hectares. The 
region’s climatic conditions allowed for a grape plant to begin producing fruit within 
approximately a year and a half. This constitutes half the time a regular grape plant would need 
to produce fruit in other regions of the world. This condition facilitated the learning experience 
and permitted that the necessary adaptations could be introduced at a much lower cost and risk. 
 
The results were dramatic. Grape exports jumped from US$8.6 million in 1999 to $107.2 million 
in 2005. During this period new farmers came to the region, following the steps of those already 
successfully established there. 
 
Today, BGMA is responsible for 60% of the region’s grape exports. The rest comes from small 
and large producers that sell their products to other exporters or directly to importers. The 
association developed the North-American, Canadian, Russian, and Spanish markets, and 
continues to carry out an important role in opening new markets. In 2006, it was negotiating with 
China.  
 
Currently, BGMA encompasses 22 firms with 150 producers. In the last three years BGMA has 
not accepted new members since, according to its president, “BGMA’s main objective is not to be 
São Francisco Valley’s main producer, but the best producer in the area”.   129
3. Role of Support Institutions 
 
The Brazilian government made substantial contributions to the development of the Petrolina – 
Juazeiro region. The most important government agency was CODEVASF (The San Francisco 
River Valley Development Agency), but other institutions such as Banco do Nordeste (a regional 
development bank), SEBRAE (the support agency for smaller firms), and EMBRAPA (the 
federal agricultural research agency) also contributed to the region’s success. Some of the 
government interventions resulted from strategic decisions, while others were indirect effects of 
the policies implemented.  
 
 
3.1. CODEVASF, the regional development agency  
 
There are four main ways in which CODEVASF influenced the development of the region. First, 
it was responsible for the construction of the entire irrigation infrastructure and covered water 
costs for an extended period of time in order to increase the attractiveness of the region to 
investors. Second, the institution played an active role selecting and monitoring agricultural 
firms that got established in the region, which included attracting the pioneer firm. Third, 
CODEVASF promoted the diversification of cultures in the region, and stimulated investment of 
high-value export crops. Lastly, the institution supported the creation of Valexport, the San 
Francisco Valley association of exporters, and the creation of BGMA, the joint export marketing 
association. 
 
CODEVASF attracted several firms to the region with a policy of mixing large firms with small 
producers in the distribution of land. As a result, small farmers and larger firms interacted, which 
in turn stimulated a shared learning process. Large and medium-sized firms brought capital and 
technology to the region and small farmers were able to incorporate these technologies, and 
develop new crops. Octavio Damiani, a researcher on the development of the region, highlighted 
the diverse profile of the firms attracted to the region:  
 
“Several firms that were established in Petrolina came from other industries. This means 
that they had capital but also had a business vision. The traditional Latin American 
businessman always wants the State to pay for everything. This did not happen in this 
particular case. In this case, entrepreneurs from Petrolina – Juazeiro were very open-
minded. This was also very important... Also these entrepreneurs were aware of their 
reputation abroad because they lived of their exports. This is why they were concerned 
with not generating a negative image. For example, they did not employ child labor and 
tried to prevent strikes because they were aware that these could lead to a negative 
perception of them. So, I believe that the type of entrepreneur that arrived to the region 
was key in terms of the development of the region.  I believe, once again, that 
CODEVASF was very important in attracting these types of firms.” 
 
These actions meant a radical departure from the usual practices applied to the management of 
land settlement projects in Brazil and other regions, where the main beneficiaries tended to be 
landless farmers who only cultivated traditional crops. Additionally, CODEVASF created a   130
competitive environment in the region as it had firms competing for subsidies, and granted these 
to those with the best project proposals.  
 
Another area in which CODEVASF contributed was in promoting crop diversification. With the 
failure of tomato production in the region, CODEVASF started to promote the diversification of 
crops among individual farmers and firms. Highly inspired by the Chilean success, which was 
widely known by the executive team of CODEVASF, the central offices of CODEVASF in 
Brasilia created a task force in 1986 with this purpose.  
 
The task force organized workshops to promote high value perennial crops with high export 
potential such as grapes, mango, and banana. Most of the workshops and meetings organized 
were held in the cities of Petrolina and Juazeiro. The main objective of these workshops and 
meetings was to discuss possibilities and challenges of selling the region’s agricultural products 
in foreign markets. Often, CODEVASF would invite international and local specialists to lecture 
about a wide range of issues of interest to exporters. Some of the issues discussed during these 
workshops and meetings included the following: consumer tastes in specific export markets, 
rules governing imports of fresh fruits in European countries and the United States, and the 
organization of agricultural markets in the main importing countries. 
 
CODEVASF also stimulated the creation of Valexport by supporting and advocating its 
advantages, and by giving financial and technical support to the association during its initial 
stages. The institution argued that growers needed an association for at least the following 
powerful reasons: a) to collect information and search for export markets; and b) to press the 
federal government to carry out policies and other interventions that helped fruit producers to 
export, such as investments in infrastructure.  
 
Valexport’s role in export development is however controversial. Some interviewees believed 
that Valexport played a fundamental role in promoting exports, introducing quality controls, and 
attracting public investments, but an important entrepreneur in the region and long-time member 
of Cotia argued that the most important actions in this direction, such as the creation of BGMA, 
were more an initiative of Cotia than of Valexport. 
 
 
3.2. Banco do Nordeste, the regional development bank 
 
In addition to the role played by CODEVASF, the development of agribusiness in the region was 
also supported by the Banco do Nordeste, one of the main public banks in the Northeastern 
region.  
 
The Bank had an instrumental role in providing credit to farmers, but was also actively engaged 
in technology transfer. According to Damiani (1999), at the same time Banco do Nordeste was 
involved in the process of providing credit to firms and settlers, which enabled them to grow 
perennial crops, it also acted as an intermediary in the transfer of technology between these 
players. This process was associated to the Bank’s credit application process, which required 
firms applying for credit to detail the technology to be used in their projects. At the same time, 
the Bank required that small farmers used the same technologies that large firms were using in   131
order to grant them credit lines. Bank officers often visited these firms to assess the status of the 
different project proposals, becoming the first to know about new technological advances by 
firms in the region. 
 
 
3.3. EMBRAPA, the federal agricultural research agency 
 
EMBRAPA had a minor role in the export development of seedless grapes. The EMBRAPA 
office in the region was focused on products for non-irrigated areas.  Only by the end of the 
1990s EMBRAPA SEMI-ARIDO division re-evaluated its priority list, and started to develop 
research on irrigated agriculture, becoming actively involved in the study of export crops.  
 
 
4. Counterfactual Analysis 
 
Petrolina – Juazeiro is not the only case of government-sponsored investments in irrigation 
infrastructure in the Northeast. The federal government also made heavy investments in roads, 
electrification, and irrigation infrastructure in other regions in the São Francisco River Basin, 
which include the North of Minas Gerais and the Lower São Francisco region. However, these 
two regions achieved different outcomes than Petrolina – Juazeiro, the only region that had a 
breakthrough in exports. This section analyzes the differences among these three areas, which 
followed distinct development patterns, although they have been subjected to the same 
macroeconomic conditions, the same regional policies of the federal government, and to several 
similar interventions of federal government agencies. 
 
 
4.1 Production Processes and Practices in the Three Regions  
 
The Petrolina – Juazeiro region had different productive structures, market access techniques, 
and revenues when compared to the Lower São Francisco and North of Minas Gerais regions.  
 
Petrolina – Juazeiro developed a diversified agriculture that included crops both for export 
(grapes and mango), and for the domestic market (banana, passion fruit, guava, tomato, melon, 
watermelon, and onion, among others).  In contrast, farmers in the Lower São Francisco focused 
on cultivating low-quality rice for regional markets. The North of Minas Gerais region showed 
an intermediate pattern, with farmers growing mainly banana, plus a mix of substantially smaller 
areas of beans, corn, table grapes, and mango. Most of their production was sold in the domestic 
market. 
 
Petrolina – Juazeiro farmers obtained higher yields from irrigated crops than those from the 
North of Minas Gerais and the Lower São Francisco regions. Actually, these two other regions 
obtained even lower yields than other regions of irrigated crops in Brazil. Furthermore, irrigated 
agriculture in Petrolina –Juazeiro led to widespread increases in wages, upskilling of labor, and 
improvement in labor standards.  In contrast, most wage workers in both the North of Minas 
Gerais and the Lower São Francisco were temporary, earned low wages (frequently lower than   132
the legal minimum), were not registered, did not receive fringe benefits, and worked in poor 
conditions.  
 
These divergent trajectories required different technologies and investments. In Petrolina-
Juazeiro, export crops cultivated demanded new production technologies, investments in 
expensive post-harvest facilities, and a skilled workforce in order to attain the desired quality 
standards. In turn, growers from the Lower São Francisco have been slow to adopt new 
technologies and preferred to sell their product output to markets that were not as demanding in 
quality. In the North of Minas Gerais, producers obtained intermediate quality levels, good 
enough for demanding markets in the cities of Belo Horizonte and Rio de Janeiro, but not good 
enough to export. 
 




Production Aspects in Three Regions of the San Francisco Basin 
  Petrolina – Juazeiro  North of Minas Gerais  Lower São Francisco 
Type of crops  Diversified crops 
(grapes, mango, banana, 
passion fruit, guava, 
tomato, melon, 
watermelon, onion, etc.) 
Mainly rice  Mostly traditional crops 
(banana, beans, corn, 
table grapes, mango) 




Local markets  Regional markets; some 
exporting 
Technology-intensity  Higher Lower lower 
Quality High  Low  Intermediary 
Productivity High  Low  Low 
Labor force  Mostly permanent, 
registered, well-trained, 
well-paid 
Mostly temporary, low 
wages, not registered, 
no fringe benefits, no 
training 
Mostly temporary, low 
wages, not registered, 




4.2. Main Drivers of Development in the Three Regions 
 
The Lower São Francisco and the North of Minas Gerais regions did not attract a firm that could 
play the leading role that Cotia played in Petrolina – Juazeiro. In fact, Cotia could have created 
units in the Lower San Francisco and North of Minas Gerais regions. However, two fundamental 
factors in attracting Cotia to Petrolina – Juazeiro included the dry climate and the land structure 
in the area developed by CODEVASF, and these two factors were not present in the other two 
regions. 
 
The three areas share some climatic similarities, but have some important differences. The three 
are located in the São Francisco River Basin and have a semi-arid climate. Moreover, the three of 
them have poor soils, though there are some differences in soil fertility. The Lower São 
Francisco region had the least fertile soil, followed by Petrolina – Juazeiro, and the North of   133
Minas Gerais. Also, the Lower São Francisco had an important proportion (75%) of soils of low 
permeability, which are very appropriate for the cultivation of crops irrigated with inundation 
(Damiani, 1999). 
 
Despite these similarities, the three regions are different in one important characteristic: rainfall. 
Petrolina – Juazeiro had a lower rainfall (450 mm annually) than the North of Minas Gerais (650 
mm) and the Lower São Francisco (800 mm) (Damiani, 1999). The lower rainfall of Petrolina – 
Juazeiro turned out to be an advantage when producing with irrigation because it reduces the 
costs of controlling pests and allows farmers to grow various crops all year round rather than in a 
particular season. This enables producers to get two to three harvests a year from each plant and 
to produce during some periods of the year in which competitors in international markets would 
not be able to do so. The possibility of harvesting more than one time per year helps to reduce 
production seasonality and allows farmers to employ workers almost all year round, permitting 
more investment in human capital.  Also, since the low rain fall was one of the main 
characteristics that Cotia was looking for in a region, this was crucial for the cooperative’s 
decision to go to Petrolina – Juazeiro. 
 
CODEVASF integrated innovative principles to the management of irrigation projects in 




First, CODEVASF’s irrigation project in the Petrolina – Juazeiro region included a mix of small 
farmers and agricultural firms. Since the institution was concerned with attracting flagship firms, 
which could play the role of bringing capital, as well as production and marketing know-how, 
CODEVASF decided to focus its attention on medium-sized firms. With this particular focus, it 
also imposed land size limits to avoid the concentration of land in the hands of a few large firms. 
Cotia, the pioneer firm in grape exports, is an example of the effectiveness of this measure. In 
contrast, CODEVASF provided land only to landless settlers in the Lower São Francisco region, 
although in the North of Minas Gerais, CODEVASF’s irrigation projects included both landless 
settlers and firms, but the number of firms was substantially smaller than in Petrolina – Juazeiro.   
 
Second, in Petrolina – Juazeiro, CODEVASF introduced the provision of subsidies and 
distributed these according to farmer’s size, fostering competition among them. It did not 
provide firms with across-the-board subsidies. Instead, it selected agricultural and agro-
processing firms from outside Petrolina – Juazeiro, which already possessed technology and 
marketing know-how. The attractiveness for outside firms was the subsidized leased land and the 
irrigation infrastructure.  These firms were required to build their own farm-level irrigation 
infrastructure and had to pay for training in crop and irrigation technologies in addition to 
agricultural extension. In contrast, CODEVASF only partially selected firms in the North of 
Minas Gerais, and did not do this at all in the Lower São Francisco region. 
 
Third, CODEVASF required certain performance levels from agricultural firms that received 
subsidies. Firms that received subsidized land and irrigation infrastructure were required to meet 
production targets. If theses targets were not reached, firms would be fined or forced to leave.  
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Furthermore, CODEVASF offered five-year renewable leasing contracts, allowing firms to buy 
land only upon completion of the leasing period and based on good performance (Damiani, 
1999). In contrast, the agency did not monitor firms’ performance in the North of Minas Gerais.  
 
Fourth, the institution allowed turnover and even encouraged it in irrigation projects in Petrolina 
– Juazeiro. This was in sharp contrast to what other federal government agencies were doing in 
their settlement projects. Ten years after the establishment of irrigation projects, turnover among 
firms varied between 25% and 50%, including mostly firms that did not comply with their 
project proposals; turnover among individual settlers reached 60%.  Turnover also took place in 
CODEVASF’s projects in the North of Minas Gerais and in the Lower São Francisco. Yet, 
turnover was negatively viewed by officials of the agency’s local branches in both regions. 
Avoni Santos, the superintendent of CAJ and the actual president of BGMA, commented on the 
distinct policies of settlement implemented by CODEVASF in different areas of the Northeast: 
 
“The climate is only one aspect, you must adapt your crops to the climate. The other 
issue is that you must have an entrepreneurial mind. Here in Petrolina-Juazeiro, it 
worked because we had large firms with an entrepreneurial vision, not with that mindset 
that ‘I have an hectare here, and I will survive because the government will subsidize 
me’. Here we had some projects that were a mix, an industry area here, a colono
45 area 
there. The colono area there is abandoned. This is because the colono’s mentality is like 
that. They think that: ‘the government put me here, it has to subsidize me, I don’t pay 
water, I don’t pay electricity either, the loans that I got, I dont pay ‘them either because 
its from the government... And government paternalism did not help things to work out. 
Here you could also have had that situation, but what happened here? Some of these 
areas also belonged to colonos. Some entrepreneurs started to buy. The colonos sold 
their land, and you could buy land of different sizes and add them up to have something 
larger. Then the problem took a different dimension. Now, if you have a philosophy of 
land reform such as today, you go nowhere.  It’s a model that needs to be looked at. You 




5. Case Study Analysis and Conclusions 
 
The development of the Petrolina – Juazeiro region is a rare example of a joint-effort by public 
and private actors. This partnership led to the successful development of a region now 
considered an Oasis of wealth in the Brazilian Northeast, the country’s poorest region. 
 
The public sector, by means of CODEVASF, played a crucial role in creating infrastructure, 
attracting leading firms, and diffusing knowledge throughout the region. Additionally, 
companies were stimulated to continually invest in more profitable crops and in supporting the 
creation of an association that would promote the sector’s interests in exporting. 
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Yet, all the aforementioned efforts might not have succeeded, had it not been for Cotia, the 
pioneer cooperative enterprise that acted as an important catalyzer in the whole process. 
 
 
5.1. The Nature of the Discovery 
 
The discovery, in this case, was the production of seedless grapes in the region of Petrolina – 
Juazeiro to serve export markets.  
 
The original production of grapes in the area was not considered a “discovery”, since the product 
was basically transplanted from other areas to the San Francisco River Basin, specifically to the 
Petrolina – Juazeiro region. Initial efforts were not very successful and did not include any 
relevant breakthroughs that led to subsequent developments. For this reason, there is a consensus 
that the first mover was in fact Cotia. 
 
Cotia’s main role in the discovery and diffusion process included: 
 
•  to recognize the region’s potential for export crops; 
 
•  to adapt technology to the region’s climate;  
 
•  to develop foreign markets; and 
 
•  to disseminate to other growers its production techniques and its international marketing 
knowledge. 
 
By means of these actions, the cooperative led other growers in the region to generate a very 
successful agricultural cluster. 
 
Cotia played a leading role in the export success of Petrolina – Juazeiro, as expected by 
CODEVASF. While operating in the region, the cooperative demonstrated the export potential of 
the region and also trained the labor force in the production and marketing of agricultural 
products, opening up markets for other producers. It played a very important role in the diffusion 
of knowledge.  
 
5.2. First Mover Characteristics 
 
Cotia was already an outstanding organization at the time of the discovery. Started in São Paulo 
by Japanese immigrants, it became the largest agricultural cooperative in the world in the 1980s. 
Despite its giant size, Cotia’s managers were quite entrepreneurial. 
 
Cotia pioneered several initiatives in the expansion of Brazilian agriculture.  Another example of 
Cotia’s pioneering role can be found in soybeans production in Barreiras, Bahia, which is 
considered one of the new agricultural frontiers of soybean production in Brazil. It also played an 
important role in apple production in Santa Catarina, the country’s main apple exporting state. 
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5.3. First Mover’s Motives and External Stimuli 
 
Cotia became the first mover for three specific and easily identifiable reasons: 
 
•  The cooperative was searching at the time for a new area, with a dryer climate, to plant 
grapes; 
 
•  There was an interest in developing new cultivation areas to expand the agricultural 
frontier and give the younger generation of the members’ families an opportunity to own 
their own land; 
 
•  The cooperative was contacted by CODEVASF, which offered attractive opportunities. 
 
Together, these reasons were more than enough to move Cotia to the Petrolina-Juazeiro region. 
 
 
5.4. Difficulties faced by the First Mover 
 
Cotia did not have to face any marketing difficulties, since it already had an office outside Brazil, 
and had accumulated experience for many years in the exporting of fresh agricultural products. 
In fact Cotia had a trading company that operated all over the world. 
 
Main difficulties faced by Cotia came from technical problems, related to the management of the 
soil and the adaptation of grape varieties to the region. These were dealt with by trial-and-error, 
and by the transfer of technology and know-how obtained in other areas of the country. 
 
 
5.5. Impact of Diffusion on the First Mover 
 
Cotia did not survive to the turbulent Brazilian business environment, and went bankrupt in 
1994. Main problems were its excessive bureaucracy, combined with inadequate financial 
management practices. 
 
Being a cooperative, Cotia could disappear without the loss of its various achievements in the 
agricultural area. In the specific case of Cotia members in the Petrolina – Juazeiro region, the 
evidences collected in this research suggest that they strongly benefited from the cooperative’s 
initiatives, and did collect the awards for their entrepreneurship in the Petrolina – Juazeiro 
region. They reorganized in a much smaller cooperative, The Agricultural Cooperative of 
Juazeiro, that continued to act in a similar manner. Presently, the president of this cooperative is 
also the head of BGMA, the joint export marketing association. 
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5.6. Characteristics of Imitators 
 
There were basically two kinds of imitators: individual settlers and firms.  
 
Individuals settlers were typically people from the region, but sometimes also from other parts of 
the country, especially from other regions of the Northeast. These settlers did not have much 
technical know-how to be used in irrigated agriculture, and strongly benefited from the 
association with larger agricultural firms. Apparently a number of the initial individual settlers in 
the region sold their land to others. 
 
Firms came typically from outside the region, commonly from the South and Southeast, and 
were medium and large-sized organizations from various sectors. These companies were 
carefully selected by CODEVASF, and brought capital, technology, and management know-how 
that were later transferred to other firms in the region. 
 
 
5.7. Strategies Followed by Imitators 
 
Imitators used exactly the same strategies as the first mover. The main producers decided to 
standardize their production and to develop joint export marketing activities in order to increase 
their export potential and avoid negative spillovers from one operation into another. 
 
The first step was product standardization, combined with rigid specifications and quality control 
mechanisms. Once production practices were standardized and growers were getting essentially 
the same product quality, the next step was to develop a joint marketing strategy. Marketing and 
sales were carried by BGMA, the joint export marketing association that was put together by 
Cotia with the support of CODEVASF. In fact, one of the major contributions of the first mover 
was the transfer of marketing know-how to other firms, by means of BGMA. Not only the first 
mover shared its marketing know-how, but it also shared its export marketing facilities with 
BGMA. In addition, a brand name was created to serve as an umbrella for the products of all 
BGMA members. This brand name – Copacabana Gold – became a synonym of quality for 
foreign buyers. 
 
As other firms entered the region, they also could become members of BGMA, meaning that 
they would have to follow the same strategies. It should be noted however that since 2003, as 
reported in section 2.2, BGMA was not accepting new members. 
 
5.8. External Events Influencing Discoveries and Diffusion 
 
Table 22 presents the external events identified in the recent historical development of the 
Petrolina – Juazeiro region. None of these, however, had a major impact on the discovery, 
although the 1999 devaluation triggered the second phase of expansion of the region. 
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Table 22 
External Events in the Process of Discovery and Diffusion in the Petrolina – Juazeiro 
Region 
Crops Externalities  Observations 
1988 pest (“traça”)  Negative impact  Tomato Crops 
Competition from imported tomato products  Negaitive impact 
Melon Crops  1994 Appreciation of the Brazilian currency  Negative impact 
1999 Devaluation of the Brazilian currency  Positive impact 
Abnormal rainfall in 2004  Negative impact 
Grapes Crops 
2004 Appreciation of the Brazilian currency  Negative impact 
 
 
5.9. Coordination Issues and Spillovers 
 
The failures experienced with previous crops – tomato and melon – were important learning 
experiences. The earlier failure with exporting melon motivated Cotia managers to make a joint 
effort to avoid similar problems, leading to the creation of a growers’ association to resolve 
collective problems and commercialize the crops. During the 1990s this association played a 
crucial role in expanding exports from the region. BGMA is perhaps the biggest success case of 
joint export marketing groups in Brazil. Additionally, the cooperation between growers and 
public institutions was decisive to the success of exports.  
 
All these cooperative efforts were promoted by the pioneer firm and stimulated by CODEVASF. 
Producers were aware that cooperation was important in order to succeed because their prior 
experiences had proven that success was unattainable without cooperation. 
 
Spillovers were mainly the result of Cotia’s efforts to promote collective action and its efforts to 
train local workers in the use of agricultural techniques. One of the major positive spillovers, in 
fact, was the emergence of a well-trained and better paid workforce, different in almost every 
regard from the typical agricultural worker of the Northeast region of Brazil. 
 
CODEVASF itself actively stimulated spillovers from firms to local settlers, under the form of 
technical and marketing know-how. This was achieved by mixing together the two groups. 
 
5.10. Role of Private and Public Support Institutions 
 
As in the soybeans case, public institutions had a major role in the development of grape exports 
from the Petrolina – Juazeiro region. Section 3 presented a detailed account of these institutions 
actions, particularly of CODEVASF’s. Section 4 also discussed the impact of different strategies 
used by CODEVASF in the development of other areas of the São Francisco Basin. 
 
In summary, CODEVASF’s actions had a positive impact on the development of the region 
because of three aspects: 
 
•  It provided the necessary incentives to attract potential investors with an interesting 
profile to the region; 
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•  It stimulated these newcomers to bring capital and technology and share their knowledge 
with locals; 
 
•  It applied effective selection and control mechanisms that stimulated production, 
penalized speculation, and delivered highly competent producers with an entrepreneurial 
mind-set. 




This section presents the overall conclusions emanating from the study. It is organized in four 
sub-sections. The first sub-section summarizes and compares the findings from the two 
manufacturing sectors studied. The second section does the same for the two agricultural sectors 
investigated. The third section presents the general lessons learned, and the fourth section 
explores public policy issues. 
 
 
1. Summary of Findings: Manufacturing 
 
The two manufacturing industries selected for this investigation present very different profiles 
and trajectories. Strengths and weaknesses can be better understood in light of the following 
comparison, which tries to extract the main issues learned from the two cases. 
 
 
1.1 Relevant Sector Characteristics 
 
A number of observations can be made concerning the discoveries and the diffusion process in 
the two manufacturing industries examined. First, the nature of the industry, or the cluster, and 
its historical development must be taken into consideration. Both industries – the furniture 
industry and the swimwear industry – are fragmented, and both are formed mainly by small and 
medium-sized firms. But similarities end here. While firms in the furniture industry tend to pass 
from one generation to another, leading firms in the swimwear industry are entrepreneurial, 
based on the founder-designer talents, or large textile conglomerates that integrated forward to 
produce swimwear. Because the swimwear industry is a young industry in Brazil, and in designer 
firms the first generation of entrepreneurs is still in command, it is hard to predict whether the 
designer firms will disappear, pass to a next generation, or to new owners.  
 
As to industry organization, the furniture industry tends to be organized in production clusters, 
while the swimwear industry tends to be organized in marketing clusters, typically a large city. 
The spatial organization of the swimwear industry does not show the same type of dense 
agglomeration of the furniture industry, mainly because supply chain requirements are not very 
important. The logic of clustering in the swimwear industry is rather based on the proximity of 
fashion centers, where designers can be close to other designers and to the consumer market. 
This is why the birth of the swimwear industry is associated to the city of Rio de Janeiro, 
specifically to the vicinity of Ipanema beach, in the 1970s, expanding to São Paulo in the 1980s, 
as the latter became a leading fashion center.  
 
The historical development of the clusters in both industries also differs substantially. The 
furniture cluster of São Bento do Sul had its origin in a combination of natural resources (forests) 
and skills of the local labor (the ability to carve wood). The original community lived almost 
completely insulated from other areas of the country for more than a century, in such a way that 
most of the original commerce was within the region. In fact, one of the “innovations” by the 
first mover was exactly selling to other regions in the country. The common Germanic origin and   141
culture, the century-long insulation, and intermarriages combined to generate a very 
homogeneous cluster.  
 
The Rio de Janeiro swimwear cluster, on the other hand, stands as almost a perfect 
counterexample. Competitive advantages of the cluster are associated to design. As to the São 
Paulo cluster, its main advantages derive from the ability to produce in larger scales for private 
label contracts. The expansion of the two clusters came mainly from new entrants, which may 
not have had any previous contact with established firms. Interactions between firms competing 
in the industry were quite unusual, at least until a channel of communication was established by 
means of a calendar of fashion shows, where designers were forced to some sort of interaction.  
 
Firms in the Rio de Janeiro and in the São Paulo swimwear clusters are also more spread 
geographically, within the limits of the city, although the larger brand-name manufacturers tend 
to have stores in the same commercial areas, often in the same area of a shopping center, side by 
side. The most important element to shape the nature of the Rio de Janeiro swimwear cluster is 
the entrepreneurial character of the incumbent firms with their founder-designers, characterized 
by a strong individualistic orientation, while large-scale operations seem to be the main aspect of 
the São Paulo cluster.  
 
But although there is very little cooperation among firms in the swimwear industry, fashion 
shows played a role in defining the boundaries of each regional cluster, and permitting the 
necessary interactions for industry development. They created a climate that encouraged the 
exchange of experiences, creativity, cross-fertilization, and entrepreneurship, which in turn 
stimulated the development of internationally competitive products. At the same time, they 
increased rivalry in an industry characterized by strong individualism. It can be said that 
competition, rather than cooperation, drives the industry. 
 
 
1.2. The Role of First Movers 
 
The role of the first mover and the immediate follower in export development was also 
extremely different in the two industries: while they played an important role in the furniture 
cluster, setting examples, generating spin-offs, and actively influencing other firms to export, in 
the swimwear cluster they remained as benchmarks, or abstract symbols of international market 
opportunities. In the furniture industry, the pioneer accepted the responsibility for the diffusion 
of business innovations, particularly exporting; in the swimwear industry, the first mover and the 
immediate follower not only did not interfere in the diffusion process, but were rather 
antagonistic to it. 
 
Flagship firms – firms leading the cluster – were  of paramount importance to the development 
of the furniture cluster. The two flagship firms had grater influence in different periods of time: 
while one is certainly behind the first and the second wave of adopters of exporting in the cluster, 
the other influenced at least the third wave. Also, both CEOs were respected business leaders in 
the cluster, and they made substantial efforts to engage other firms in exporting, believing this 
was the path to the cluster’s success. Again, the picture extracted from the swimwear industry is 
the opposite. It is difficult to identify flagship firms. The two firms identified as pioneers – first   142
mover and immediate follower – in the swimwear industry had a limited influence over the other 
firms. In fact, almost every firm interviewed in the swimwear industry claims not to have been 
influenced by any other firm, but having influenced other firms. 
 
In both industries, first movers acted on their own, and faced the difficulties and challenges using 
their own ingenuity. For example, to acquire technical knowledge, the first mover in the furniture 
industry had to import books from Germany, a quite difficult process at the time. He also had to 
adapt the information acquired in these books to his own needs, designing his own equipment, 
and training his employees. In the next step, the change to pine wood furniture, again the 
pioneering firm took the initiative to send a family member to acquire technical knowledge in a 
foreign market. Only later other initiatives were taken to improve technical know-how within the 
cluster.  Similarly, the first mover in the swimwear industry traveled to visit foreign buyers 
without having any previous contacts, only with a handful of samples to show. 
 
First movers in neither case were the main beneficiaries of their discoveries. Part of the reason 
seems to be associated to idiosyncratic preferences and external events not related to the 
diffusion process. In the case of the first mover in the furniture cluster, succession problems 
halted its development and the firm lost the lead. In the case of the swimwear industry, the 
entrepreneur was never able to build a professional organization that could take full advantage of 
the industry’s export development. In this case, his organization was too small and too 
entrepreneurial to lead the industry. The fact that this is an industry characterized by designer 
firms does not in itself explain the lack of firm growth, since some of the largest conglomerates 
in the international fashion industry had their origins in one designer.  
 
The growth of the furniture cluster was based on spin-offs, which tended to mimic their mother 
companies products and business strategy. The relationship between the original “mothers” and 
the spin-offs tended to be friendly. Flagship firms were nurturing towards their spin-offs, 
although not willing to stimulate them. In fact, managers’ attitudes towards spin-offs in both 
firms were a combination of acceptance and pride. These factors contributed to build trust and 
foster informal cooperation within the cluster. On the negative side, isomorphic behavior may 
threat the ability of the cluster to adapt to changes in the environment. The danger of mimicking 
behavior when a cluster generates a large amount of endogenous spin-offs, rather than attract 
external entrepreneurs (Ferreira, Tavares, and Hesterly, 2006), clearly appears in the case of the 
furniture cluster, with new firms imitating successful business strategies adopted by flagship 
firms. The positive attitude towards spin-offs and the desire to help other firms in the cluster to 
engage in exporting may be associated to specific characteristics of the furniture cluster, its 
Germanic culture, its insulation, and the fact that the same families have lived in the area for 
generations, creating various types of social links between individuals, such as kinship, 
friendship, church connections, etc. In support to this contention we have the fact that while there 
seems to be a high level of informal cooperation and cohesion within the cluster, formal 
mechanisms of cooperation, such as associations, were said not to be very effective. It should be 
noted however that one of the CEOs had a major role in the diffusion of exporting to other 
furniture clusters. 
 
Spin-offs were quite unusual in the swimwear industry, and when they appeared, the relationship 
between the original firm and the spin-off was antagonistic. Rivalry and jealousies among   143
designers and their firms are the result of a very individualistic environment. Nevertheless, 
certain aspects suggest substantial dynamism. First, there is much more diversity in the 
swimwear clusters than in the furniture cluster. Exporting firms adopt a variety of business 
strategies and search for product differentiation, although very small firms tend to copy styles 
and designs. Second, new entrants tend to come from outside the swimwear industry, bringing 
new experiences and ideas.  
 
 
1.3. The Role of External Actors 
 
Research results confirmed the importance of external actors in both industries in transferring 
know-how and facilitating export initiation and diffusion. In the furniture cluster, external actors 
were foreign buyers working for large international distributors and retailers, and export agents 
who established themselves in the region. Buying agents working for international distributors 
and retailers brought new technologies, materials, production requirements, designs, and 
accessories. Export agents, domestic or foreign-owned, were responsible for broadening market 
opportunities available to the firms in the cluster by identifying new markets and distributors. 
Their impact on the furniture cluster was even more important because firms are production-
oriented, and tend to delegate marketing functions to intermediaries. 
 
In the swimwear industry, foreign buyers carried innovations from one to another firm, 
promoting export product standardization, and the transfer of technical know-how. Aware of the 
opportunities for outsourcing in Brazil, they were responsible for the initiation of many firms in 
exporting. 
 
Positive spillovers came from the action of these external agents. One way was the need to 
comply to more strict product specifications, requiring an upgrade in raw materials used in 
manufacturing the final product. In both industries the whole supply chain was upgraded due to 
these positive spillovers. 
 
 
1.4. The Role of Public Support Institutions 
 
Public support institutions played a subsidiary role in the diffusion process of exporting as a 
business strategy in both industries.  
 
In the furniture cluster, public institutions only interfered in the later stages of the adoption 
process, once the cluster was already intensely involved with exporting, with a large number of 
firms exporting 80 to 100 percent of their output. In fact, the furniture cluster itself generated the 
resources and skills necessary to develop its export activities. Government actions were directed 
more towards transferring the cluster’s experience to other clusters and firms than to support the 
original exporters. 
 
In the swimwear cluster the role of public support institutions was similar. Government actions 
aimed at stimulating smaller firms to export by offering incentives to the formation of export 
consortia, and by supporting their participation in international fairs and exhibitions. It had little   144
impact on the export initiation and development of larger firms in the industry. In fact, 
government actions were directed towards the transfer of experiences from larger established 
firms to new entrants.  
 
 
1.5. Two Models of Diffusion? 
 
The diffusion of exporting as a business strategy in both industries shows remarkable 
differences. In the furniture industry, the process was carried out by respected business and 
community leaders, who accepted this responsibility, and social institutions were in charge of 
promoting diffusion. The cluster can be metaphorically associated to a “constellation”, because 
of its homogeneity. 
 
In the swimwear industry, exporting was initiated by independent “stars”, who did not interfere 
in diffusion, left mainly to external actors, including foreign buyers and government. While the 
diffusion process can be reasonably tracked in the furniture cluster, the paths cannot be clearly 
identified in the swimwear industry, because of its random, erratic nature.  
 
We used the term “the constellation model” to describe our conceptualization of the furniture 
industry, studied under the perspective of the selected cluster. In fact, the cluster studied can be 
seen almost as a unit in itself, and could therefore be studied as such. We have already explored 
the reasons that seemed to shape isomorphic strategic behavior within the cluster, including the 
presence of endogenous spin-offs. As firms in the cluster mimicked each other, their individual 
strategic trajectories became indistinguishable, forming one single strategic group. Despite the 
advantages for the diffusion of innovations, risks for the cluster increased.  
 
As to the swimwear industry, we used the term “the lonely stars model” to describe its dynamics. 
Looking at the industry, one finds no homogeneity in strategic behavior, but four rather 
heterogeneous strategic groups. Cooperation between firms in the industry is almost nonexistent, 
and new entrants seem to come from outside the industry. Firms do not mimick each other, but 
search for singularity. This is a weakness to some extent, since it reduces the flow of information 
and tends to reduce the speed of diffusion of innovations, but diversity increases the chances of 
industry and cluster survival, since there are always new business experiments underway 
 
Table 23 compares the two experiences and summarizes the above discussion. 
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Table 23 
A Comparison of the Two Experiences: Furniture vs Swimwear 
The Furniture Industry 
“The Constellation Model” 
The Swimwear Industry 
“The Lonely Stars Model” 
Industry Organization 
Organized in production clusters 
Integrated supply chain 
Fragmented industry 
Industry Organization 
Organized in marketing clusters 
Independence of supply chains 
Fragmented industry 
Cultural Aspects 
Shared history; geographic insulation 
Cooperation within the cluster; relationships 
More collectivist 
More production-oriented 
Long-lasting family businesses 
Cultural Aspects 
Independent origin; spread geographically 
Rivalry/jealousy among firms/designers 
Strongly individualistic 
More marketing-oriented 
Dependence on a founder-designer 
Diffusion Process 
Led by respected leaders 
Pioneer took responsibility for diffusion 
Social institutions promoted diffusion 
Diffusion process can be tracked 
Diffusion Process 
Started by independent “stars” 
Pioneer did not interfere in diffusion 
External agents and government promoted diffusion 
Diffusion process cannot be clearly tracked 
 
 
2.  Summary of Findings: Agriculture 
 
The two agricultural sectors selected for this study are not as divergent as the two manufacturing 
sectors, but they also had their own distinctive trajectories. 
 
 
2.1 Relevant Sector Characteristics 
 
The two sectors selected for study, soybeans and grapes, have in common the fact that they are 
both export industries, with a significant percentage of its output sold in foreign markets. Yet 
soybeans is the second largest Brazilian export product, with total exports in 2005 of US$ 10 
billion, while the exports of grapes reached only US$107 million in the same year, the equivalent 
of approximately 15% of all fruits exported from Brazil. Soybeans exported from Brazil come 
from a vast territory, with several producing regions in different parts of the country, although 
the largest export crops come from the cerrados region. However, 95% of table grapes exported 
come from a specific region, the Petrolina – Juazeiro region in the São Francisco Basin. 
 
Soybeans cultivation was already successfully carried out in the South of Brazil before the 
expansion to the savannahs. It was already a modern export-oriented sector, using modern 
technology. Therefore, the country already had marketing know-how to export soybeans. In 
contrast, grapes cultivation occurred in the South of Brazil, but typically grapes were not 
exported, possibly because of a lack of country competitive advantage, and the fact that the 
domestic market could absorb the production. One important producing area was the Vale dos 
Vinhedos, in Rio Grande do Sul, up to that point the best land to produce grapes for the 
production of wine in the country. There was almost no tradition of exporting grapes in Brazil,   146
except in very specific cases. The first mover in the grapes case was one of the very few firms 
with a history of successfully exporting grapes and other fresh fruits. 
 
The origins of these new growing areas (in the savannahs and in the semi-arid) is also very 
different. Soybeans farms in the cerrados were established by individual settlers in search of less 
expensive land. Grapes production in the São Francisco Valley was the result of investments of 
existing firms from the Southeast and South of the country in response to government incentives.  
 
Both growing areas were new, since their occupation and effective economic exploration only 
started in the 1970s, thanks to development policies implemented by the federal government 
Both regions – the savannahs and the semi-arid in the São Francisco Valley – had low or 
irregular levels of rainfall and low fertility, requiring substantial investments in irrigation and 
fertilizers, and the development of varieties adapted to the local soil and humidity conditions. 
 
In the case of soybean growers, most of them had previous experience with this culture in their 
original state, while most firms that entered the new cultivation area of Petrolina – Juazeiro, with 
the exception of the first mover – did not have previous experience with this agricultural product, 
or in some cases, with agriculture at all. 
 
 
2.2. The Role of First Movers 
 
First movers had almost opposite characteristics in the two agricultural sectors. 
 
In the case of soybeans, first movers were individual settlers, sometimes whole families, who 
moved from the state of Rio Grande do Sul to the state of Mato Grosso and surroundings, 
starting in the 1970s. There were both small and larger farmers that moved to the cerrado. There 
was not one individual that can be singled out, or at least there are no written records or 
testimonies of such.  
 
Also, the gauchos had a tradition of migrating to other parts of the country. This internal 
migration can be seen as a continuous wave of settlers to that region, in search of cheaper land 
and opportunities. To some extent, the cerrado region was a sort of agricultural Eldorado, 
attracting people from all ages, to try a new life in a different environment. Word-of-mouth and 
personal connections permitted the continuity of the migration process. Once the news that the 
land was good, and that soybeans could be cultivated and exported arrived to the original 
municipalities from where these settlers came from, relatives, friends, and neighbors followed, 
preferably buying new land close to the first ones to migrate, reestablishing the original kin and 
vicinity ties in the new land. They actually transplanted to a large extent their original social 
environment to the new physical environment in the savannahs. 
 
A totally different picture appears in the case of grapes cultivation in the São Francisco Valley. 
This time earlier growers were firms from the Southeast and South of the country attracted 
mainly by incentives offered by the government, mainly under the form of large irrigation 
projects and subsidized water costs. There was in fact one firm in this case that was identified as 
the first mover. This firm was a giant cooperative organization with headquarters in São Paulo,   147
searching for land in the semi-arid to plant grapes. The first mover played an extremely 
important role in the irrigated project of Petrolina – Juazeiro, mainly because it was the only firm 
with technical and marketing know-how that could be useful in the project. Also, the first mover 
was willing to share its know-how with other firms in the region, forming a very successful joint 
export cooperative group. The reasons why the first mover was so ready to cooperate derive from 
a previous failure with another crop in the region attributed to lack of cooperation among 
growers, and to its own nature as a cooperative. In fact, the concept of cooperativism includes 
the idea of sharing and of joint action. 
 
First movers in each case had very different characteristics. The early gauchos who migrated to 
the savannahs were experienced farmers, and updated in terms of the technology used in modern 
agriculture. They were said to be adventurous and entrepreneurial, motivated by the desire to buy 
new land and profit from export crops. The first firms to move to the semi-arid region of the São 
Francisco Valley were large and medium-sized, and they brought capital to the new irrigation 
project in the area, but in general had no experience with the cultivation of fresh fruits to export, 
except the first mover. They were motivated by the classic capitalist desire of making profits 
from this new activity. In both cases government actions were of extraordinary importance to 
make these two areas attractive to newcomers.  
 
Difficulties faced by first movers were in both cases dominantly technical, including the need to 
learn soil management techniques, and the need to develop new varieties adapted to the region. 
These obstacles were not insurmountable. In the case of soybeans, two factors helped: the 
increased international price of the commodity permitted to accept the risks of experimentation, 
and the support of the Brazilian federal agricultural research agency. In the case of grapes, the 
first mover was responsible for most of the required adaptations. 
 
As far as it is possible to determine, the first gauchos that moved to the cerrados succeeded, and 
the best evidence available is the word-of-mouth that attracted followers to the region. Yet the 
lack of specific information (e.g. family or farm names) does not permit to confirm this 
supposition. In the case of grapes, the first mover, Cotia, failed for reasons other than this 
initiative, but its members reorganized in a smaller cooperative representing the growers of 
Petrolina – Juazeiro. While it existed, the cooperative did collect the positive results of its efforts 
in the region through its local members. After its extinction, the new cooperative continued to 
generate profits and to take advantage of this successful economic experiment. 
 
 
2.3. The Role of External Actors 
 
Contrary to the experience of the two manufacturing sectors previously examined, external 
actors had very little importance either in the discoveries or in the diffusion process in the two 
agricultural sectors.  
 
Nevertheless, there were a few exceptions in the soybeans case. The soybean processing industry 
played an important role in the 1990s. As this industry consolidated and multinational companies 
bought a number of local firms, these multinationals were financing more than two-thirds of   148
soybeans production in the state of Mato Grosso. International trading companies also played a 
role in the commercialization of Brazilian soy. 
 
 
2.4. The Role of Public Support Institutions 
 
Once again in contrast with the evidence collected for the two manufacturing cases, the two 
agricultural cases are examples of very successful interventions by government agencies.  
 
In the soybeans sector, the process started with a vision, shared by various high officials during 
the military government, of the strategic role of agriculture in the country’s development, and the 
need to expand the agricultural frontier. A natural consequence was to envisage the expansion of 
soybeans cultivation to the savannahs region of the cerrados. Investments aimed at creating a 
modern agricultural sector, with state-of-the-art technology. First, heavy investments were made 
in the development of agricultural technology to explore the cerrados, and in rural extension 
services to support diffusion. Incentives were offered to attract settlers and to stimulate 
production and exports. Furthermore, investments were made in the transportation infrastructure, 
and the government made available subsidized credit and insurance to growers. Finally, a 
program for the modernization of agricultural equipment permitted a substantial increase in 
productivity. These investments led to the emergence of a huge industrial complex associated to 
the industrialization of soybeans, expanded the supply chain for the whole soybean agricultural 
and industrial complex, and stimulated the development of a number of related industries.  
 
In the grapes case, the most important government actions included investments in infrastructure, 
especially in irrigation, and subsidized water cost for an extended period of time. In addition, the 
government development agency in charge of the project used a very effective strategy to attract 
and select candidates to participate in the project. The firms selected brought capital and 
management know-how. One of the firms, identified as the first mover, also brought the 
technical and marketing know-how necessary to export fresh fruits. The development agency 
also planned the transfer of know-how from the newcomers to the local farmers, by mixing their 
lots in the region. Finally, the agency supported and stimulated cooperative efforts among 
growers. 
 
One aspect that should be pointed out is that in both cases government did not protect weak 
players in either sector. In the grapes case, firms that did not comply with the norms received 
penalties or were excluded. In the soybeans case, at a given point in time government support 
was drastically reduced, with firms having to take responsibility for their own future. This type 
of government actions permitted to develop two sectors that remained extremely competitive, 
even after government support was reduced or eliminated. 
 
 
2.5. Two Models of Diffusion? 
 
Again, in the two cases of agricultural products, we are faced with two models of diffusion, both 
from the perspective of the types of actors, their specific actions, and the consequences of 
diffusion.   149
 
In the soybeans sector, diffusion occurred mainly thanks to word-of-mouth carried by large 
personal networks that linked the gauchos in the cerrado to their original settlements in Rio 
Grande do Sul. This search for a modern Eldorado, as we put it previously, resulted in a 
continuous migration, in which successive waves of migrants settled in the cerrado, often close 
to a network of friends and relatives that had already moved to the area. Diffusion was 
extraordinarily helped by the first settlers, who transferred to the newcomers their successful 
experiences. Diffusion was also promoted by the Brazilian government, formally using the rural 
extension services agency. Finally, cooperatives of producers were created to facilitate 
production and exporting, which also played an important role in diffusion.  
 
The cultivation of grapes in the semi-arid of the São Francisco Valley was a totally different 
experience. First, as already stressed in previous sections of this report, it attracted already 
established large and medium-sized firms from the South and Southeast of the country, which 
brought capital and management know-how. Second, among these firms, one was the first 
mover, and couldn’t have been better selected by the government development agency in charge 
of the irrigation project in the area. It was the one firm in Brazil at that point that had the capital, 
the resources, the technical know-how, and the specific export marketing experience that was 
needed to make the project successful. Third, the development agency was particularly careful in 
mixing the planted areas that were distributed to local settlers with the larger areas allocated to 
the firms, in order to facilitate the transfer of know-how, a practice that is considered by experts 
in agricultural development as a key factor in the success of diffusion. Moreover, the benefits of 
this successful economic experiment were extended to the local population, which profited from 
a general improvement in income, education, and social status. 
 
The extent of the cerrado experience of diffusion, however, is not comparable to the experience 
in the semi-arid: it was much broader, involved many more settlers, generated an extraordinary 
amount of positive spillovers for the country, and definitely changed the face of one of the last 
agricultural frontiers, from previously sterile, unproductive land into one of the most competitive 
and technologically-advanced agricultural areas in the world. 
 
On the other side, although the grapes experiment in the semi-arid was extremely successful, 
economic development was encapsulated in a small area, and did not really change the economic 
and social landscape of the broader region. The extent of spillovers was also quite limited. This 
is why we called this model “an island of prosperity” in an environment that remained essentially 
poor, although other successful experiences existed in the São Francisco Valley, such as the 
cultivation and exportation of mangos, and the cultivation of grapes for the production of 
sparkling wine.  
 
Table 24 summarizes this discussion. 
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Table 24 
A Comparison of the Two Experiences: Soybeans vs Grapes 
The Soybeans Sector 
“The New El Dorado” 
The Grapes Sector 
“An Island of Prosperity” 
Sector Organization 




Small and large farms 
Technology varies substantially in the industry 
Typically domestically-oriented 
Cultural Aspects in the Savannahs 
Gaúchos migration 
Informal cooperation among settlers 
Cooperativism 
Cultural Aspects in the Semi-Arid 
Firms from the Southeast and South 
Formal cooperation among firms 
Cooperativism 
Diffusion Process 
No individuals or firms were identified as first 
movers 
Government promoted discovery and diffusion 
Word-of-mouth promoted diffusion 
Pioneers cooperated for diffusion 
Diffusion process cannot be tracked 
Diffusion transformed the region 
Diffusion Process 
Led by a large and competent first mover 
Pioneer took responsibility for diffusion 
Government supported diffusion 
Diffusion process can be clearly tracked 
Changes were encapsulated. 
 
 
3. General Conclusions and Lessons Extracted from the Study 
 
This study’s results provided valuable insights that could hardly be obtained if the sectors 
selected were more similar. Differences help to understand the specificities of each sector, as 




3.1. Barriers to Discovery 
 
The examination of the four cases selected for this study suggests that the main barriers to 
discovery came either from the lack of marketing knowledge or technical knowledge, although 
technical difficulties seemed to be a much more important barrier in three of the four cases 
examined. 
 
Three of the cases studied showed technical difficulties coming from the need to adapt to certain 
conditions in the natural environment: either to learn how to manage pine wood forests in Brazil, 
or to develop new varieties of plants to fit different soil and humidity conditions in the savannahs 
or in the semi-arid. In the case of the furniture industry, there was also a need to acquire the 
technical know-how to produce a high-quality product. These technical barriers were by no 
means insurmountable, but first movers typically did not have the resources to solve these 
technical problems, except in the case of grapes.   151
Marketing challenges only characterized one case, in which the first mover was a small 




3.2. Facilitators and Obstacles to the Diffusion Process  
 
The study permitted to identify a number of factors that influenced the diffusion process, either 
by accelerating or reducing its speed: 
 
•  Cultural aspects seem to play an important role in the diffusion process. A more 
cooperative culture (furniture, grapes, soybeans) seems to facilitate diffusion, in 
opposition to a more individualist culture (swimwear). 
 
•  The presence of flagship firms seems to facilitate diffusion (furniture, grapes). Flagship 
firms tend to actively promote diffusion among the cluster, the industry, or the region. By 
contrast, weak flagship firms (swimwear) could be associated to a longer, more complex, 
or erratic diffusion process. 
 
•  Spin-offs seem to facilitate diffusion when parent companies see the spin-off as 
acceptable or legitimate (furniture), but to generate more “noise” when parent companies 
see them as negative outcomes (swimwear). 
 
•  Social ties between individuals can be a major factor in facilitating the diffusion process 
(furniture, soybeans). Social ties originate from kinship, intermarriages, vicinity, church, 
or previous employment relationships. 
 
•  Isomorphic strategic behavior (imitation of first movers’ strategies) can be interpreted as 
the result of a successful diffusion process (furniture, grapes); but it can also be seen as 
increasing the risk of failure for the cluster or the industry. By contrast, divergent 
strategic behavior (swimwear) may indicate erratic or uncoordinated diffusion, but it may 
bring dynamism and innovation to the industry, at the same time it reduces the risk of 
industry failure. 
 
•  Foreign buyers and export agents can play an important role in the diffusion of technical 
and export marketing know-how (furniture, swimwear), but they typically only play this 
role in later phases of the diffusion process. 
 
•  Research institutes may play an important role in helping to overcome technological 
challenges, facilitating diffusion (soybeans). 
 
•  Channels of communication, formal or informal, have to be established to facilitate the 
diffusion process. Formal channels of communication included structured joint marketing 
activities (fashion shows in the swimwear industry), joint export marketing organizations 
(grapes), other types of producers’ associations, government advertising and publicity, 
etc. Informal channels included personal networks of friends and relatives, generalized 
word-of-mouth, and the action of export agents and foreign buyers.   152
3.3. The Importance of Spillovers and Market Failures 
 
Positive spillovers were identified in all the cases studied. The two types of spillovers referred to 
in the literature occurred: horizontal (intra-industry) and vertical (in the supply chain). There 
were also spillovers to other industries. Positive spillovers were more effectively absorbed in 
those industries in which a higher level of horizontal or vertical cooperation existed among 
firms. The dominant type of cooperation, however, could be either less formal (furniture, 
soybeans), or more formal (grapes, soybeans). 
 
Spillovers were very large in the case of soybeans. As detailed in earlier parts of this paper, 
spillovers included the emergence of a whole industrial complex for the processing of soybeans, 
the emergence of related industries to which soy was a major input, and the expansion and 
development of all kinds of firms in the supply chain. The expansion of the soybeans to the 
savannahs was also responsible for the appearance of a number of cities and towns of various 
sizes, and industrial districts.  
 
Market failures were an important learning mechanism in at least one of the cases studied. The 
most outstanding experience came from producers in the Petrolina – Juazeiro region. Their first 
experience of growing tomatoes failed because of the unexpected competition of imported 
tomato products, which benefited from the trade liberalization in the early 1990s. The following 
crop was melon, and this one failed because of a lack of coordination among producers, which 
caused international prices to fall below cost. Growers learned from these experiences, and this 
experiential learning showed them that a joint effort was necessary to succeed. This attitude 
permitted not only to form a very successful export group, but also allowed the establishment of 
unusual cooperative relationships between firms and local farmers, and firms and local 
employees. Another example is the end of the colonial-style furniture boom in the domestic 
market, and its impact on the furniture cluster studied. This change in consumer preferences 
forced companies to move to pine wood furniture, accelerating the adoption and diffusion of its 
production and exportation. Also, changes in supply caused by the failure of other world crops in 




3.4. Institutional Responses  
 
Institutional actions sometimes anticipated innovators’ needs, and other times were a response to 
the active search of solutions by innovators. Some of these actions were extremely positive, 
while others had negative effects. We shall first refer to the successful government interventions 
in the two agricultural sectors; then we will focus the less ambitious but still successful 
intervention in the furniture sector; and finally we will discuss the less efficient government 
interventions in the swimwear sector 
 
The expansion of soybeans cultivation to the cerrado region is an outstanding example of 
successful government intervention. In this case, government tended to respond to first movers 
demands, although certain actions were taken in anticipation, such as the creation of certain 
incentives to attract settlers to the region. The original settlers were aware of the possibility of   153
developing new varieties that could adapt to local climatic conditions, and actively put pressure 
on universities and research institutes that were working on these issues to solve their technical 
difficulties. The creation of the federal agricultural research agency was to some extent a vision 
shared by certain high officials, but also responded to the demand for technological solutions. 
Even before the agency was sufficiently organized to generate its own solutions, it compiled the 
results of research efforts that had already been made by several other research organizations, 
and made them available to innovators. It permitted these pioneers to take advantage of already 
existing knowledge. Later on this agency was responsible for a large number of agricultural 
developments that helped the sector to increase its productivity and attain superior levels of 
product quality. 
 
In the case of grapes cultivation, however, the development agency in charge of the irrigation 
project in the semi-arid region carefully planned its actions in anticipation of newcomers’ needs, 
by developing the irrigation infrastructure and a detailed plan to attract investors from the more 
developed regions of the country. It also reacted – typically in a fast and effective way – to 
specific needs of the firms, as the project evolved. 
 
In both cases these interventions were heavy and directed towards: (i) removing the barriers that 
were faced or could be faced by innovators, in the areas of infrastructure and research and 
development; (ii) protecting innovators against initial failures; (iii) increasing innovators’ payoff; 
and (iv) stimulating diffusion.  
 
In the case of soybeans, there were no entry barriers, probably because of the very large 
availability of land in the cerrado region. Settlers moved to the region and acquired their land. In 
the grapes case, because of limitations in the amount of irrigated land available for the specific 
project, the development agency in charge had certain selection criteria, and chose the firms that 
would be involved with the specific economic experiment. 
 
In addition, government intervention was not directed towards protecting inefficient firms in the 
longer term. In both cases government intervention was substantially reduced, permitting these 
sectors to become fully competitive. 
 
Government intervention in the furniture industry was limited to the later steps of the adoption 
process. In this case, the federal government acted in conjunction with the industry association to 
subsidize certain marketing activities, such as design, participation in trade fairs and exhibitions, 
etc. Although the amounts involved were more limited, the fact that the government did not 
directly intervene, but used industry representatives to allocate the money among firms 
guaranteed, to some extent, that these subsidies had a broader reach and were more effectively 
used, without undesirable consequences, such as the ones now seen in the swimwear industry. 
 
Government actions in the swimwear industry aimed at stimulating micro and small-sized firms 
to join export consortia. These efforts have had limited success, since the amount presently 
exported by these consortia is considered insignificant. Moreover, these smaller manufacturers 
are to large extent copycats that do not have their own design, but copy models and styles 
developed by successful designer firms to export at lower prices. Their quality is considered 
below international standards, damaging the image of Brazilian swimwear products abroad. This   154
is a clear example of how ineffective government actions can: (i) promote early entry, restricting 
the benefits that can be obtained by legitimate firms; (ii) increase the social cost of intervention, 
by stimulating copycats (Hausmann and Rodrik, 2003); (iii) threatening the continuity of exports, 
by damaging the “Made in Brazil” image. It should be noted that the “Made in Brazil” image of 
swimwear products – a result of decades of fortuitous events and private actions – is the main 




4. Public Policy Issues 
 
The literature is full of examples of how government intervention can have positive and negative 
impact on economic development. Interventions need to be extremely careful in order to produce 
the desired effects, since often unexpected results confront policymakers’ choices. Part of the 
reason is that economics is not an exact science – economic agents may react in directions that 
are unpredictable – and externalities may play a role in shaping future outcomes. Nevertheless, 
despite certain unpredictability of the outcomes of a given government intervention, learning 
from other experiences can be a useful way to improve public policies. Specifically, the study of 
how government actions impacted on high-growth episodes may help positive policy 
interventions in the future. 
 
Public policymakers can benefit from some of the lessons extracted from the study of these four 
cases of success. We believe that the lessons learned are not limited to the cases studied, and that 
they can be useful to policymakers in other emerging countries. Yet caution is necessary in using 
these results; each situation needs to be carefully studied before applying any mechanisms of 
public intervention. 
 
The following discussion will look specifically at four issues: (i) attraction and selection of 
firms; (ii) type of support; (iii) penalties to failure; (iv) length of intervention. Practical 
considerations are also emphasized.  
 
 
Attraction and Selection of Firms 
 
One of the most important issues in government interventions aimed at nurturing a sector seems 
to be the ability to attract and support the “right” kind of firms. The evidence available from this 
project suggests that this might be one of the most relevant issues to be previously dealt with in 
an economic development project. 
The selection process can be more difficult when all firms are very small, and there are no 
indications of which firms (or individual entrepreneurs) are better prospects for government 
intervention. In this case, the only solution seems to be to make resources available to all firms 
(or individual entrepreneurs) in a sector, and carefully monitor the use of these resources, by 
establishing intermediary goals that have to be achieved in terms of results. The emergence of 
leading firms also should be carefully monitored, to take advantage of their potential as leaders 
of the specific business community. It should be noted that innovating firms do not always 
become flagship firms, since the latter have to show the ability to lead other firms or   155
entrepreneurs into the specific business adventure, and facilitate the diffusion of the economic 
experiment. 
 
Another situation can be when there are no firms or entrepreneurs already engaged in the specific 
sector or project, and it is necessary to attract them. In this case, development agencies should 
have strict criteria for the profile of flagship firms – firms that could lead the development 
project
46. This means that the main difficulties to be faced by the newcomers should be 
previously identified by development agencies. The selection of firms should then include those 
that bring with them the technical or marketing know-how that could be helpful in overcoming 
the specific initial barriers to the “discovery”. The case of grapes cultivation in the semi-arid of 
Brazil clearly shows the importance of these preconditions in the success of the project. 
 
When the discovery and the diffusion process is already underway, a question is whether the 
government should or should not interfere to support further diffusion. If the government 
chooses for one reason or another to interfere, it seems that a wise decision is to delegate the 
selection of beneficiaries of public support to the industry. This was successfully done in the case 
of the furniture industry, where the industry association became the sole entry to submit 
applications to the government export promotion program. By doing this government agencies 
avoid the danger of selecting copycats or inefficient firms, as well as of reducing the payoffs to 
innovators (Hausmann and Rodrik, 2003). One word of caution: it is necessary that the 
association or organization chosen to be the channel for incumbent firms to apply to government 
funds represents the relevant segments of the industry.  
 
Another solution when the discoveries and the diffusion process are underway is to support those 
firms that are already successful. In this case the selection process is easy, and firms are 
rewarded for their earlier accomplishments with further support. In the swimwear case, support 
to laggards – typically smaller, inefficient firms – may threaten previous industry 
accomplishments in international markets. 
 
It is often the case that government agencies do not have people with the training and experience 
necessary to make effective firm selection of the kind suggested here. There are however 
consulting firms in the private sector that are experienced in understanding the specific business 
capabilities required for business success in a new project, and could identify targeted prospects 
to receive government incentives or subsidies. More cooperation between government agencies 
and these consulting firms could thus lead to better selection processes. 
 
 
Type of Support 
 
The type of support to be offered by government agencies varies according to the stage in the 
discovery and diffusion process. Government intervention in the cases examined typically aimed 
at: 
 
                                                 
46 We extend here the use of the term flagship firm to the situation of a development project. We believe that geographical clustering helps the 
emergence of flagship firms, but it is not impossible to have them when this condition is not present.   156
•  removing entry barriers; 
 
•  protecting innovators against initial failures;  
 
•  increasing innovators’ payoff;  
 
•  stimulating communication and the transfer of know-how; 
 
•  subsidizing international marketing activities; 
 
•  stimulating laggards 
 
When investing in a new project, government intervention should be directed towards removing 
relevant entry barriers to innovating firms. This was successfully done in the two agricultural 
cases examined, as government invested in infrastructure and R&D to permit the development of 
new agricultural areas in the cerrados and in the semi-arid region of Brazil. Additional incentives 
could be directed to protect innovators against initial failures and increasing their payoff. 
 
A much more difficult task for public policymakers is related to mechanisms to stimulate the 
right kind of diffusion of a new economic experiment, in which innovating firms are already 
engaged. The dangers of inefficient and even predatory intervention are huge. One way of 
dealing with the problem is by delegating to the industry itself the implementation of diffusion 
mechanisms, guaranteeing transparency and fairness, and controlling results. 
 
This support should be directed to those areas in which more difficulties are faced by incumbent 
firms, either technical or marketing difficulties. In both manufacturing cases at this point, it 
seems that marketing difficulties are more important obstacles to further export development 
than technical difficulties.  
 
Technical support could be given by investing in the upgrading of existing technical schools, or 
creating new ones. In the manufacturing sector, issues such as design and packaging are 
extremely important for successful exporting. Testing laboratories could also be needed and 
could be developed as a joint effort of leading firms in the industry.  These types of incentives 
tend to have a broad long-term impact on the industry and have the advantage of not protecting 
inefficient firms. 
Marketing support for export activities could come under the form of marketing research, 
warehousing, and showroom facilities in foreign markets, marketing campaigns, organization of 
trade fairs, etc. It is advisable that foreign marketing research agencies are hired to develop the 
specific studies, under the general coordination of a Brazilian team composed by industry 
members and marketing experts. Government could also finance joint warehousing, commercial, 
and showroom facilities in a few key international locations (such as Miami, New York, Los 
Angeles, London etc.), that could be leased, rented, or simply used by exporters. Again, these 
types of incentives do help to remove serious obstacles faced by exporters, but they have the 
advantage of supporting firms that are more capable. 
   157
Another issue is whether government interventions aimed at expanding the scope of the diffusion 
process should be directed towards late movers, or laggards, by subsidizing their earlier efforts. 
Our research points out to a negative answer to this question. Yet since this is based in one 
industry case, it is clear that further research is necessary to support our contention. 
 
 
Penalties to Failure and Length of Intervention 
 
A very interesting policy that has not been frequently used by the Brazilian government refers to 
penalties to those firms that receive public support and fail to achieve the previously established 
goals. This type of discipline was historically used in South Korea and produced in general good 
results. In one of the cases examined, penalties were applied to failing firms, and this is believed 
to have generated a stronger group of firms leading the recent growth of table grapes exportation.  
 
In the soybeans sector, market discipline was imposed by the early 1990s economic 
liberalization, which substantially reduced government intervention, thus permitting the final 
consolidation of a very healthy and competitive agricultural and industrial complex. These 
research findings support Hausmann and Rodrik’s (2003) contention that the lack of discipline is 
behind the limited success of many government interventions in Latin America. 
 
A final issue has to do with the negative impact of the State on the competitiveness of Brazilian 
firms. Among those, managers interviewed pointed out to exchange rate policies, high level of 
taxation, bureaucratic impediments, lack of transportation infrastructure, bottlenecks in ports and 
airports services, and incompetence and bureaucracy in customs. In fact, many managers agreed 
that the productive sector would strongly benefit if policymakers draw their attention to the 
removal of these obstacles to the expansion of export activities, rather than to further government 
interference.   158
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